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ABSTRACT 
 
It is a general assumption in psychology that past social relationships and experiences influence present 
social behaviour. With attachment theory and current social-cognitive theory as conceptual basis, the 
present study focused on the association between past experiences with significant others and the current 
processing of interpersonal information. By means of a 2x3x4 experimental design the study investigated 
the influence of chronic accessibility and subliminal priming (of significant other representations) on the 
accuracy and speed of processing scripted interpersonal information. One hundred and thirty seven 
university students took part in two sessions no more than two weeks apart. In session one they 
completed the Attachment Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Feeny, Noller & Hanrahan, 1994), and provided the 
names of positive and negative significant others. According to a median split of the Confidence Scale of 
the ASQ, they were assigned to a chronic positive or a chronic negative group, assuming that the 
information based on predominantly positive or negative experiences with positive or negative significant 
others will be chronically more accessible. In session two, in an individual computer task, they were 
subliminally primed (33 ms) with a control word or the name of the positive or negative significant other to 
increase the accessibility of the appropriate memory structures. They were then asked to read a positive, 
negative, mixed or ambiguous script of an interpersonal event and complete a memory test of 36 
interpersonal statements (nine positive, nine negative, nine ambiguous and nine filler statements). The 
accuracy and response time for every statement was recorded, and the response times of accurate 
responses for positive and negative scripts were included in the main analysis. Separate univariate 
analyses of the differences between positive and negative priming per polarity of chronic group and script 
supported the priming hypothesis. The average response time of the chronic negative group was fastest 
when they received a negative prime (p = .039), and the positive group was fastest when they received a 
positive prime (p = .000). The results of a two-way analysis of variance for chronic group and script 
showed a highly significant interaction effect between chronic group and script (p = .000). When the 
primes were congruent to the scripts, the chronic groups were significantly faster in recognising 
statements from a congruent script. The results supported the conjunctive model of priming. The 
implications of these findings for the understanding of the cognitive structures and processes involved in 
processing interpersonal information are discussed, with specific reference to relational schemas and 
attachment working models. Possible directions for future research as well as the application of the results 
are also described. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Dit is ‘n algemene aanname in die sielkunde dat sosiale verhoudinge en ervarings uit die verlede ‘n 
invloed het op huidige sosiale gedrag. Vanuit die bindingsteorie en die huidige sosiaal-kognitiewe teorie 
as konseptuele uitgangspunt, fokus die huidige studie op die assosiasie tussen ervaringe met 
betekenisvolle persone in die verlede en die huidige prosessering van interpersoonlike inligting. Met 
behulp van ‘n 2x3x4 eksperimentele ontwerp is ondersoek ingestel na die invloed van chroniese 
toeganklikheid en subliminale opwekking (van geheuevoorstellings van betekenisvolle ander) op die 
akkuraatheid en spoed waarmee interpersoonlike tekste verwerk word. Eenhonderd-sewe-en-dertig 
universiteitstudente het deelgeneem aan twee sessies wat nie meer as twee weke na mekaar plaasgevind 
het nie. Tydens sessie een het die deelnemers die Attachment Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Feeny, Noller & 
Hanrahan, 1994) voltooi en die name van positiewe en negatiewe betekenisvolle persone voorsien. Op 
grond van die mediaan-verdeling van die Selfvertroue Skaal van die ASQ is die deelnemers toegewys aan 
’n chronies positiewe of chronies negatiewe groep, met die veronderstelling dat inligting gebaseer op 
oorwegend positiewe of negatiewe ervarings met positiewe of negatiewe betekenisvolle ander deurlopend 
meer toegankilk sal wees. Tydens sessie twee, wat ’n individuele rekenaartaak behels het, is ’n 
subliminale stimulus (33 ms) van ’n kontrole-woord, of die naam van ’n positiewe of negatiewe 
betekenisvolle ander aan hulle aangebied om die toeganklikheid van die toepaslike geheue-strukture 
verder te verhoog. Daarna is hulle versoek om ‘n positiewe, negatiewe, gemengde of dubbelsinnige teks 
van ’n interpersoonlike gebeurtenis te lees en ’n geheuetoets van 36 stellings te voltooi wat bestaan het 
uit nege positiewe, nege negatiewe, nege dubbelsinnige en nege neutrale stellings. Die akkuraatheid en 
reaksiespoed van elke stelling is gemeet en die reaksietyd van die akkurate response op stellings uit 
positiewe en negatiewe tekste is in die primêre ontleding ingesluit. Die resultate van onafhanklike 
eenveranderlike ontledings van die verskille tussen positiewe en negatiewe opwekking per polariteit van 
chroniese groep en teks, het die hipotese van opwekking ondersteun. Die gemiddelde responstyd van die 
chroniese negatiewe groep was die vinnigste wanneer hulle die negatiewe stimulus ontvang het (p = .039) 
en die van die positiewe groep was die vinnigste wanneer hulle die positiewe stimulus ontvang het (p = 
.000). Die resultate van ’n tweerigting variansieontleding van chroniese groep en teks het ‘n beduidende 
interaksie tussen chroniese groep en teks aangedui (p = .000). Wanneer die opwekkingstimuli kongruent 
met die tekste was, was die chroniese groepe betekenisvol vinniger in die herkenning van stellings van 
die kongruente teks. Die resultate ondersteun ’n konjunktiewe model van opwekking. Die implikasies van 
die bevindinge vir die verstaan van die kognitiewe strukture en prosesse betrokke by die verwerking van 
interpersoonlike inligting word bespreek, met spesifieke verwysing na verhoudingskemas en die 
gebruiksmodelle in bindingsteorie. Riglyne vir toekomstige navorsing op die gebied word verskaf, en die 
implikasies vir die praktiese toepassing van die resultate word bespreek. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
“One of the fundamental propositions of modern psychology has been that a primary 
determinant of how people understand and interpret new stimuli is past knowledge” 
(Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991; p. 169). 
This phenomenon can indeed be observed in everyday social interaction. The 
features or the behaviour of a newly encountered person may remind one of another 
person, relationship or interpersonal experience from the past. Such reminders, and 
the associated expectations, emotions and even behavioural responses are not only 
based on past experiences, but also influence the present experience.  
Stated in terms of social-cognitive theory, personal histories of social relationships 
and experiences are associated with unique sets of memories, beliefs and 
expectations that guide (a) how people construe their social world and (b) how they 
interact with others (Collins & Read, 1994). People will reconstruct past experiences 
in the present and even respond to the present situation in terms of this 
reconstruction.  
In the next section, a brief historical review of this broad theme is presented, followed 
by an outline of the objectives of the present study. 
1.2 Historical review 
It has been a general assumption in psychology for many decades that present social 
behaviour and social relationships are profoundly influenced by past interpersonal 
relationships and experiences (see Baldwin, 1992; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; 
Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Feeney & Noller, 1990; Freud, 1958/1912; Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Horowitz, 1991; Kelly, 
1955; Kiesler, 1996; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990; Safran & Segal, 1990; 
Sullivan, 1953). 
1.2.1 Psychoanalysis and object relations theory 
In terms of the classical Freudian approach, the concept of transference involves the 
process by which a client in psychotherapy superimposes childhood fantasies and 
conflicts, based on unconscious psychosexual conflicts with a past significant other, 
onto the therapist (Freud, 1958/1912). Various developmental psychoanalytic and 
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object relations theorists expanded the concept of object relations, initially developed 
by Freud. Object relations theory is concerned with the content and organisation of 
mental representations of significant others (Diamond & Blatt, 1994; Westen, 1991). 
Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962) postulated that interpersonal experience lays the 
foundation for an internal representational world constructed from self- and object 
representations. This representational world acts as a cognitive map to navigate 
through different relationships.  
Kernberg (1976) described an internalised object relation as including three parts: (a) 
an image of the other person, (b) an image of the self in interaction with the person, 
and (c) a feeling influencing both the self-image and the other image, derived from 
whatever motive or wish is relevant to the interaction. Securely attached young adults 
described their parents in a more differentiated, elaborated, and integrated manner 
than insecurely attached young adults did. Dismissing avoidant young adults tended 
to describe their parents in less differentiated terms, whereas preoccupied young 
adults provided portrayals that were more ambivalent (Levy, Blatt & Shaver cited in 
Reis & Patrick, 1996).  
1.2.2 Attachment theory 
Although Bowlby (1969), who originated attachment theory, focused extensively on 
parent-child relations in infancy and childhood, he also believed that people’s 
childhood experiences influence their adult personalities and relationships. 
Attachment theory provides a rich theoretical framework to conceptualise the 
influence of past relationship experiences on current relationship beliefs, emotions 
and behaviour, and will be discussed more comprehensively in Chapter 2. 
1.2.3 Interpersonal theory 
Sullivan (1953) also insisted that human behaviour could only be understood in 
relation to its historical and current interpersonal contexts. He hypothesised that 
social behaviour is largely motivated by the desire to be securely related to significant 
others and assumed that children form personifications of themselves and significant 
others, based on early relationships with significant others. Dynamisms link the 
personifications of self and others according to typical relational patterns. The self-
system, a secondary dynamism, develops as a product of interpersonal experience. 
In this model, transference is termed “parataxic distortion” or “parataxis”, and involves 
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the use of such idiosyncratic personifications and dynamisms. The new person is 
experienced in terms of the significant other, and the interpersonal patterns learned 
with the significant other are experienced in the new relationship. 
In current interpersonal theory a central position is accorded to a construct of self that 
is interpersonal and transactional in its development and functioning throughout life 
(Kiesler, 1996). Interpersonal theory incorporates an interactionist position in which a 
person’s behaviours are the products of both predispositions toward transactions, as 
well as situational-environmental events. The environmental events is dominated by 
the way the person perceives it (the psychological environment) and the most 
important class of situations is that of other persons, especially significant others. 
Increasingly more emphasis is placed on the cognitive events that are central to 
human interactions (Kiesler, 1996). The interpersonal framework does not focus on 
the study of the behaviour of an individual in a particular social situation, but rather 
on the behaviour of persons relating to and interacting in a system with other 
persons.  
Interpersonal behaviour encompasses not merely overt, observable transactions 
between two individuals; it refers also to the private, unobservable, symbolic 
(fantasised) interactions and dialogues between self and other. The study of these 
symbolic interactions attempts to understand not only the nature of the active 
cognitive schemas, for both the other member of the dyad and other persons more 
generally, but also the reciprocal relationships of each person’s cognitive events to 
respective action-reaction sequences occurring in the arena of their conjoint 
behaviour (Kiesler, 1996). 
1.2.4 Close relationships 
The crucial difference between personal relationships and role relationships with no 
or little acquaintance is that personal relationships rely on their history. It is the 
cognitive representation of this history in both partners that provides continuity and 
allows for security and trust (Banse, 1999). A growing body of research on the 
attributions and attribution processes in close relationships focuses on the 
explanations perceivers construct about their significant others (Bradbury & Fincham, 
1990; Collins, 1996; Fletcher & Fincham, 1991). Research by Collins (1996) also 
showed that individuals with different attachment styles are inclined to perceive, 
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interpret, and explain relationship events in ways consistent with the distinct nature of 
their models of self and other that have been developed in part on the basis of past 
experiences with significant others (see also Downey & Feldman, 1996). 
1.2.5 Integrated approaches 
Based on attachment and interpersonal theories, Safran (1990a, 1990b) developed a 
model of how repeated relationship experiences lead people to develop interpersonal 
schemas. It is defined as generic cognitive representations of self-other interpersonal 
events, rather than representations of self and others in isolation. Safran (1990a) 
assumed that humans have a wired-in propensity for maintaining relatedness to 
others and an interpersonal schema can be described as a program to maintain such 
relatedness. 
Horowitz (1991) integrated psychodynamic insights with cognitive principles and 
argued that people learn role relationship models or schemas of self in interaction 
with another person. Role-relationship models are conceptualised as combinations of 
a self-schema, a schema for at least one other person and a script of transactions 
between them. The schemas of self and other each contain roles, characteristics, 
traits and value standards (Horowitz, 1991). According to Horowitz (1989) a role-
relationship model can contain up to seven elements: a self-schema, the schema of 
the other, an anticipated action or expressed emotion of the self, the expected 
response of the other, the reaction of the self to the response of the other and the 
self-estimation of these reactions and the other's expected self-estimation of these 
reactions. Horowitz (1991) suggests that person schemata "are structures of 
meaning that integrate knowledge about self and others. These mental structures 
may operate consciously and unconsciously to organise thought, complex mood 
states, self-appraisal and interpersonal actions" (p.1). 
Baldwin (1992) reviewed various constructs from diverse theoretical approaches, 
including psychoanalytic, sociological, family systems and cognitive perspectives, 
with the core idea that people internalise their experiences with others and this 
provide a context from which future social circumstances are imagined, approached 
and interpreted. The construct of mental representations suggests that these 
integrated representations are formed through actual interpersonal experience, but 
have an enduring quality and will provide a context from which future interpersonal 
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experience will be imagined, approached and interpreted. This construct has been 
used alongside many different but associated terms: e.g. "self-representation", 
"object representation", "internal working model", "introjected object", "internal 
object", "representational world", "psychical representation", "schema", "self-
schema", "personal-construct system" "life history narrative", "core conflictual 
relationship theme", and "evocative memory". Each of these terms addresses the 
representational process in somewhat different language, although with remarkable 
conceptual overlap (Sperling & Lyons, 1994). The relational schema concept 
described by Baldwin will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
1.3 Transference 
Some psychodynamic theorists focus on the transference construct exclusively in the 
client-therapist relationship and also emphasise the particular importance of parental 
representations (Luborski & Crits-Christoph, 1990). The "transference" concept can 
also be understood in a broader sense, to refer to the transfer of memories, 
expectations or affects about relationships from one situation to another. Singer 
(1985) suggested that transference reflects the impact of an organised set of beliefs 
about other people or about oneself in relation to others. The more traditional 
understanding of transference, namely a particular response within the therapeutic 
relationship, can then be seen as only one subcategory within the wider array of 
transference responses (Chen & Andersen, 1999).  
According to Reis and Patrick (1996), this seemingly simple notion of internalised 
relationships is in reality extraordinarily complex, because these mental 
representations co-ordinate nearly all the social, cognitive and motivational 
processes that regulate interpersonal behaviour. The research program by Susan 
Andersen and colleagues (see Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990; 
Andersen, Glassman, Chen & Cole, 1995; Andersen, Reznik & Manzella, 1996; 
Baum & Andersen, 1999; Chen & Andersen, 1999; Chen, Andersen & Hinkley, 1999; 
Glassman & Andersen, 1999a; Glassman & Andersen, 1999b; Hinkley & Andersen, 
1996) demonstrated, under experimental conditions, the multi-faceted effects of prior 
experiences with significant others on present-day interpersonal life. The social-
cognitive model of transference and the supporting research program will be 
reviewed in Chapter 3. 
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According to the social-cognitive model of transference (Andersen & Glassman, 
1996) transference occurs in everyday social judgement and can be based on all 
types of significant others – a parent, sibling, other family member, best friend, 
romantic partner, former lover, mentor, etc. Although the process of transference 
operates uniformly across individuals, the content of transference depends on the 
particular significant other representation and differs across individuals. It is also 
assumed that the content of the representation need not be static, but may change 
over time (Andersen & Berk, 1998). 
1.4 Objective of the present study 
Despite the general assumption that an individual’s social behaviour and social 
relationships are influenced by his or her mental representation of others and in 
particular the significant other people in his or her life, relatively little empirical studies 
have been done on how such “inner audiences” are invoked and the cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie their influence (Shah, 2003a). 
The present study therefore empirically investigates the association between past 
experiences with significant others, the available significant other representations 
and the current processing of interpersonal information. It thereby aims to contribute 
to the understanding of how experiences with significant others are internally 
represented and subsequently activated to influence social perception and 
behaviour. 
More specifically, the study will investigate the chronically accessible memory 
structures of individuals with different relationship histories, as well as the temporary 
activation of these structures by means of subliminal priming. The effect on the 
subsequent processing of congruent interpersonal information will also be examined. 
The study also aims to demonstrate that different elements of the structures 
representing interpersonal information are connected in memory. The interaction 
between the chronic accessibility and temporary activation of congruent information 
will also be studied.  
1.5 Outline of dissertation 
Theoretically the study is based within social-cognitive theory, and integrates the 
theory and basic empirical from the social-cognitive approach with concepts from 
attachment theory. Consequently, a selective review of attachment theory will be 
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presented in Chapter 2. The main emphasis will be on the concept of working 
models, also referred to as mental representations of the relational patterns with 
significant others (Perlman & Bartholomew, 1994). This will be followed in Chapter 3 
by a review of the social-cognitive theory, with specific emphasis on the relational 
schema concept described by Baldwin (1992), and the social-cognitive model of 
transference formulated by Andersen and Baum (1994). Following a summary of the 
selected literature the problem statement, research questions, and the related 
objectives and hypotheses based on this review will be presented and discussed in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes the method of research, experimental design, 
participants, apparatus, measures and procedures. The results will be presented in 
Chapter 6, while Chapter 7 provides a discussion and interpretation of the findings in 
terms of the available research. 
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CHAPTER 2  ATTACHMENT THEORY 
Attachment theory will be used as a theoretical framework to demonstrate how 
memory representations of early relationship histories shape how people think about 
and behave in subsequent interpersonal situations. The literature review will 
emphasise the role of internal representations in explaining different styles in the 
processing of interpersonal information. 
2.1 The attachment system 
According to attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969), children are born with an 
ethnologically determined need to seek and maintain proximity with caregivers. 
Several interconnected and highly adaptive regulatory systems are hardwired into 
human infants. The mechanism, through which proximity is achieved, is the 
regulation of emotional states. When the attachment system becomes activated, 
negative emotions will activate proximity seeking that will only be terminated once 
caregivers are sufficiently close or available and emotional contentment has been 
restored. Therefore, the systems designed to maintain proximity to caregivers, 
contain affective, cognitive and behavioural components. 
According to Bowlby (1969) the attachment system serves a number of distinct 
functions: (a) proximity maintenance: staying near the caregiver; (b) separation 
protest: resisting separations from the caregiver; (c) safe haven: turning to the 
caregiver for comfort, support and reassurance, especially during times of stress or 
danger, and (d) secure base: engaging in exploring the environment and other non-
attachment behaviour when feeling safe and secure because caregivers are 
sufficiently close or available. 
In recent literature the attachment system has been conceptualised as (a) a state-
based set of distressing symptoms that emerge when the attachment figure is not 
available, (b) a trait-based tendency to form particular relationships and respond to 
these relationships similarly, or as (c) an interactive process between two people in 
an ongoing relationship (Berman & Sperling, 1994). Hazan and Shaver (1994) 
described adult attachment in terms of (a) internal representations or models that 
guide interpersonal behaviour and information processing or (b) characteristic 
strategies that individuals use to maintain feeling secure. It is this enduring tendency 
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of an individual to respond in a characteristic style to relationship situations that is the 
focus of the present discussion. 
2.2 Internal working models 
As children develop their own history of attachment relationships, they develop 
mental representations of themselves and the significant people in their lives. Stern 
(1985) explained this process in the following way. After a person experienced a 
number of similar types of interpersonal interactions, these experiences are 
generalised to form a prototype or structure about the likely course of events in 
future. In this way, different interpersonal experiences become organised into 
representations of interactions that have been generalised. These representations 
reflect children’s interactions with attachment figures and organise their memory in 
terms of their attempts to gain security, and the typical outcomes of such attempts 
(Main, Kaplan & Cassidy, 1985). Internal working models are expected to be fairly 
accurate reflections of the social reality as experienced by the individual (Bowlby, 
1973). 
Bowlby (1973) considered the representations to be “working” models because they 
(a) organise internal appraisals and interpersonal behaviours along lines adaptive in 
the person’s earlier development, and (b) thereby shape the person’s later social 
experiences in schema-consistent ways. Working models help individuals to process 
interpersonal information in a sufficient and self-protective manner (Lopez, 1995). 
Main et al. (1985) defined attachment working models as "a set of conscious and/or 
unconscious rules for the organisation of information relevant to attachment and for 
obtaining or limiting access to that information, that is, to information regarding 
attachment related experiences, feelings, and ideation" (pp. 66-67). 
This internalised set of beliefs integrates perceptions of one’s own competence and 
acceptability (self-model) together with expectations of the availability and 
responsiveness of attachment figures (other model). The model of self and model of 
others are likely to be complementary. Working models define the personal rules by 
which two individuals interact and allow the individual to anticipate what the other 
person will do. Because a new person could be perceived in terms of an existing 
model, the rules may or may not be accurate or appropriate. It still enables 
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individuals to act in new situations without having to experience it as completely 
unfamiliar (Main et al., 1985). 
Collins and Read (1994) proposed that internal working models have four inter-
related components: (a) autobiographical memories of attachment related 
experiences, including representations of specific interactions and episodes that can 
be reconstructed and reinterpreted; (b) beliefs, attitudes, and expectations about self 
and others, abstracted from attachment experiences; (c) a characteristic hierarchy of 
attachment-related goals and needs that become activated in particular social 
situations; and (d) a set of behavioural strategies and plans for achieving these 
attachment-related goals. 
Berman and Sperling (1994) defined internal working models as cognitive-affective-
motivational schemata built from the individuals’ experience of their interpersonal 
world. (a) It can be predicted that working models will influence cognitive response 
patterns through the basic processes of selective attention, selective memory and 
recall, and selective inference and explanation (Collins & Read, 1994). (b) Working 
models are also likely to guide affective responses. (c) The cognitive and emotional 
processing of attachment-related information may elicit particular available behaviour 
responses that will serve the particular goals and needs of the individual. When the 
working model becomes activated, this behavioural response may be elicited 
automatically (Collins & Read, 1994).  
It is therefore clear that internal working models must be fairly complex structures. 
Research to date demonstrated that they include or influence symbolic 
representations of people and relationships, social perception, affective 
predispositions, social behaviour, and defences. The major current challenges in the 
field of attachment research are to continue clarifying the construct of working 
models and finding ways to assess it reliably (Rothbard & Shaver, 1994). 
2.3 Different attachment styles 
Individual differences in attachment style observed in children and adults are 
attributed to different attachment experiences and the subsequent differences in 
working models of self and others. Traditionally researchers on attachment have 
focused on three attachment patterns, namely the secure, anxious-avoidant and 
anxious-ambivalent styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978). Main et al., 
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(1985) also identified three primary patterns: secure-autonomous, preoccupied-with-
attachment, and dismissing-of-attachment. Hazan and Shaver (1987) proposed the 
three adult romantic analogues of the major styles. Main and Solomon (1985) 
proposed a fourth category termed disorganised, that contains elements of both the 
preoccupied and dismissing types. Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) suggested that 
attachment categories may be considered as combinations of models of self and 
others, resulting in a fourfold categorisation: (a) secure and comfortable with intimacy 
and autonomy, (b) preoccupied with relationships, (c) dismissing of intimacy, and (d) 
fearful of intimacy. Work by Feeney, Noller and Hanrahan (1994) provided support 
for the four styles hypothesised by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991), and was able 
to uncover two underlying dimensions reflecting models of self and models of others. 
They noted that the mental models of some individuals (the fearful group) combine all 
the aspects of insecurity. Although the central distinction between secure and 
insecure attachment was prominent, the insecure groups were not as clearly 
differentiated from one another, as the theoretical models of attachment would 
suggest. 
2.4 Continuity in attachment styles 
There have been impressive demonstrations of longitudinal (Elicker, Englund & 
Scroufe, 1992; Grossman & Grossman, 1991; Kirkpatrick & Hazan, 1994; Scarfe & 
Bartholomew, 1994) and even cross-generational continuity in attachment styles 
(Benoit & Parker, 1994; Fonagy, Steele & Steele, 1991; Main et al., 1985). This 
stability is usually attributed to the impact of internal working models because it 
explains how earlier interactions can be used to predict and control present and 
future interactions (Reis & Patrick, 1996). 
During the early years of life, attachment models are still relatively open to change if 
the quality of care-giving changes. Given a consistent pattern of attachment 
experiences through childhood and adolescence, models become more established 
through repeated experience. Gradually the working model becomes more a property 
of the person than the relationship. Once formed, the working models tend to operate 
automatically and unconsciously, thereby making them even more difficult to change 
(Collins & Read, 1994).  
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According to Collins and Read (1994), several factors contribute to this stability. (a) 
As mentioned before, information-processing bias predisposes people to construe 
the world in ways that support their existing models. (b) People are also likely to 
create social environments that confirm their existing representations of self and 
others. (c) People may also select environments that are consistent with their 
expectations about self and others. Internal working models tend to resist change, 
particularly in the case of insecure models, which are thought to be rigid and 
inflexible (Crittenden, 1990). 
2.5 Retrospective studies of early attachment relationships 
Hindy and Schwarz (1994) demonstrated that anxious romantic attachment in males 
and females can be associated with a number of particular parental and family 
antecedents (for example hostility and control, rejection, low emotional attachment). 
In a study of attachment histories of college-age and older adult subjects (Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987), the recollections of childhood relationships with parents differed 
systematically across the secure, avoidant and anxious/ambivalent attachment 
groups. Secure subjects described respectful, responsive, caring, accepting, 
confident and undemanding mothers, whereas insecure (avoidant and anxious/ 
ambivalent) subjects described almost the opposite profile. Avoidant subjects 
described their mothers as being cold and rejecting, and anxious/ambivalent subjects 
described their fathers as having been "unfair". Feeney and Noller (1990) and 
Mikulincer, Florian and Tolmacz (1990) have replicated these results. 
Rothbart and Shaver (1994) summarised the findings of several self-report studies as 
follows. (a) Adults classified as secure described their primary attachment figures in 
childhood as having been generally warm, responsive, available and sensitive. (b) 
Adults classified as anxious/ ambivalent described their parents as having been 
warm and loving part of the time, but also inaccessible, unresponsive, intrusive and 
inconsistent. Issues related to the type of care they received as children continued to 
preoccupy them as adults. They seem both enmeshed in these issues and resentful 
or angry toward parents because of it. (c) Avoidant adults described their parents as 
being less warm and nurturing, relatively uninvolved and at least somewhat rejecting 
when they were growing up.  
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Evidence from cross-sectional studies suggested that positive parent-child 
relationships are associated with more intimate peer relationships and greater 
interpersonal competence (Batgos & Leadbeater, 1994). College students who were 
securely attached reported higher levels of social competence and social support 
than an avoidant group (Kobak & Sceery, 1988). The assumption that early 
attachment relationships can be functionally related to subsequent adult attachment 
has thus far been explored by means of retrospective and mostly correlational 
methods, as well as through studies of intergenerational patterns in the attachment 
styles of adult parents and their children. Links between the nature of adult’s current 
attachment styles and their retrospective accounts of relationship with parents have 
been demonstrated by several researchers (Brennan, Shaver, & Tobey, 1991; 
Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1994; Collins & Read, 1990; Feeney & Noller, 
1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987). 
Due to the absence of prospective and longitudinal studies following the nature of 
attachment organisation from infancy to adulthood, the continuity hypothesis has not 
been critically tested (Hendrick & Hendrick, 1994). There are also concerns about the 
convergent validity and temporal stability of attachment measures (Lopez, 1995). 
Baldwin and Fehr (1995) also demonstrated the instability of attachment style ratings, 
but some of these concerns could be answered (see section 2.11 and Shaver & 
Norman, 1995). 
2.6 Adult attachment behaviour 
The major determinants of attachment styles might be similar in childhood and 
adulthood, originating from relationships with parents and elaborated on and 
changed in the context of subsequent important relationships (Rothbard & Shaver, 
1994). The adult forms of attachment styles would presumably be more complex than 
the childhood forms. Mental representations of attachment become increasingly 
complex as relationships within and outside the family provide more opportunities to 
learn more about oneself and interactions with other people (Collins & Read, 1994). 
There are two other obvious differences between attachment processes during 
childhood and adulthood. Children form attachment bonds with parents, while adults 
form bonds with persons of similar age. Children typically have dependent, asexual 
attachments with their parents, while adults typically have reciprocal, sexual bonds 
(Perlman & Bartholomew, 1994).  
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In general it would be expected that secure adults view others as trustworthy and 
dependable, the self as lovable and worthy, and relationships as a source of support 
and comfort. Avoidant adults would be expected to view others as untrustworthy and 
undependable, the self as either unlovable or (defensively) too good for others, and 
relationships as either threatening to one's sense of control, not worth the effort or 
both. Anxious/ambivalent adults would be expected to view others as desirable 
relationship partners but as largely unpredictable. They should view the self as 
generally unlovable and close relationships as the primary way in which people can 
achieve a sense of security. Most of the results obtained by researchers were 
consistent with these predictions (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Collins & Read, 
1990, 1994; Feeney & Noller, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987). 
The attachment system probably also plays an important part in the choice of marital 
partner and relationship patterns in marriage (Holmes, 1993). Secure subjects sought 
and provided more emotional and physical support in anxiety provoking situations 
than avoidant subjects (Simpson, Rholes & Nelligan, 1992). Secure and anxious 
avoidant subjects were more attracted to a high-disclosing partner than avoidant 
subjects and reported greater likelihood of disclosing to a high-disclosing partner 
than a low-disclosing partner (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991). Secure and 
anxious/ambivalent subjects revealed significantly more personal information to high- 
than to low-disclosing partners, and were significantly more disclosive to high-
disclosing partners than were avoidant subjects (Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991).  
A number of studies also investigated patterns of information-processing associated 
with the different attachment styles. In a lexical decision task, Baldwin, Fehr, 
Keedian, Seidel and Thompson (1993) found that secure individuals were quicker to 
identify words associated with positive interpersonal outcomes, whereas avoidant 
individuals identified negative interpersonal words more quickly. Baldwin, Keelan, 
Fehr, Enns and Koh-Rangarajoo (1996) also provided results demonstrating the 
systematic availability and accessibility of mental models with secure and insecure 
individuals (see also section 4.2.1.2.1). More empirical evidence is however needed 
demonstrating that people filter interpersonal information through specific working 
models and then behave in accordance with such models. 
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2.7 Prototypes or exemplars 
It is still a question whether internal working models are stored in memory as 
prototypes (abstract, summary generalisations about others in general) or exemplars 
(concrete examples of specific events, partners and relationships). The concept of 
the working model is weighted towards the view that infant relations with a primary 
caregiver form a dominant prototypic schema. Other alternative attachments are 
viewed as secondary and theorists speculate regarding the specific influence of 
multiple attachments on the working model (Levitt, Coffman, Guacci-Franco & 
Loveless, 1994). But prototype models have been challenged by alternative models 
suggesting that categories of information are not represented by a single prototype, 
but by varying exemplars of the category (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Smith & Zárate, 
1992). From an exemplar model perspective, expectations need not to be based on a 
specific prototype relationship, but on the degree of similarity between the new 
relation and one or more of several previous relationships. Exemplar based social 
network models can account readily for the existence of simultaneous multiple 
attachment relations (Levitt et al., 1994). 
2.8 Network of working models 
It is an important premise of attachment theory that the attachment bond is primarily 
to a specific figure (or small group of figures), but this does not mean that only one 
working model is available. Children can have somewhat different models for 
mothers and fathers (Fox, Kimmerly & Schafer, 1991). Bowlby even visualised the 
coexistence of incompatible models – for example “the good mother who lets me 
come near to her (if I look after her)”, and “the bad mother who rejects me and makes 
me angry (and who I’ll try not to think about)” – which lead to sudden changes of 
mood and poor adaptation (Holmes, 1993). A small child’s attachments can usually 
be described as hierarchically, with the mother on top, followed by the father (or 
rarely the other way around), grandparents, siblings, godparents, and so on.  
Collins and Read (1994) proposed that individuals can have different separate 
models of attachment that can best be considered as a hierarchical network of 
interconnected models. On top of the hierarchy is the default model that corresponds 
to the most general representations about people and the self, abstracted from a 
history of relationship experiences. Further down are models that correspond to 
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particular kinds of relationships and lowest in the hierarchy are the most specific 
models corresponding to particular partners and relationships. Models higher in the 
hierarchy will fit a wide range of situations, but will be less useful in guiding 
perception and behaviour in a particular situation. The different models in the 
attachment network are expected to share many elements and to be connected 
through different associations. Particular models within the network should also differ 
in terms of their degree of elaboration and connectedness. Models of major 
attachment figures are likely to be more central in the network structure, and more 
elaborated and better connected than other models. Models that develop early in 
one’s relationship history will contribute to the structure of all subsequent models. 
The attachment network of different people will also vary according to their relative 
network size (more or less models) and network density (more or less relatedness 
amongst the models). As people move in and out of relationships, these experiences 
result in the formation of more general and abstract models of self and others (Collins 
& Read, 1994). 
Many attachment theorists regard the structure of this network also as of primary 
importance. Main (1991) theorised that attachment insecurity is characterised by a 
lack of coherent integration among multiple inconsistent models. Inner working 
models are fundamentally concerned with metacognition - monitoring and co-
ordinating multiple accessible models and memories so as to allow individuals to 
interact appropriately and satisfyingly with others (Crittenden, 1990; Main, 1991). 
2.9 Activation of working models 
Which model becomes activated to guide perception and behaviour is likely to be a 
trade-off between different features of the situation as well as the characteristics of 
the models in the attachment network. The strength of the model, the match between 
the model and the situation and the specificity of the model will all be important. 
Models that are quite central in the network, and that has been used quite often in 
the past can be considered to be stronger. Characteristics of the interaction partner, 
the nature of the relationship and the goals salient in the situation are features that 
will determine the match between the situation and a particular model. If a more 
specific model can be linked to the current situation, then it will be preferred over 
models that are more general (Collins & Read, 1994). A study demonstrating that 
one's model for the opposite sex parent is a better indicator of aspects of a romantic 
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relationship than the model for the same sex parent, can be regarded as support for 
this view of differential activation (Collins & Read, 1990). The study by Baldwin et al., 
(1993) demonstrating accessibility effects for attachment styles has already been 
mentioned. According to Bartholomew (1994) the question still needs to be answered 
whether a hierarchy of attachment models exist and under what conditions these 
models are likely to be activated. 
2.10 Review of working models 
Bowlby (1973) referred to internal models as “working” models, and therefore it can 
be understood that they are at least potentially modifiable by new information. He 
depicted healthy internal working models as subject to constant revision and change 
in the light of experience. In the first years of life, attachment models are relatively 
open to change, but they become solidified through repeated experience. Substantial 
changes in the care-giving environment may lead to changes in the working models, 
which may be observable in different behaviours. It cannot be assumed that only the 
care-giving environment directly determines children's social behaviour, because 
then it would be difficult to understand cross-situational consistency in the absence of 
the attachment figure and longitudinal resistance to change. It also seems unlikely to 
attribute consistencies in attachment styles primarily to innate temperament, because 
many children exhibit different attachment styles with their mothers and fathers 
(Rothbard & Shaver, 1994). 
Bretherton (1987) speculated why internal working models in insecure attachment 
are particularly resistant to change. Mental structures are organised hierarchically 
from low level event scripts (Schank, 1982), such as “When I hurt myself my mother 
comes to comfort me”, through intermediate generalisations like “My mother is 
usually there when I need her” to basic assumptions “My mother is a loving person; I 
am loveable and loved”. Insecure individuals not only have negative core 
assumptions, but may also not be able to revise these models in the light of 
experience, because communication between different levels of the hierarchy is 
distorted and restricted (Holmes, 1993). 
2.11 Measuring adolescent and adult attachment 
The Adult Attachment Interview is an hour-long semi-structured clinical interview that 
probes the attachment-related experiences of adult mothers. Respondents are 
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questioned about their early relationships with their parents. The interview transcripts 
are subsequently rated and respondents assigned to autonomous (secure), 
enmeshed (anxious), detached (avoidant), or unresolved (disorganised) attachment 
categories (George, Kaplan & Main cited in Lopez, 1995). Most investigators 
however needed a more economical measure of attachment style. 
Hazan and Shaver (1987) developed a single-item categorical measure of 
attachment designed to classify persons into secure, avoidant, or anxious/ambivalent 
attachment styles. Subjects are asked to identify their own attachment style from 
three paragraphs describing the three styles. In most populations the three styles are 
observed in unequal proportions, with approximately 55% secure, 25% avoidant and 
20% anxious/ambivalent subjects (Hazan & Shaver, 1994). The scale has enjoyed 
widespread use, despite questions about its reliability. Baldwin and Fehr (1995) 
pooled the test-retest data from ten samples and reported that 17.2% of the subjects 
who reported to be secure at Time 1 changed their preference at Time 2. Of the 
subjects indicating the avoidant style 33% changed at Time 2, as well as 55% of the 
anxious/ambivalent subjects. Baldwin and Fehr (1995, p. 259) considered three 
possible explanations for the findings: “a lack of long-term continuity in people’s 
attachment behaviour, a lack of reliability in the measurement of truly stable 
attachment styles, or the presence of short-term instability in individuals’ ‘states of 
mind’ with respect to attachment.” In line with their conceptualisation of cognitive 
structures representing interpersonal experience (see section 3.3.1) they preferred 
the latter explanation. 
Collins and Read (1990) objected to the fact that the categorical nature of the Hazan 
and Shaver (1987) scale assumed that the three attachment styles were mutually 
exclusive and that it was impossible to indicate to what degree a style characterises 
the behaviour of a person. They developed the 18-item Adult Attachment Scale as a 
more sensitive index of the dimensions underlying adult attachment styles. Factor 
analysis yielded three dimensions (a) comfortable with closeness, (b) can depend on 
others, and (c) anxious or fearful about being abandoned or unloved (Bradford & 
Lyddon, 1994). This measure could be considered as a revision of the Hazan and 
Shaver scale in an attempt to improve its psychometric properties. 
Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991, see section 2.3) suggested a fourfold 
categorisation: (a) secure and comfortable with intimacy and autonomy, (b) 
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preoccupied with relationships, (c) dismissing of intimacy, and (d) fearful of intimacy. 
They developed self-report prototypes of the four attachment styles, similar in format 
to the Hazan and Shaver (1987) forced choice measure. Respondents are asked to 
rate on a seven-point scale the degree to which they resemble four items – 
representing secure, preoccupied, fearful-avoidant or dismissing-avoidant attachment 
styles. 
Feeney et al. (1994) developed the Attachment Style Questionnaire (ASQ) as a 
broad-based measure able to accommodate the different dimensions of attachment 
as well as the different possible styles needed to describe the individual differences 
in attachment. They also wanted to design a measure suitable for young adolescents 
or others with little or no experience of romantic relationships. 
Sixty-five items were developed and administered to 470 university students. A five-
factor solution accounted for 43.3% of the total variance, with the following factors: 
Confidence (in self and others), Discomfort with Closeness, Need for Approval, 
Preoccupation with Relationships, and Relationships as Secondary (to achievement). 
The Confidence scale represented secure attachment and each of the other four 
scales represented a particular aspect of insecure attachment. A 40-item measure, 
called the Attachment Style Questionnaire (ASQ), remained after certain complex 
items or those with low loadings were removed. Feeney et al. (1994) reported high 
levels of internal consistency for the five factors with coefficient alphas of .80 
(Confidence), .84 (Discomfort with Closeness), .79 (Need for Approval), .76 
(Preoccupation with Relationships) and .76 (Relationships as Secondary). The test-
retest reliability over a period of approximately ten weeks was .74 (Confidence), .74 
(Discomfort with Closeness), .78 (Need for Approval), .72 (Preoccupation with 
Relationships) and .67 (Relationships as Secondary). 
As far as validity is concerned, all pair wise correlations between the five scales of 
the ASQ were significant. The Confidence scale correlated negatively with the other 
four scales; and all four scales measuring aspects of insecurity were positively 
intercorrelated (Feeney et al., 1994). The Hazan and Shaver (1987) scale divided 
subjects into secure, avoidant and anxious/ambivalent groups. The secure subjects 
(according to the Hazan and Shaver measure) scored significantly higher on the 
Security scale than any of the other groups (F(2,292) = 32.69, p < .0001). The results 
provided strong support that the ASQ measures attachment styles similar to those 
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originally conceptualised by Hazan and Shaver (1987). The subjects in the secure 
group had high self-esteem and were confident about their relationships with other 
people; they were comfortable with closeness and saw relationships as important 
(Feeney et al., 1994). They clearly had positive attitudes towards themselves and 
others. 
Feeney et al. (1994) also tested 137 eighth-grade students and compared the results 
of the five scales of the ASQ with the three scales from the ICPS Family Functioning 
Scale. The results supported the theory relating attachment style to quality of 
parenting. High scores on the Confidence scale were associated with reports of high 
family intimacy, democratic parenting, and low levels of family conflict. 
2.12 Discussion of attachment theory 
Personal histories of social relationships and experiences guide how people construe 
their social world and how they interact with others. The essence of the continuity 
assumption of attachment theory is that the quality of early relationships is 
functionally related to subsequent adult attachment style and interpersonal 
competencies (Bowlby, 1988). This continuity is explained by means of internal 
working models, based on own memories of attachment-related experiences and 
including beliefs and expectancies about the self and others. 
Adults classified with secure attachment styles report their primary attachment figures 
in childhood as warm and responsive to their needs and they can recall various 
examples of such experiences. The working models representing these experiences 
could well be very accessible and influential in assessing present social situations. 
Adults classified as insecure report the opposite history, experiencing their parents 
as cold, rejecting, unresponsive or inconsistent. They still in the present report lower 
levels of social competence and social support than adults with a secure attachment 
style.  
However, despite these promising results and support for the attachment theory, 
many questions still remain. For example, the distinctions between the different types 
of insecure attachment styles are not as clear as between the secure and insecure 
styles, and the temporal stability of the measurements of attachment styles is also 
less reliable. 
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Although the theory about the structure and organisation of internal working models 
is one of the best developed components of attachment theory, Reis and Patrick 
(1996) is also of the opinion that relatively few studies have investigated their precise 
nature. Can empirical research clarify the structure and processes of working 
models? What is the nature of the network structure of attachment working models, 
and which model becomes activated to guide perception and behaviour? It should 
also be demonstrated to what degree working models operate at a conscious or an 
automatic level. Although most available studies assess the descriptive content of 
internal working models with explicit measures, the impact of working models on 
social perception and judgment is most likely to be outside awareness. The chronic 
accessibility of working models would be expected to induce the automatic 
processing of interpersonal information, including procedural knowledge. 
Holmes (1993) argued that Bowlby’s concept of working models acts as a possible 
bridge between psychoanalysis and cognitive science. For a more detailed analysis 
of the questions above one can turn to the interface between attachment theory and 
social-cognitive theory and research. It will be valuable to continue studying the 
social-cognitive processes associated with the activation, operation and revision of 
attachment working models. It remains important to demonstrate that members of 
different adult attachment categories possess different internal models of self, others 
and attachment relationships that have developed out of previous relationships with 
important attachment figures. 
Bartholomew and Thompson (1995), however, cautioned that attachment should be 
considered as one aspect of relational behaviour, and probably also in only certain 
relationships, namely parent-child and long-term sexual relationships. One should be 
cautious in applying the concept to all social relationships that could probably be 
better understood in terms of other conceptual models. 
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CHAPTER 3  SOCIAL-COGNITIVE THEORY AND RESEARCH 
3.1 Introduction 
Allport (1968) defined social psychology as "an attempt to understand and explain 
how the thoughts, feelings, and behaviour of individuals are influenced by the actual, 
imagined, or implied presence of others" (p.3). Social cognition research developed 
as one of the dominant approaches within social psychology and typically focuses on 
how social information is perceived, interpreted, stored in memory and recalled. 
Social cognition research has been described as a study of how people make sense 
of other people and themselves (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In this chapter, the influence 
of relationships with significant others on the processing of social information will be 
discussed from the perspective of social cognition theory and research. 
The notion that people’s mental representations of their social world are important 
has a long history in psychology (see Kelly, 1955). Of late, this idea has been 
supported by the advent of modern cognitive psychology that regarded mental 
representations as empirically demonstrable concepts. A mental representation can 
be defined as an encoding of information or knowledge that can be retained in 
memory, accessed and used in various ways (Smith, 1998). Because there are 
different kinds of knowledge, there are most likely different kinds of representations 
as well. Within social psychology literature there are presently various theoretical 
contributions about the existence of multiple forms of social representation, and 
different new methods have been adapted or developed to examine these 
representations empirically. The mental representations of each individual may be an 
articulation of individual cognitive activity, related to personal needs and goals, but 
may also be culturally pervasive and the product of social construction (Levine, 
Resnick & Higgins, 1993). 
The first section of this chapter will be a selective review of the basic constructs in 
social-cognitive theory. The latter part will focus on recent developments in the study 
of representations of interpersonal relationships, as well as the representations of 
significant others. Recent research in these two areas will also be reviewed. 
3.2 Social-cognitive theory 
Understanding the nature of cognitive structures and cognitive processes can provide 
insight into complex social phenomena. It is an important task for social-cognitive 
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research to specify the interactive effects between the different factors influencing 
cognitive structure activation (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). It is useful for the 
present discussion to start of with the distinction between different types of cognitive 
structures (different ways in which knowledge is represented in memory), and the 
basic cognitive processes (mental processes operating on those structures). 
3.2.1 Social-cognitive structures 
A cognitive structure can generally be described as a mental representation of an 
object or an idea. Carlston and Smith (1996) proposed multiple forms of cognitive 
representation as a basic principle in social cognition. Social knowledge is therefore 
likely to be cognitively represented in a variety of different ways, implicating different 
kinds of cognitive processes and even different cognitive systems or brain structures. 
They urged that new and more sophisticated models of representation be developed 
to accommodate the complexities raised in current social theory and research. 
3.2.1.1 Declarative and procedural knowledge 
Kihlstrom and Cantor (1983) draw a general distinction between the different ways 
social knowledge can be represented. (a) Declarative knowledge about the self and 
others can easily be made accessible and includes (i) semantic knowledge (facts and 
meanings stated as general propositions or constructs about the self and others; their 
traits and characteristics; prototypes for situations or exemplars), as well as (ii) 
episodic knowledge (memories for specific experiences or autobiographical events 
from the person's past). (b) Procedural knowledge about the self and other refers to 
cognitive and motor skills that are not easily described, but executed with expertise. It 
consists of if-then decision rules or productions derived from processing information 
about the self and others (for example: "if he greets me, then he is friendly"; or “if I do 
this, he will not approve of it"). 
Therefore, all the different representations of specific people or objects, social 
constructs, semantic categories, event memories, scripts and procedures can be 
described as examples of cognitive structures, representing social knowledge.  
3.2.1.2 Elaborative and relational processing 
There is another fundamental distinction to be taken into consideration when 
discussing social memory structures. It is the difference between individual-item (or 
elaborative) versus relational (or organizational) processing. In social research it 
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equals the distinction between (a) focusing on the unique and idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the person and forming a personal exemplar or (b) focusing on the 
category-typical characteristics of the person, the similarities and relations to other 
possible group members and deriving a category average, prototype or stereotype 
(Carlston & Smith, 1996; Smith & Zárate, 1992). In general, the type of processing 
depends on the stimulus characteristics as well as the perceiver’s characteristics and 
goals. It is therefore also implied that although the mental representations of the 
perceiver can vary in form and content, they will be somehow linked or connected to 
each other. 
The associative network model is one metaphor for the interconnections among 
concepts. In this model the concepts are represented as nodes and the connections 
between concepts as links between the nodes. Activation of one concept cues the 
activation of related concepts. Although individual nodes are fairly elementary without 
meaningful internal structure, larger meanings can be constructed by combining 
different nodes. The network model can also explain priming and retrieval effects 
through the spreading activation mechanism (Collins & Loftus, 1975). A concept that 
is activated spreads the activation over various links to its connected concept nodes. 
The excitation at these nodes approaches the threshold needed for activation (the 
priming process) and when it reaches the threshold, a response is generated (the 
retrieval process). The person memory model includes many of these features (Wyer 
& Srull, 1989). 
3.2.1.3 Schemas 
As mentioned previously, Kelly (1955) postulated that each individual perceives 
events through the filter of highly personal and idiosyncratic constructs. People 
create this framework of patterns or templates from a history of frequent experience 
with certain types of social behaviour in their environment. They then attempt to fit 
these personal constructs on the significant individuals and other experiences in their 
lives. 
The schema is probably the most generic of all cognitive structures and has a long 
history in psychology. The concept was originally used in experimental and 
developmental psychology (Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1955), but has come to refer more 
broadly to the mental structures which individuals use in the cognitive processing of 
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internal and external events. Fiske and Linville (1980) define a schema as a cognitive 
structure of organised prior knowledge, abstracted form experience with specific 
instances. A schema contains both the attributes of the concept and the relationships 
among the attributes (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). The schema concept can be used to 
conceptualise various information-processing phenomena. It guides the processing 
of new information and the retrieval of stored information. When stimulus information 
presents a sufficient match to a schema of a perceiver, the particular schema can be 
retrieved from memory and used in a top-down manner to complete the fragmentary 
cues of the stimulus. In this way prior knowledge is used to interpret new input 
information. Schemas often persist even in the face of conflicting evidence (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984). An activated schema can also direct attention to particular stimulus 
information. A schema is assumed to be most influential in social perception if it has 
been activated in some way. Taylor and Winkler (cited in Singer & Salovey, 1991) 
proposed four stages in schema development. (a) A schema begins as an encoding 
of a single example that represents the general case. (b) At the second stage, the 
importance of the most representative or the stereotypical attributes of the person, 
event or group are overestimated. (c) At the relative expert stage, the person 
becomes more attentive to inconsistencies between preconceived knowledge and 
schema-incongruent information. (d) During the last stage, the features of the 
schema are over learned, the subunits of the schema become tightly linked and 
processing become automatic and largely out of awareness of the individual. The 
schema concept can be extended to include self-schemas (to be discussed later), 
person schemas, role schemas, event schemas and procedural schemas. 
Although the schema concept has been very influential in social theory and research, 
the concept knowledge unit has also been used to refer to the basic structure 
representing information. Within social-cognitive research, the concept social 
construct is also often preferred in referring to the basic unit of social knowledge. 
Social constructs often studied are types of persons, stereotypes and roles. The 
concepts cognitive representation, knowledge unit, social construct, cognitive 
structure and cognitive schema are all closely related. The schema concept differs 
from the others in implying a close relationship between its constituent parts or 
attributes. 
 26
3.2.1.4 Person schemas 
Person schemas can be described as an individual’s understanding of typical or 
specific individuals. It is composed of traits and goals and helps to categorise others 
and to remember schema relevant behaviour (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). People may 
also be represented in terms of more individuated concepts or attributes on the one 
hand or social categories like traits or groups on the other (Brewer, 1988). Dual 
memory theories suggested that people would recall and use both behavioural or trait 
representations to understand information about other people (Srull & Wyer, 1989). 
Considerable research demonstrated that people spontaneously generate trait 
representations from behaviours (Newman & Uleman, 1989). Apart from trait 
categorisation, there has also been recognition of the way that people categorise 
others in social groups in terms of gender, race and other attributes. Stereotyping 
can be understood as the categorisation of target individuals and the attribution of 
category-typical traits to those that are categorised (Zárate & Smith, 1990). Trait 
generation and stereotyping can occur automatically (Devine, 1989; Newman & 
Uleman, 1989). 
A social role is the set of appropriate norms and behaviours expected of a person in 
a particular social position. A role schema is the cognitive structure that organises a 
person's knowledge about these appropriate behaviours (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Cantor, Mischel and Schwartz (1982) proposed that people learn prototypes for 
situations that help them anticipate how an interaction will proceed and therefore 
allow them to plan their actions accordingly. One can think about stereotypes as a 
particular kind of role schema that organises people's expectations about other 
people who fall into certain social categories (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
A “proper name” of a specific person or exemplar can also operate as a social 
construct (Smith & Zárate, 1992). Relatively less work has been done on individual-
person exemplars (Higgins & King, 1981; Smith & Zárate, 1992) or “n-of-one” 
constructs, which denote a single individual. Work by Andersen et al. (1995) 
demonstrated that an activated individual person exemplar, based on a significant 
other, could also be used to interpret new individuals. Significant other 
representations are by definition not only frequently thought about, but also highly 
important, familiar and self-relevant. This will be discussed in more detail in section 
3.3.2. 
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3.2.1.5 Self-schemas 
A self-schema can broadly be defined as a cognitive structure representing 
information about the self. It is derived from past experiences and organises and 
guides the processing of self-related information (Markus, 1977). Markus (1977) also 
demonstrated that if a person has a firm idea about the self in some domain of 
behaviour, domain relevant information is processed efficiently and consistently. 
Rogers (1981) has demonstrated improved recall for self-descriptive information. 
Markus (1990) documented the development of self-schemas, emphasising the 
context of significant interpersonal experiences and the role of parent and peer 
relations in self-development (see also Stern, 1985). Markus and Wurf (1987) have 
described the self-concept as a self-system that includes goals, incentives, plans, 
and scripts for behaviour, as well as self-schemas in particular behavioural domains. 
People are therefore assumed to have multiple self-schemas. From all the available 
knowledge about the self, only a small subset is activated at any given time, to 
produce the working self-concept of the moment (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Banaji and 
Prentice (1994) also presented the notion that the working self-concept can change 
as a function of the social context. Markus and Smith (1981) noted that self-schemas 
provide a frame of reference for judgments and evaluations of others. According to 
the implicit personality theory (Sneider, 1973), people interpret their social world 
according to a personal organised body of knowledge, that includes expectations 
about what attributes of personality typically co-occur in other people. 
3.2.1.6 Scripts 
A script or event schema is a representation of knowledge about a coherent 
sequence of events in a well-known situation or context. A script contains inferences 
about the potential occurrence of a set of events and the order of these events 
(Abelson, 1981). The script model is built on if-then cognitive sequences that can 
operate in an autonomous way. The experience of one event is expected with a high 
probability to be followed by other events in a consistent order. Scripts for social 
situations include both procedural knowledge (helping to guide social behaviour), as 
well as semantic-declarative knowledge (helping to think about and understand the 
situation) (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1985). People are assumed to abstract scripts from 
repeated experience with similar situations and then to apply them to the 
understanding of new experiences. An interpersonal script can be defined as a 
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cognitive structure representing a sequence of actions and events that define a 
stereotypical relational pattern (Baldwin, 1992). 
Social information need not only be represented in semantic form. Visual images can 
also be a form of social representation (Brewer, 1988), and can influence people’s 
perceptions and behaviours (Lewicki, 1985). Affective responses can also be 
regarded as material represented in memory and recalled and implemented in 
interpreting new information. In social cognition models it makes an important 
contribution in understanding emotional reactions to situations or particular 
individuals (Carlston, 1994; Wyer & Srull, 1989). 
It is clear that people have a large variety of cognitive structures, based on past 
experience that can be applied to new stimulus input. Available cognitive structures 
can be activated to various degrees and employed in the processing of new stimulus 
input. Knowledge structures provide meaning, organisation and predictability to social 
events (Strauman, 1991). 
3.2.2 Social-cognitive processes 
The following section reviews the fundamental processes proposed by social-
cognitive theory to operate on the information represented in the cognitive structures. 
3.2.2.1 Controlled versus automatic processes 
It has been demonstrated that actions frequently and consistently practiced, require 
less conscious attention to be performed (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Social-
cognitive theorists and researchers (see Bargh, 1996) also acknowledged this 
distinction between controlled and automatic processing. (a) Controlled cognitive 
processes are assumed to be effortful, intentional, consuming extensive cognitive 
capacity and therefore relatively slow. In contrast, (b) automatic processes are 
assumed to be fast, effortless, unintentional and relatively capacity-free. Historically, 
automatic processes was said to be strictly unintentional, outside awareness, 
uncontrollable and consuming minimal attention resources. Bargh (1996) argued that 
very few demonstrations of automatic processes satisfied all four these criteria and 
proposed a less mutually exclusive view of controlled versus automatic processes. 
Several studies demonstrated that self-relevant information is capable of being 
processed in a non-conscious manner (Bargh, 1982; Bargh & Pratto, 1986, Bargh & 
Thein, 1985; Bargh & Tota, 1988). Automaticity develops as a reflection of the 
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regularities in the social world of the person involved. This regularity should be 
reflected in a high frequency as well as consistency in associative activation (Bargh, 
1996). People also develop a certain chronic framework for interpreting and encoding 
the behaviour of others that can operate at an automatic level (Higgins, King & 
Mavin, 1982). Social judgments being performed increasingly efficiently can also be 
conceptualised as procedural learning (Smith & Lerner, 1986). From a number of 
steps that have to be performed effortful and in serial order, the procedure can 
become automotive and all the component processes can operate in parallel with 
minimal attention needed (Bargh, 1996). This process can be conceptualised using 
the if-then sequence proposed by Anderson (1983). If certain conditions are present 
in the cognitive environment, then the process associated will be completed. The 
differentiation between the controlled and automatic processes may contribute to the 
present review of the influence of social memory based on repeated and consistent 
interpersonal experiences in the past. 
3.2.2.2 Accessibility and availability 
It has been mentioned that different knowledge structures are available to be used in 
identifying and responding to a stimulus. Social-cognitive theorists have attempted to 
identify the factors that determine which information will be activated. The 
accessibility of stored constructs describes the likelihood that it will be used in 
information processing (Higgins & King, 1981). Accessibility can be understood as 
the activation potential of available knowledge (Higgins, 1996). Knowledge 
accessibility refers to the level of knowledge activation before the stimulus input from 
either momentary sources of temporary accessibility or long-term sources of chronic 
accessibility. The effect of subliminal priming on subsequent stimulus categorisation 
is clearly an accessibility effect (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982). The availability 
however, refers to whether or not some particular knowledge is actually stored in 
memory. Availability is therefore a necessary condition for accessibility. If knowledge 
is not available, it cannot be accessible. 
3.2.2.3 Applicability 
Knowledge activation does not depend only on the accessibility of stored knowledge. 
There is also a further variable that will influence the likelihood that some stored 
knowledge will be activated, namely the fit or applicability between the stored 
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knowledge and the presented stimulus (Bruner, 1957). The greater the overlap 
between features of the stored knowledge and the attended features of the stimulus, 
the greater the applicability of the knowledge to the stimulus and the greater is the 
likelihood that the knowledge will be activated in the presence of the stimulus 
(Higgins, 1989). 
Various factors can influence which factors are attended to in any given point in time. 
There are different types or levels of applicability. (a) A behavioural description can 
be described as unambiguous stimulus information when only one alternative 
construct is applicable to it. (b) A behavioural description is ambiguous when at least 
two alternative constructs are equally applicable to it. (c) It is vague when no 
construct has more than weak applicability to it. (d) It is inconsistent when the 
construct is clearly not applicable to it. (e) A behavioural description is contrary as 
stimulus information when the applicability of a competing alternative construct is 
both strong and stronger than the target construct’s applicability (Higgins, 1996).  
Higgins and Brendl (1995) proposed that higher levels of accessibility could 
compensate for lower applicability. In conditions of vague stimulus description, 
subjects still demonstrated construct related impressions, because the accessibility of 
the construct was very high. Applicability concerns the attended features of the 
stimulus and not all features of a stimulus receive equal attention. Various factors 
can influence which factors are attended to at any given moment. The salience of a 
particular stimulus refers not only to the important features of the stimulus, but also to 
the prior goals or expectancies of the subject. The goals can create an active set in a 
perceiver that will direct more attention to some features of a stimulus than others. 
Pre-exposure characteristics of stored knowledge and the level of knowledge 
activation can influence which features of a stimulus will receive more attention. 
3.2.2.4 Temporary accessibility 
Priming was developed in experimental cognitive psychology as a tool to investigate 
the content and structure of cognitive representations. It refers to procedures that 
stimulate or activate identified stored knowledge (Higgins, 1996). One of its effects is 
to increase the probability of using that knowledge when responding to a subsequent 
stimulus (see experiments by Higgins, Rholes & Jones; 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979). 
This basic phenomenon of increasing the accessibility of knowledge and observing 
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the consequences of that activation on some aspect of information-processing, has 
been replicated many times using a wide variety of priming methods, types of 
responses and types of stimuli (see Higgins, 1996, p.138 for a review). This research 
has included single word semantic priming (presenting a concept stored in semantic 
memory), stories or thematically related stories (Radcliff & McKoon, 1988), and 
pictures of significant others (Baldwin, 1994; Baldwin, Carrell & Lopez, 1990). 
Cognitive structures can be activated with conscious awareness or even without any 
conscious involvement (Erdley & D’Agostino, 1988; Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 
1987: Martin, 1986). Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) used subliminal techniques to 
expose different groups of subjects to hostility-related words. The rated hostility of a 
stimulus person in a subsequent session was dependant on the number of times the 
subject had been primed with the hostility-related word.  
Recent priming refers to the transient or temporary activation of stored knowledge to 
produce a knowledge-related effect. This effect was also demonstrated with 
subliminal priming (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Devine, 1989). Studies supported 
the conclusion that the effect of recent priming tends to decrease as the delay from 
priming to stimulus exposure increases. When there is a competing accessible 
construct, the effect of recent priming on judgement can disappear in a couple of 
minutes. It has been demonstrated in different studies that the priming effect 
increased as a result of an increase in the frequency of priming (Srull & Wyer, 1979, 
1980). Higgins, Bargh and Lombardi (1985) as well as Lombardi et al. (1987) 
compared recent and frequent priming. After a short delay, the recently primed 
construct was more prominent, but after a longer delay, the frequently primed 
construct was used more often. 
3.2.2.5 Chronic accessibility 
The chronic accessibility of a construct refers to the readiness of the construct to be 
activated, even with minimal temporary sources of activation present (Bargh & Pratto, 
1986; Higgins & King, 1981). Some constructs might have been activated so 
frequently in the past that they become chronically active or accessible (Higgins, 
1989, 1996; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991). Other determinants of chronic 
accessibility include chronic expectations, goals and needs, recent and frequent prior 
activation of the construct, and the construct’s interconnectedness with other stored 
constructs (Higgins, 1996). 
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Higgins et al. (1982) directly examined how individual differences in chronic 
accessibility influenced the processing of behavioural information. Persons were 
regarded to be chronic on a construct if they listed that feature first when asked to list 
the traits of people that they liked, disliked, sought out, avoided and frequently 
encountered. In a supposedly unrelated experiment about one week later subjects 
read an essay with trait-related descriptions of a target person. It was found that 
subjects were significantly more likely to include information related to traits on which 
they were chronic when they were asked for their spontaneous impressions of the 
target person and to recall the behavioural descriptions. Higgins et al. (1982), as well 
as Lau (1989), replicated these results. Bargh and Pratto (1986) also demonstrated 
that the chronically accessible constructs of subjects were indeed at a higher level of 
activation readiness than their inaccessible constructs. Higgins and Brendl (1995) 
investigated chronic accessibility as a continuous variable and found a strong 
positive relationship between higher chronicity scores and the frequency of construct 
related responses. 
The work by Markus (1977) on self-schemas has already been mentioned. 
Independent schematics (individuals with the independence construct central to their 
self-description) processed independent-related stimulus information faster and more 
consistently than independent aschematics did. Being schematic for a particular 
construct can be regarded as equivalent to this construct being chronically 
accessible. Bargh (1982) demonstrated similar results with people chronic towards 
the construct independence on reaction time measurements allocated to a dichotic 
listening task. The study supported the notion that chronic accessibility can be 
associated with processing efficiency normally associated with automatic processing 
(Bargh, 1982), as did an information overload study by Bargh and Thein (1985). 
Similar results from by Baldwin et al. (1993) supported the chronic accessibility 
effects of interpersonal constructs. 
3.2.2.6 Interaction between temporary and chronic accessibility 
Greater temporary accessibility (as a function of priming) and greater chronic 
accessibility (as an individual difference) predict higher accessibility and stronger 
responses to stimulus information. The interaction between temporary and chronic 
activation was studied from the social-cognitive perspective. Bargh, Bond, Lombardi 
and Tota (1986) selected subjects, chronic or nonchronic, for the construct “kind” and 
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then subliminally primed or did not prime them in a seemingly unrelated experiment. 
Chronic accessibility had a reliable effect even in the priming condition, but did not 
interact with it. A study by Higgins and Brendl (1995) supported this result. The 
chronicity effect was nonsignificantly stronger within the priming condition. These 
studies demonstrated that chronicity and priming could have independent and 
interactive effects on judgements. Although chronic and temporary sources of 
accessibility may be viewed as equivalent, Carlston (1991) cautioned that they might 
reflect different cognitive mechanisms. Temporary accessibility may involve higher 
levels of residual activation, while chronic accessibility may involve greater 
interconnectedness within the associative structure. Construct activation and 
application can occur based on chronic sources, transient sources or some 
combination of the two. Increases in the contribution from any of these sources are 
thought to produce corresponding increases in activation (Bargh et al., 1986; Higgins 
& Brendl, 1995). 
Research, therefore, supported the findings that the following factors can cause 
cognitive structure activation: a person’s expectations, motivations and goals, how 
recently or frequently a structure has been activated, the relation between the 
structure and other structures that have recently been activated, and inherent and 
relational features of stored constructs (Sedikides & Skowronksi, 1991). 
3.2.2.7 Assimilation and contrast effects 
Several other factors beyond knowledge accessibility also determine how increased 
accessibility from recent priming will influence subsequent stimulus judgements. One 
such factor is people’s awareness of the priming events themselves. Higgins et al. 
(1985) found that the assimilation effect of recent priming was stronger among 
subjects who did not remember the recent prime. In a study where the subjects were 
fully aware of the priming tasks or they remembered the priming events at the time 
when they made the stimulus judgement and completed the priming tasks, a contrast 
effect was found (Martin, 1986). However, when the subjects believed that the 
priming task had been interrupted, the assimilation effect was found (Martin, 1986). 
Lombardi et al. (1987) replicated the results by Higgins et al. (1985) with a strong 
contrast effect among subjects that remembered the priming events. Newman and 
Uleman (1990) also found a contrast effect when the primes were blatantly given to 
subjects before they were asked to interpret ambiguous behaviour. Moskowitz and 
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Roman (1992) and Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler and Wanke (1993) obtained a 
similar pattern of results. In the impression formation study by Strack et al. (1993), 
they found that if people were primed with a trait name (for example hostility), their 
impressions of an ambiguous target person were consistent with the prime (they saw 
the person as hostile), unless they have been reminded of the priming event. When 
they were reminded, there ratings showed a contrast effect (they saw the person as 
not hostile). Assimilation effects of priming are more likely when people are not 
aware of the priming events at the time when they make their judgement of the 
stimulus. When subjects are aware of the attempts to introduce bias or control their 
attention and thinking, they consciously override the effect by discounting it or 
compensating for it. Other researchers proposed that simple awareness of the 
priming episodes does not necessarily lead to their suppression. It may only happen 
when the priming is associated with negative effects or they are perceived to be 
unrepresentative (Strack, 1992). People will also attempt to control priming effects 
when they are motivated to be accurate. The assimilation effect in priming research 
has been fairly reliable as long as the prime is kept unobtrusive, subtle or subliminal. 
The contrast effect in priming research can be avoided by a subliminal presentation 
of the priming stimulus. 
3.2.2.8 Relation between prime and stimulus 
Applicability (discussed in section 3.2.2.3) refers to the level of fit between the stored 
knowledge and the presented stimulus. Smith and Branscombe (1987) investigated 
whether the relation between the specific content of the prime and the content of the 
stimulus information also influences the strength of the priming effect on behavioural 
judgements. Priming by traits words did not have any effect on behavioural 
judgements after a fifteen minute delay, but priming by behavioural descriptions 
produced an assimilation effect. The study demonstrated that priming effects could 
also be a function of prime-stimulus similarity. 
3.2.3 Information-processing consequences 
In this review the discussion will now focus on the functional consequences of the 
activation of cognitive structures on subsequent processing of social information. 
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3.2.3.1 Representation consistent attention 
The higher the accessibility of a stored knowledge unit or construct, the more likely it 
is that stimulus information related to that knowledge will receive attention. 
Individuals with high chronic accessibility for a particular trait were less able to ignore 
that construct when it appeared in a Stroop task (Bargh & Pratto, 1986). Individuals 
whose chronic accessibility for particular objects were relatively high, or whose 
accessibility of these objects was temporarily increased, were more likely to notice 
these objects (Roskos-Ewoldson & Fazio, 1992). Work by Cohen (1981) and Markus 
(1977) demonstrated that people are more likely to notice information that can be 
assimilated into their existing knowledge about self and others, especially if the latter 
are highly accessible (Bargh, 1984; Higgins et al., 1982). The results of an 
experiment by White and Carlston (1983) supported the impact of activated cognitive 
structures on attention and recognition in social interactions. 
3.2.3.2 Representation consistent encoding 
The activation of cognitive structures affects a person’s ability to encode relevant 
social information and also the nature and content of the encoding derived from that 
information (Bargh et al., 1986; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins et al., 1977; Sedikides 
& Skowronksi, 1991). The effects of cognitive structure activation on social encoding 
appear to be automatic and not a strategic or controlled effect (Lombardi et al., 1987; 
Martin, 1986). 
3.2.3.3 Representation consistent memory 
The studies by Higgins et al. (1982) supported the conclusion that stimulus 
information related to more chronically accessible constructs is remembered better 
than stimulus information related to less accessible constructs. Subjects’ memory 
and impressions of a target person’s behaviour were influenced by their chronically 
accessible constructs. The same findings were supported by the work of King and 
Sorrentino (1988). The speed and confidence in the memory processing of self-
relevant information, demonstrated by Markus (1977), has already been mentioned. 
Bower and Gilligan (1979) demonstrated the improved recall and recognition of self-
relevant information. 
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3.2.3.4 Representation consistent affect 
Research on schema-triggered affect has demonstrated that when an affect-laden 
social category (e.g. stereotype) is activated, it will influence how a target person, 
categorised in these terms, is evaluated (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). The affect or 
evaluation (e.g. liking or disliking) linked to the representation, will also be applied or 
experienced towards the target person. The higher the accessibility of a stored 
knowledge unit, the more likely a stimulus event will produce feelings related to that 
knowledge. Strauman and Higgins (1987) primed desired-self attributes that were 
discrepant from subjects’ actual-self attributes and it produced dejection-related or 
agitation-related emotions. 
3.2.3.5 Representation derived evaluation and judgment 
The higher the accessibility of a stored knowledge unit, the more likely a stimulus 
event will be judged in relation to that knowledge. Studies by Devine (1989), Duncan 
(1976) and Lewicki (1985) demonstrated this effect. In studies by Srull and Wyer 
(1979, 1980) subjects with activated hostility-relevant constructs perceived an 
ambiguous stimulus person’s behaviour as more hostile than the subjects with less 
active hostility-relevant constructs. The theory of schema-triggered affect proposes 
that the overall tone of a significant other representation may be transferred to a new 
person (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). The activation and application of a significant-
other representation to a new person should lead to evaluations of the person 
derived from the representation. Work by Andersen and Baum (1994) and Andersen 
et al. (1996) in support of this proposition will be discussed in section 3.3.2.3.8. This 
is analogous to what has been demonstrated upon activation of a social category or 
stereotype. 
3.2.3.6 Representation consistent behaviour 
Lau (1989) found that candidate choice in an election was related to political 
orientation, especially for individuals with chronically accessible political constructs. 
Fazio and Williams (1986) also studied an election and found that voting behaviour of 
individuals could be predicted by their attitudes towards the candidates. Carver, 
Ganellen, Froming and Chambers (1983) demonstrated that subjects with activated 
aggression-relevant constructs judged a stimulus person as more aggressive and 
behaved more aggressively in a different context than subjects in whom the 
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aggression-related constructs were less active. Neuberg (1988) exposed subjects to 
neutral or competitive subliminal primes before they engaged in a laboratory game in 
which players could act either cooperatively or competitively. The subliminal 
competitive primes not only increased the frequency or competitive behaviour, but 
also the intensity of the competitive behaviour in the particular subjects. Pre-
measured personality dispositions also had an effect on the results. People already 
predisposed to be competitive became significantly more competitive if they were 
shown the words, whereas people who were predisposed to be non-competitive 
actually behaved slightly less competitively when primed. Bargh, Chen and Burrows 
(1996) demonstrated the behavioural effects of non-consciously primed traits and 
stereotypes. They concluded that the activation of perceptual representations can be 
related to automatic social behaviour. Lewicki (1985) had participants interact with an 
unpleasant confederate, and in a seemingly unrelated situation, approach two 
receptionists – one of which resembled the unpleasant confederate from the earlier 
encounter. Participants who had the earlier encounter were far less likely than control 
participants (without the earlier unpleasant encounter) to walk to the receptionist that 
resembled the unpleasant confederate. On the basis of physical resemblance, 
person schemas and interpersonal expectancies were activated. 
3.2.3.7 Information processing effects of temporary and chronic activation 
In their review on cognitive structure activation, Sedikides and Skowronski (1991) 
concluded that temporarily and chronically activated cognitive structures do not 
appear to have substantial different judgmental and behavioural effects. 
3.2.4 Summary of social-cognitive theory 
The discussing in section 3.2 focused on the basic concepts describing structures 
that represent social information, as well as the processes that operate on these 
structures. Social information can broadly be represented as declarative knowledge 
(knowledge in propositional form that can readily be reported) or procedural 
knowledge (knowledge in production form based on repeated social-cognitive 
activity). Multiple social-cognitive structures can be differentiated primarily on the 
basis of their content or domain (e.g. self-schemas, person schemas) or the 
complexity of their internal structure (e.g. social construct, schema, interpersonal 
script). The spreading activation mechanism explains the interconnection between 
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different structures and the relationship between different elements of a cognitive 
schema. The accessibility of different cognitive structures describes the level of 
activation and the likelihood that it will be used in the processing of social 
information. Accessibility can be based on chronic sources, temporary sources or a 
combination of both. The results form available research is not clear on the 
interaction in the contributions of these different sources. When people are aware of 
the attempt to bias or control their responses (e.g. through a priming stimulus), a 
contrast effect can replace the expected assimilation effect. In studies using 
subliminal methods, participants do not report being aware of the priming stimuli. 
Different studies have demonstrated the representation consistent information-
processing effects of activated social-cognitive representations or structures. It is 
very likely that the same basic principles that govern other social constructs also 
guide the activation and use of representations of significant-others and relationships 
with significant-others, which will be the focus of discussion in the next section. 
3.3 Representations of significant others and self-with-significant-other 
relationships 
The discussion on attachment theory (see Chapter 2) emphasised the influence of 
early relationships with significant others on later social behaviour. According to 
attachment theory, it is important to experience connection, nurturance and 
acceptance in the relationship with significant others (Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996; 
Holmes & Rempel, 1989). Social-cognitive theory proposes that the mental 
representations (working models of significant others and relationships with 
significant others) play a key role in explaining the influence of early relationships on 
current processing of interpersonal information (Andersen & Glassman, 1996). This 
review will now focus on the nature of representations of self-with-significant-other 
relationships (section 3.3.1) and representations of significant others (section 3.3.2). 
3.3.1. Relational schemas 
Several theorists mentioned in Chapter 1 (for example Bowlby, 1969; Freud, 
1958/1912; Horowitz, 1991; Kiesler, 1996; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1990; Safran 
& Segal, 1990; Sullivan, 1953) proposed various constructs based on the notion that 
people develop cognitive structures representing patterns in their interpersonal 
relationships. Baldwin (1992) proposed a social-cognitive model of how people think 
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about their significant relationships and its effects on their sense of self and their 
relationships. He attempted to integrate social-cognitive models with other classic 
traditions in psychology, for example the interpersonal and attachment theory 
traditions. Baldwin (1992) argued that despite considerable progress in studying 
isolated aspects of social cognition, (e.g. self-schemas, person perception and social 
scripts), important questions still remained about the inter-dependency of two or 
more of these domains.  
3.3.1.1 Theoretical model 
After a review of the relevant literature, Baldwin (1992) theorised that self-with-
significant-other information is represented in memory in relational schemas. A 
relational schema can be defined as a cognitive structure representing regularities in 
patterns of interpersonal relatedness. The focus is placed on cognition about 
relationships, rather than about the self or the other person in isolation. "The 
assumption is that people develop working models of their relationships that function 
as cognitive maps to help them navigate their social world" (Baldwin, 1992, pp. 461-
462). 
Relational schemas are hypothesised to include three elements, namely self-
schemas, associated significant other schemas, and interpersonal scripts. The 
interpersonal scripts reflect knowledge about expected patterns of interaction 
between the self and others that have been learned through past interactions with 
these others. In this manner the relational schema concept endeavours to explain the 
influence of past social experiences on current experiences. 
Baldwin (1992) defined the self-schema and other-schema components of the 
relational schema, as generalisations about the self and other in particular relational 
contexts that are used to guide the processing of social information. It has already 
been mentioned (section 3.2.1.5) that people have multiple self-schemas. Specific 
self-schemas are hypothesised to be associated with representations of specific 
other people. The self as experienced in that particular relationship is a similar 
concept to the representation of self-with-other as introduced by Ogilvie and 
Ashmore (1991). They emphasised how the self is experienced in different 
relationships. Their self-with-other unit was defined as "a mental representation that 
includes the set of personal qualities (traits, feelings and the like) that an individual 
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believes characterises his or her self when with a particular other person" (Ogilvie & 
Ashmore, 1991, p. 290). It can be assumed that self-schemas and other schemas 
are linked in an associative network with other declarative and procedural knowledge 
relevant to the particular relational context, such as the interpersonal script and 
episodic memories of when the script was activated (Baldwin, 1992). The self-with-
other schema and the other schema can also be associated with a particular 
interpersonal script. The interpersonal script part of a relational schema is composed 
of knowledge about likely sequences of action, represented as if-then contingencies. 
As people get to know someone else, they learn to anticipate how the person will act 
in certain situations and how the person will react to their behaviour (Baldwin, 1992).  
Although people have multiple relational schemas available, their learning history will 
determine which relational schemas are typically used to encode social information. 
The more chronically accessible schemas will play a more dominant role in the 
processing of social information. Although some stability should be derived from a 
person’s preferred or chronically most accessible relational schema, different 
relational schemas can be activated. They can be associated with different 
memories, expectations, interpretations, emotions and behavioural tendencies. This 
can explain different attachment orientations in different relationships or interpersonal 
situations (Baldwin & Fehr, 1995). Baldwin et al., (1996) found that people reported 
different attachment orientations in different significant relationships. Baldwin (1992) 
also proposed that people would take the particular relational context into 
consideration in their perception of self and others. Person A might be viewed 
differently in Situation A than in Situation B. In the same way, different aspects of the 
self become accessible in different contexts. 
The three elements of the relational schema are thought to be structurally associated 
in memory such that schematicity in each element and in the entire structure exists. 
The latter can be termed conjoint schematicity. Priming or activation of one element 
of the relational schema will spread conjointly to the other elements. Baldwin (1992) 
predicted information-processing effects for all three elements in the relational 
schema. Relational schemas will direct people’s attention to specific kinds of 
interpersonal information, leading them to ignore or forget other schema irrelevant 
experiences. Baldwin (1992) also speculated about the motivational and affective 
implications of relational schemas. Apart from the internal states associated with a 
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relational schema, there might be strong motivation to achieve or avoid a particular 
interaction that is partly based on past experience. 
3.3.1.2 Empirical support for the relational schemas model 
Elements of the relational schema model have received support in research studies 
employing a range of methods. Baldwin and collaborators conducted research to 
examine the content, structure and function of relational schemas across a number of 
interpersonal contexts. Often the focus was on people’s schemas for their closest 
significant relationships (Baldwin, 1999). Some of the research was based on self-
report data, but one of the advantages of conceptualising interpersonal expectancies 
as relational schemas, is that it can also be examined using the experimental 
paradigms of the information-processing approach. 
3.3.1.2.1 Assessing the content of relational schemas 
The relational schema model proposed that the cognitive mechanism underlying 
attachment styles are expectations about interactions with significant others. In a 
study by Baldwin et al. (1993, study 1) subjects first generated if-then or behaviour-
and-response pairs in the interpersonal domains of dependency, closeness and trust 
(for example: “if I depend on my partner, he or she will support me”). Subjects were 
asked to imagine being in the situation with a romantic partner and to rate the 
positive and negative outcomes according to how often the partner would respond 
that way. The results demonstrated a meaningful relationship between subjects’ self-
reported attachment style (secure, anxious/ambivalent or avoidant) and their 
expectations about likely patterns of interaction in the domains of trust and 
closeness. The attachment style of the subjects was measured with the forced choice 
attachment measure of Hazan and Shaver (1987). 
In a second study by Baldwin et al. (1993, study 2) subjects with different attachment 
styles performed a lexical decision task in which target words represented either 
positive or negative interpersonal outcomes and sentences established the 
interpersonal contexts (trust, closeness and dependency). The prediction was that 
placing the words in meaningful interpersonal contexts would overall lead to faster 
response times, and that this effect would be strongest when outcomes matched the 
subject’s attachment style. The overall main effect for relatedness was only 
marginally significant, but in the predicted direction (F(1,29) = 3.67, p = .065). For 
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targets selected to match the expectancies of the attachment styles, there was 
indeed a significant relatedness effect (F(1,30) = 4.40, p < .025). These two studies 
provided evidence that interpersonal expectations, expressed as if-then 
contingencies, could be different in persons with different attachment styles. Subjects 
with different attachment styles gave different estimates of the likelihood of various 
positive and negative outcomes in response to expressions of trust and closeness 
seeking (Baldwin et al., 1993). 
In a number of studies Baldwin and co-workers also used self-report research to 
reveal that the content of if… then… social expectations correlate with specific 
individual differences. Baldwin and Keelan (1999) studied gender differences in 
expectancies of friendliness and dominance. Women expected more affiliative 
responses to their friendly behaviour (F(1,178) = 9.10, p < .01) and their submissive 
behaviour (F(1,178) = 7.19, p < .05) towards other. High self-esteem individuals 
(measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory) also expected more affiliative 
responses to their friendly behaviour towards others (F(1,178) = 9.10, p < .01). Fehr, 
Baldwin, Collins, Patterson and Benditt (1999) found gender differences in the 
anticipated response to the expression of anger in close relationships. Women were 
more likely to expect that when they express aggression directly their partner would 
deny responsibility (p < .10) or mock them (p < .05). In contrast, men were likely to 
expect that that their partner would express hurt feelings (p < .001), avoid (p < .10) or 
reject them (p < .001) when they express aggression more directly. People with 
social anxiety expected others to respond by dominating or rejecting them, even 
when they would act in a warm and friendly manner towards the others (Baldwin & 
Fergusson, cited in Baldwin, 1999). This kind of research investigated the 
interpersonal expectations that may enhance the understanding of the “social-
cognitive maps” that people use to navigate their social behaviour. It is a serious 
limitation that all these studies relied only on self-report methodology. What people 
say they would do in anger situations, for example, may differ from what they would 
actually do. 
Baldwin et al., (1996, studies 1 & 2) demonstrated that subjects’ self-reported general 
attachment style was related to (a) the percentage of their significant relationships 
that fitted their particular attachment style descriptions (F(2,342) = 140.32, p < .001), 
(b) the ease with which they could generate exemplar relationships matching these 
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descriptions (F(2,546) = 7.64, p < .01) and (c) their interpersonal expectations in 
these relationships (F(4,584) = 10.63, p < .001). Participants with secure attachment 
styles (a) were most likely to report secure relationships, (b) could more easily 
identify examples of secure relationships, and (c) had the most positive relationship 
expectancies overall (F(4,342) = 3.17, p < .05). The results demonstrated the 
availability and accessibility of relational schemas. Most people however reported 
multiple styles of relating, supporting the idea of having multiple interpersonal models 
and ways of relating to available others. 
Although analysing the content of verbal reports has proven useful in studying the 
content of relational schema, this method is limited to beliefs and motives that 
individuals can consciously experience and articulate (Shaver, Collins & Clark, 1996). 
Baldwin et al. (1996, study 3) primed different types of attachment experiences 
through visualising the face of a person with whom the person had a secure, 
avoidant or anxious-ambivalent relationship. As predicted, the selective priming 
affected participants’ attraction to potential dating partners who displayed particular 
attachment behaviour (F(4,142) = 2.46, p < .05). There was no significant effect 
when attraction ratings were analysed in terms of self-reported attachment style and 
the result is therefore difficult to reconcile with the view that attachment styles are 
essentially stable dispositions. 
3.3.1.2.2 Priming studies with relational schemas 
One of the fundamental assumptions of the relational schema construct is the 
conjoint schematicity or associative links between the different elements of the 
schema. Baldwin (1999) agreed with the assertion by Higgins and Bargh (1987) and 
Segal, Hood, Shaw and Higgins (1988) that evidence of spreading activation is 
needed before one can claim the existence of a schema. This will demand that one 
element of the hypothesised schema be primed and measures taken to demonstrate 
that the activation has spread to the other elements. Dependant measures that can 
assess this activation can be reaction time tasks, lexical decision tasks, Stroop tasks 
or other impression formation tasks. Subliminal priming, also in combination with 
reaction time and other related tasks, have an advantage over self-report measures, 
because it may avoid some of the problems with asking persons to report on their 
cognitive processes. It may also provide some insight into the automatic cognitive 
processes of subjects (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Erdley & D’Agostino, 1988). 
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Priming studies can activate a specific relational schema through guided visualisation 
of the significant other or exposure to the name or characteristic features of the 
significant other. The effects of this activated relational schema on information-
processing or behaviour can then be observed (Baldwin, 1995). Baldwin and co-
workers demonstrated the spreading activation between the other schema and the 
self-schema elements of relational schemas in a number of experimental studies 
(Baldwin, 1994; Baldwin et al., 1990; Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Baldwin & Sinclair, 
1996). 
In a study by Baldwin and Holmes (1987) forty undergraduate women visualised the 
faces of either two campus acquaintances or two older members of their family. After 
a short discussion (a time interval of over ten minutes), the subjects were asked to 
take part in a seemingly unrelated experiment of reading a sexually permissive piece 
of fiction and responding on how much they liked it. Participants primed with a 
parental figure reported less enjoyment (M = 4.02) of the sexually charged written 
passages than did participants who were primed with the representation of a friend 
(M= 4.82, F(1,36) = 4.46, p < .05). This finding suggested that the activation of the 
representation of a familial significant other versus a friend differentially influenced 
participants’ self-evaluative standards. In the debriefing after the study, the subjects 
overwhelmingly denied awareness that the “private audiences” that were primed had 
any connection with their responses to the passage (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987). The 
results supported the assumption that the visualisation prime served as a cue in 
activating cognitive structures representing significant others and one’s relationship 
with them. The primed relational schema apparently shaped the subjects’ sense of 
what kind of behaviour were acceptable. 
It was hypothesized that cognitive structures representing interpersonal information 
could be activated with more subtle or even minimal primes. In two related studies 
(Baldwin et al., 1990), stimuli representing disapproval by significant authority figures 
were presented as primes below the level of the subjects’ awareness. In study 1 
sixteen graduate students were subliminally exposed (two milliseconds pictorial prime 
followed by a masking slide for ten milliseconds) with (a) the disapproving face of 
their program director, or (b) the smiling face of a post-doctoral fellow. After the 
experiment the subjects were asked to guess what had been flashed on the screen, 
but nobody was able to report accurately on the actual nature of the experimental 
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stimuli. The students who were subliminally exposed to the disapproving face of their 
director rated their research ideas less favourably (M = 72.7) than those who were 
exposed to the approving face of a post-doctoral fellow (M = 79.9, t(15) = 1.84, p < 
.05) (Baldwin et al., 1990, study 1). The findings supported the prediction that even 
very limited exposure to positive or negative evaluative stimuli of an interpersonal 
nature can affect self-evaluation. The sample size and the uncertainty about the 
direction of the effect limited the study. Without a control condition it was impossible 
to indicate whether the disapproving or smiling face was responsible for more of the 
variance. 
In a similar study (Baldwin et al., 1990, study 2), forty-six female Roman Catholic 
participants were asked to read two passages: (a) a filler story about a local park 
area and (b) the same passage describing a woman’s sexual dream portraying a 
permissive attitude toward sexuality that was also previously used by Baldwin and 
Holmes (1987). Then the subjects were subliminally exposed (approximately four 
milliseconds) to (a) the disapproving face of Pope John Paul II, (b) the disapproving 
face of an unfamiliar person, or (c) a plain white card. Subjects were designated as 
high or low practicing following a median split procedure based on their post-
experiment ratings of their involvement in their religion. The participants subliminally 
exposed to the disapproving face of the Pope evaluated themselves less positively 
on a subsequent self-concept inventory than did their counterparts who were 
exposed to the disapproving face of a non-significant other or the control stimulus 
(F(2, 40) = 3.38, p < .05). The effect of the Pope stimulus was limited to those 
subjects who considered themselves highly involved in their religion (F(2, 40) = 3.41, 
p < .05) (Baldwin et al., 1990). Subliminal exposure to the disapproving face of a 
personally significant other had an effect on subsequent self-evaluation. This 
experiment ruled out the alternative explanation that simply the exposure to a 
disapproving face caused the effect. Therefore, the brief exposure to the 
disapproving face of a recognised significant other could activate pre-existing 
cognitive structures representing negative evaluation by people who are personally 
important. The results supported the hypotheses that a pattern of interacting 
observed over time in a relationship, became represented as a regular pattern of 
relating between the self and the significant other. The effect of activating one 
element of the structure could be demonstrated in another element of the structure. A 
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possible alternative interpretation remains that the nature of the stimulus (a 
disapproving face of a significant other) could activate an affective process of some 
kind. This alternative can only be ruled out if stimuli are presented that are more 
neutral in nature, or stimuli that can be experienced in a positive or negative light. 
Names have been used occasionally in social cognition research to prime social 
constructs. Herr (1986) briefly exposed subjects to the names of hostility-related 
people (for example the boxer Joe Frazier or the dictator Adolf Hitler), and those 
primed were more likely to apply hostility in subsequent impression-formation tasks. 
Baldwin (1994, study 1) asked thirty-three undergraduate subjects to provide the 
name of a highly critical person who currently did not like them, and one of a very 
accepting person who did like them. One name or the other was then presented to 
them subliminally (16 milliseconds with a mask of 100 milliseconds) during a 
computer exercise. The subjects were then asked to perform a very difficult task and 
their self-evaluations and momentary mood were assessed. No subject was able to 
report accurately on the priming stimuli. This provides evidence that the masking 
procedure was effective in rendering the names inaccessible to conscious 
awareness. The participants primed with the name of a contingent accepting 
relationship reported lower levels of momentary self-esteem (M = 63.27) than 
participants primed with the name of a non-contingent relationship (M = 71.22, 
F(1,31) = 5.58, p < .05). Although the self-evaluative and the social-evaluative 
concerns of those in the critical-other condition were raised, the effect of the prime 
did not spread to the subjects’ self-report of mood. The subliminal presentation of the 
name of a critical significant other activated a schema for the other person (critical 
other), a schema for the self (“I am inadequate”), and a script for a possible 
interaction (“If I do not perform well, he/she criticises and reject me”) (Baldwin, 1994). 
Unfortunately, the lack of neutral-prime or no-prime control conditions in the 
experiment makes it impossible to infer whether the contingent or non-contingent 
prime is responsible for the experimental effects. Baldwin (1994) also suggested that 
future research should include such control conditions. 
Baldwin and Sinclair (1996) used a lexical decision task to examine people’s speed 
in processing acceptance and rejection target words in success and failure contexts. 
In study 1, low self-esteem individuals recognised rejection words quicker in the 
failure context than in a success context (F(1, 52) = 4.69, p < .05). Thus, low self-
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esteem individuals had a chronically accessible relational schema, in which success 
and failure are associated with acceptance and rejection respectively. It was 
suggested by study 3 that, by means of guided visualisation of an accepting or 
evaluative person, contingent-acceptance relational schemas would be activated. 
Contingent-prime participants recognised rejection words significantly faster in the 
failure than in the success context (t(19) = 2.38, p = .01, one-tailed). It was concluded 
that the acceptance or contingent prime temporarily activated a relational schema in 
which failure was associated with rejection. In study 3, no self-esteem effects were 
found, suggesting that the situational prime were more influential than the individual 
differences between subjects. 
Baldwin and Meunier (1999) did an experiment to demonstrate that interpersonal 
structures may be triggered by contextual and incidental cues in the environment. 
Classical conditioning paradigms examined the possibility of creating associations 
between neutral cues and specific relational schemas so that presentation of the cue 
activates the relational expectancies. The activation of the relational schemas were 
tested by conducting a lexical decision task with forty-two participants of different 
attachment orientations while a specific tone sequence, previously conditioned with 
visualising a non-contingently accepting or a contingently accepting significant 
person, were played in the background. The conditioned stimulus had an impact on 
how people processed interpersonal information. In both cases the contingent 
conditioned stimulus activated an expectancy of contingent evaluative feedback. For 
participants higher in the preoccupied orientation, the stimulus led them anticipate an 
if-then link between failure and rejection (F(3,37) = 5.91, p < .05) and for those higher 
in the secure orientation a link between success and acceptance (F(3,36) = 6.96, p < 
.05). The two avoidant attachment conditions (fearful and dismissing) did not 
contribute to the prediction of conditioning effects. There was no non-conditioned 
stimulus or neutral-conditioned stimulus control conditions in the experiment. The 
results have also not yet been replicated.  
In a study by Pierce and Lydon (1998) subliminal presentation of positive or negative 
interpersonal words was used to activate positive and negative interpersonal 
expectations. The experimental priming manipulation influenced participants’ affect, 
support seeking and coping responses when faced with an imagined stressful event. 
The activation of positive interpersonal expectations increased reports of seeking 
 48
emotional support (t(45) = 2.68, p < .01, r = .37) and decreased the use of self-
denigrating coping (t(45) = 2.12, p < .05, r = .30). The activation of negative 
interpersonal expectations decreased reports of positive affect (t(45) = 2.48, p < .01, 
r = .35) and tended to impede growth-oriented coping (t(45) = 1.54, p < .07). 
Murphy and Zajonc (1993) found that subliminal priming or preactivating participants 
with a happy face increased their liking of neutral Chinese ideographs. Banse (1999) 
extended this technique and primed participants with the first names or faces of 
relationship partners, their own names or faces or neutral control words and unknown 
faces. The visibility of the primes was manipulated by either masking them or not. It 
was investigated how the different priming conditions modulated the evaluation of 
immediately following neutral Chinese letters. In the low visibility condition, the letters 
were more positively evaluated when they were preceded by the name or face of the 
relationship partner than when they were preceded by the participant’s name or face 
(F(2, 198) = 8.53, p < .001). The subliminal activation of the cognitive representation 
of relationship partners evoked a positive reaction from participants. In the high 
visibility condition, a similar but stronger effect was found for face primes, and no 
effect for name primes. In this condition the nature of the stimulus played a more 
conscious role in determining the participants’ responses to the stimulus. 
Mikulincer, Hirschberger, Nacmias and Gillath (2001, study 5) subliminally primed 
participants with the names of a positive attachment figure, the name of a close 
person, a known person or an unknown person. The participants made higher liking 
ratings of Chinese ideographs following the priming with the attachment person (M = 
4.12), than the close person (M = 3.67), the known person (M = 3.46) or the unknown 
person (M = 3.64, F(3,123) = 7.88, p < .01). 
3.3.1.3 Discussion of relational schema model 
Smith (1984) asked for a single, more general, social-cognitive model that could 
integrate different social-cognitive domains. The relational schema construct 
(Baldwin, 1992) integrated contributions from various theoretical paradigms in one 
social-cognitive formulation. It was hypothesised that relational schemas are based 
on repeated interactions with significant others and are constituted by the self-
schema, other schema and interpersonal script components operating in close 
interaction. Priming of one element is expected to spread to the other. Multiple 
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relational schemas could be available to most people and could become available in 
different social contexts. Any one model may be more or less chronically accessible 
and play a more dominant role in the processing of social information. 
The study by Baldwin et al. (1993) matched attachment styles (chronic accessibility) 
with interpersonal contexts and target words to demonstrate facilitated processing of 
social information in related conditions. This is a good example of a study 
acknowledging different factors that may be involved in determining the contribution 
of past experiences. 
The priming studies that were done in their research program demonstrated the 
effects of subliminal exposure to the faces of personally significant persons on 
subsequent self-evaluation tasks. Although the primes were personally significant, 
they were in most cases general stimuli presented to all participants and not based 
on the specific significant others of individual participants. The effects could be 
ascribed to the nature of the stimuli and not the personal history with significant 
others. Banse (1999) primed participants with the first names of relationship partners, 
but investigated a very general response reaction. None of the studies investigated 
the effect of priming with significant others (the other schema component of the 
relational schema) on the processing of interpersonal scripts (the script component of 
the relational schema). It is also important to note that most of these studies were 
done without considering variations in attachment style. The relational schema model 
contributed to the present study in providing the relational schema as a theoretical 
construct describing regularities in past interpersonal relatedness, influencing the 
current processing of interpersonal information. The priming studies that were done 
with relational schemas provided a paradigm for investigating the different elements 
of a working model. 
In the next section a discussion on the representations of significant other is 
presented. It will contribute to the understanding of the features of representations of 
significant others and its influence on the prosessing of social information. 
3.3.2 Representations of significant others 
This review has already emphasised the role of significant others in the social 
development of individuals (Chapter 2), as well as the cognitive representation of 
interpersonal relationships (section 3.3.1). This section will focus on the way that 
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significant others are represented in memory. It can be assumed that representations 
of significant others is part of a network of interconnected social constructs. The 
contribution of the social-cognitive model of transference, as introduced by Andersen 
and Baum (1994), will be reviewed. Andersen and co-workers have done extensive 
work investigating the cognitive representation of significant others and the effects of 
activating those stored representations on the processing of social information. 
3.3.2.1 Social-cognitive model of transference 
Information about a specific person, in this case a significant other, can operate as a 
social construct representing an individual person. The central argument of the 
social-cognitive model of transference is that mental representations of significant 
others develop from numerous interactions with these individuals. The relationships 
with significant others are often characterised by stronger emotional bonds, more 
positive experiences and frequent interactions (Shah, 2003a). Significant other 
representations are of relevance to the self and are often laden with affect. People 
have numerous interactions with their significant others, and should be highly familiar 
with them. Therefore representations of significant others will have numerous 
features and share associative links with many other constructs (Andersen, 
Glassman & Gold, 1998; Prentice, 1990). The significant other representations are 
also connected with the representations of the self by means of self-significant other 
or relational linkages (similar to the proposal by Baldwin, 1992). 
This representation or exemplar of a significant other person, based on past 
experiences, can be activated and applied to a new person. As a result, interactions 
with this new person will be experienced as if he or she was the significant other. 
This activation of stored representations about a significant other and the application 
to a new person constitute the fundamental process by which transference occurs 
(Chen & Andersen, 1999). 
The same basic principles thought to govern other social constructs (see section 3.2) 
similarly guide the activation and use of significant other representations. Overall the 
social-cognitive model on transference suggests that significant other representations 
will have a chronic readiness to be activated. However, recent activation or priming of 
a significant-other representation further increases the likelihood that the 
representation will be activated and applied to a newly encountered person. 
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Furthermore, the resemblance or applicability between the target person and the 
stored knowledge about the significant other also increase the likelihood that the 
representation of the significant other will be activated and applied to the new person 
(Chen & Andersen, 1999). People will be more likely to remember a newly 
encountered person in terms of an applicable significant-other representation. They 
will report that they had learned something about the new person that they actually 
had inferred from the relevant significant-other representation (Baum & Andersen, 
1999). Chen and Andersen (1999) regarded these memory effects as the basic index 
of representation derived transference. When some information about a new person 
reminds a perceiver of a significant other, the stored representation of the significant 
other comes consciously or unconsciously to mind, colouring the perceiver's 
interpretations of and responses toward the new person (Chen & Andersen, 1999). 
Although significant other representations are expected to operate like other 
constructs (Higgins & King, 1981) and exemplars (Smith & Zárate, 1992), they are 
assumed to be especially affectively and motivationally laden (Andersen et al., 1998). 
The activation and application of a significant-other representation to a new person 
should also lead to evaluations of that person derived from the representation. In line 
with the proposal of the theory of schema-triggered affect, the overall tone of a 
significant other representation may be transferred to a new person (Fiske & 
Pavelchak, 1986). The social-cognitive model of transference proposes that 
significant-other representations also include information about motivations, and 
expectations experienced previously in relationships with significant others. 
The model also assumes that representations of self and significant others are linked 
in memory. When the significant-other representation is activated, aspects of the self 
that have been experienced in the relationship with the significant other will also be 
activated. This can be demonstrated in terms of motivations, affect, roles and 
expectations that the person experiences in relation to the significant other. 
Significant other resemblance in a new target person should lead to shifts in the 
working self-concept toward the self when with the relevant significant other (Chen & 
Andersen, 1999). The best evidence for this will involve changes in the working self-
concept, in the direction of the self-when-with-the-significant-other. People will 
become the version of themselves that they are when they are with the significant 
other. 
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The model also has a motivational basis, because it recognises that people’s 
motivations for satisfaction and security will influence their relationships with their 
significant others and will therefore also be represented in their representations of 
self, significant others and the self in relation to significant others (Chen & Andersen, 
1999). 
3.3.2.2 Basic experimental paradigm 
Andersen and Baum (1994) are of opinion that ”the unequivocal demonstration of 
transference involves the independent assessment of a previously formed mental 
representation, presumably of a significant other, and the demonstration that this 
specific representation can be applied to another person” (p. 465). Andersen and co-
workers used a basic experimental design to conduct their research program. 
Idiographic methods were used to assess the idiosyncratic content of people’s 
representations of their significant others. These descriptors were then used as 
stimuli in a nomothetic experimental design. The use of a combined idiographic-
nomothetic methodology made it possible to track normative processes generalising 
across people, while using idiographic information (Chen & Andersen, 1999). 
In a pre-test session, participants were asked to generate descriptive sentences 
about a significant other, and if needed about other control constructs as well. These 
descriptors were later used as stimulus materials in a nomothetic experiment. In most 
of the experiments participants were asked to name two significant others (“someone 
you know very well, have known for a long time, and is very important in your life”, p. 
1112). One was to be a positive significant other (“someone you like very much and 
feel good about, someone in whose presence you feel happy and great about 
yourself, and someone you want to be close to, want to share your feelings with, and 
do not want to distance yourself from”, p. 1112), and the other was to be a negative 
significant other (“someone you do not like very much and do not feel very good 
about, someone in whose presence you feel unhappy and bad about yourself, and 
someone you do not want to be close to, want to avoid sharing your feelings with, 
and want to distance yourself from”, p. 1112) (Andersen et al., 1996). 
Complete one-to-one participant yoking across conditions was used – meaning that 
each participant in the experimental condition was yoked with a participant in the 
control condition, so that the control participant was exposed to the exact significant 
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other features of this experimental participant. The yoking procedure completely 
controlled the nomothetic content of the target features presented across conditions, 
leaving only differences in idiographic meaning. This control made it possible to draw 
conclusions about the basic processes emerging in the significant other resemblance 
condition, ruling out the possibility that just anyone’s significant other features might 
be able to produce such effects (Andersen & Baum, 1994). 
In the learning phase of the experiment, conducted in a separate session, normally 
about two weeks later, participants learned descriptive sentences about one or more 
target persons. One target always resembled the significant other participants had 
described earlier. After learning about the target person(s), participants took part in 
the test phase of the experimental session. They completed a variety of dependant 
measures, including a standard recognition-memory test composed of 
representation-derived descriptive sentences (as well as some filler sentences) that 
were or were not presented about each target in the learning phase (Chen & 
Andersen, 1999). 
For every target person, the participants’ recognition-memory responses and their 
confidence ratings for representation-derived descriptors that were not actually 
presented in the learning phase, served as measure of the representation-derived 
transference. The more representation-derived responses and higher confidence in 
the significant-other-resemblance condition relative to the control condition(s) served 
as the basic index of representation-derived memory and inference. 
3.3.2.3 Empirical support of social-cognitive model of transference 
3.3.2.3.1 Identification of significant others 
In the study by Andersen and Baum (1994) a group of fifty undergraduate students, 
when asked to identify the significant other people in their lives, listed family 
members (33% - of which about half were parents), close friends (44%) and romantic 
partners (14%). Most of the romantic partners were considered to be positive (86%), 
and the non-parental significant others of their parents’ age that were listed (for 
example extended family or non-family) were mostly negative. Another group of forty-
seven subjects (Andersen et al., 1995) named family members (44% - including 22% 
mothers and 9% fathers), close friends (48%) and romantic partners (8%) as 
significant others. They identified acquaintances (30%), not-so-close friends (28%) 
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and various working people (42%) as non-significant others. These results supported 
the notion that parents (especially mothers) and close friends are the positive 
significant others in the lives of students. 
3.3.2.3.2 Accessibility of significant other representations 
In a feature-listing task with twenty-three participants, they listed more attributes 
describing a significant other than attributes describing three other social categories 
(non-significant other, stereotype or trait) (F(3,63) = 9.60, p < .0001) (Andersen & 
Cole, 1990, study 1). This implied that representations of significant others are richer 
in associations than the other social categories or that the associations are at least 
more accessible. In a similar study, the latency period to list features of a significant 
other was significantly shorter than any other condition (t(19) = 3.33, p < .001) 
(Andersen & Cole, 1990, study 2). These results suggested that the features of 
significant others are easier to retrieve than the features of related stereotypes and 
traits. 
3.3.2.3.3 Representation consistent memory effects 
Andersen and Cole (1990) demonstrated evidence for the representation-derived 
inference and memory. In study 3 (Anderson & Cole, 1990), participants had to 
generate at least fourteen descriptive items for people from each of four social 
categories (significant other, non-significant other, stereotype and trait). In a 
seemingly unrelated “memory” experiment, ten features were presented to them 
about each of four fictional people, of which six were taken from the items generated 
above. In a recognition memory test the participants had to indicate which of fifteen 
statements were earlier presented as descriptive of that particular fictional person. 
This was an ideographic extension of the false positive memory paradigm introduced 
by Cantor and Mischel (1977). The recognition confidence ratings of category 
descriptive items that have not been presented in the learning trails were averaged 
for every category and compared. The participants were significantly more confidant 
that they have seen category descriptive features that were not presented to them 
when it was features of the own significant other rather than from any other category 
(t(20) = 2.64, p = .01). The recognition confidence ratings of category descriptive 
features that were indeed presented to them were also higher when a significant 
other representation was activated at encoding (t(20) = 2.31, p = .025) (Andersen & 
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Cole, 1990, study 3). The activation of a significant-other representation by an 
unfamiliar, fictional target person led to significantly more false-positive recognition 
errors in remembering information about this person, than did the activation of any 
other category. The activation also led to better memory of the information that had 
actually been presented during the learning trials. They succeeded in their general 
research goal of activating a significant-other representation and eliciting bias in the 
processing of social information or social behaviour. 
This result has been replicated in numerous studies, using designs varying the 
number of target persons about whom participants learn, the control conditions used 
and the manner in which participants are exposed tot the descriptors about the target 
persons (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen et al., 1995; 
Andersen et al., 1996; Glassman & Andersen, 1999b; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). 
Perceivers were more likely to assume that a new person had features consistent 
with their significant other than features of non-significant others they knew or of 
social categories they used (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen et al., 1995). These 
results were demonstrated whether the significant other representations were 
positively or negatively toned (Andersen & Baum, 1994). 
3.3.2.3.4 Chronic accessibility 
It has been demonstrated that significant-other representations are highly familiar, 
frequently thought about, and of relevance to the self (Andersen & Glassman, 1996; 
Andersen et al., 1998). Therefore it was proposed that significant-other 
representations are very likely to be chronically accessible. Studies demonstrated 
that the basic inference and memory effects have persisted and may even 
exacerbate over time (Glassman & Andersen, 1999b). Participants completed a 
recognition-memory test immediately after learning about new people and again two 
to three weeks later. The participants expressed greater confidence in having learned 
representation-consistent attributes that were not presented to them in the 
significant-other condition relative to the control conditions across both administration 
times (F(3,48) = 12.60, p < .0001). The predicted transference effect increased from 
the immediate measurement (t(16) = 2.60, p < .01) to the two to three week follow-up 
measurement (t(16) = 4.18, p < .0005). The participants demonstrated greater 
recognition confidence in all the experimental conditions overall at the follow-up 
measurement (M = 2.29), compared to the immediate measurement (M = 1.57). 
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Glassman and Andersen (1999b, study 2) attempted to rule out the possibility that 
the effects in the follow-up measurement were due to the repeated administration of 
the memory test. The first and only administration of the memory test took place 
during the follow-up session. The expected effect was found (F(3,60) = 6.35, p < 
.0008) as participants expressed greater confidence in having learned 
representation-consistent attributes not presented to them in the significant-other 
condition (M=2.67) relative to the control conditions (M = 2.24). The memory effect 
favouring the target person resembling the own significant other was therefore also 
present two weeks after the exposure. The duration of such effect demonstrated the 
chronic accessibility of significant other representations. 
3.3.2.3.5 Chronic accessibility and priming sources of activation 
The presence versus absence of priming was manipulated in a study to examine 
whether chronic and priming sources of activation combined to elicit transference 
(Andersen et al., 1995, study 1). Forty-seven participants took part in a pre-test 
session in which they identified and described a significant other and a non-
significant other. In the experimental session that immediately followed the pre-test 
session (priming condition) or followed several weeks later (no-priming condition) 
they learned about four new target persons that resembled their own significant 
other, their own non-significant other, a yoked participant’s significant other or a 
yoked participant’s non-significant other. Afterwards they completed a standard 
recognition-memory test. Participants showed greater representation-derived 
recognition memory about the target resembling their own significant other, relative to 
their non-significant other and each of the yoked-participants’ targets (F(1,43) = 9.37, 
p < .004). These findings held across priming conditions, suggesting the chronic 
accessibility of the significant-other representation. For targets resembling the 
participants’ significant others, the representation-derived inference and memory 
were greater in the priming condition than the non-priming condition (F(1,43) = 6.56, 
p < .01). The data demonstrated that both chronic and transient priming sources of 
activation contributed in an additive manner to the activation of significant-other 
representations (Andersen et al., 1995). The transient sources of activation could be 
understood to be the presence or absence of advanced priming and the presence or 
absence of the triggering stimulus in the target person. Andersen et al. (1995, study 
2) replicated the results of study 1, but added a no-trigger significant other condition, 
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(the target resembled a significant other of a yoked participant, but the recognition 
memory test involved features of one of the participant’s significant others), a 
someone else’s significant other condition and a loose set of self-generated person 
descriptors. The participants showed more false memory confidence when the target 
resembled the participant’s own significant other than in the remaining conditions 
(F(3,87) = 12.14, p < .0001). The data indicated that significant other activation 
occurred even when it was not provoked by target cues in the no trigger condition in 
comparison to the other control conditions (t(29) 3.30, p < .005) (Andersen et al., 
1995, study 2). 
Shah (2003a, study 1) investigated the commitment of participants to the goals the 
significant others had for them. Priming with the name of a significant other had a 
stronger effect when the participants reported being close to the primed person 
compared to when they were relatively distant. This suggested that the nature of the 
relationship with the significant other moderated the commitment of participants to 
the goals the significant others had for them. The closeness to the significant other 
could also support the suggestion that the representation of the significant other was 
frequently used and therefore chronically activated. In a similar experiment (Shah, 
2003a, study 2) measuring the accessibility of goal related words in a lexical decision 
task, the effect of priming the concept “father” also increased with the degree to 
which participants were closer to their fathers and with the degree to which their 
fathers were perceived to value their pursuit of these goals (B = 0.046, F(1,42) = 
5.24, p < .05). 
3.3.2.3.6 Chronic accessibility and applicability sources of activation 
The social-cognitive model of transference predicted that applicability sources of 
activation would increase the likelihood that the relevant significant other 
representation be activated and applied to the person. This prediction was studied by 
manipulating the presence versus absence of applicability (Andersen et al., 1995). In 
the pre-test session participants were asked to name and generate descriptive 
statements for two different significant others. They also generated one descriptive 
sentence for each of a diverse list of well-known individuals, to provide stimuli for a 
new "no representation" control condition. Participants learned about four target 
persons in the learning phase. In the applicability condition, participants learned 
about a target person who resembled one of their significant others and received 
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descriptive statements from the same significant other as test items. In the no-
applicability condition, the target resembled one of the yoked participants' significant 
others, but the participant received descriptive statements from the other own 
significant other as test items. In the first control condition descriptive statements 
from a yoked participants' significant other were presented as target descriptive 
statements as well as test items. In the second control condition, descriptive 
statements from the "no representation" condition were presented as target 
descriptive statements as well as test items. As predicted, greater representation 
derived memory was demonstrated in the applicability condition relative to the non-
applicability condition. In the non-applicability condition there was evidence of greater 
representation derived memory than in the each of the control conditions. Therefore, 
evidence for the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations was also 
demonstrated. Overall, this study demonstrated that a significant other representation 
is more likely to be activated and applied to a new person when the new person 
bears some resemblance to the significant other and thus “triggers” the 
representation. This process occured even though significant other representations 
were chronically accessible and likely to be used (Andersen et al., 1995). 
Chen et al. (1999) examined the hypotheses that increasing degrees of applicability 
would combine with chronic accessibility of significant other representations to 
produce increasing activation of these representations. No applicability effect was 
found, but greater representation consistent memory for targets resembling 
significant others demonstrated the chronic accessibility of significant other 
representations. Because there was a degree of applicability in all the experimental 
conditions, the results could not be explained as only a result of chronic accessibility.  
It was difficult to distinguish between knowledge activation and knowledge use when 
knowledge was at least partly been activated on the basis of applicability cues from 
the target person. In such a case, the applicability cues did not only activate the 
knowledge, but were also part of the task that demonstrated the use of the 
knowledge (Chen et al., 1999). Knowledge activation could also take part during the 
memory test. 
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3.3.2.3.7 Unconscious activation of significant other representations 
In an experiment by Glassman and Andersen (1999a) participants were brought 
under the impression that they were interacting in a computer task with another 
participant, while they were simultaneously subliminally exposed to descriptors of 
either their own significant other, the significant other of another participant, or a self-
generated no-representation control group. In a subsequent impression-rating task, 
participants were asked to rate several features in terms of how descriptive they were 
of their “computer partner”. When the subliminal stimuli described their own 
significant other, the participants were to more likely to indicate that their “computer 
partner” had other features of their significant other in addition to those that were 
subliminally presented to them (F(2,111) = 3.59, p = .03). In a direct comparison 
between the own significant other group (M = 5.86) and the significant others of 
another participant group (M = 4.82), the effect was significant (t(71) = 2.45, p < .02). 
A manipulation check confirmed that the participants were not conscious of the 
stimuli (Glassman & Andersen, 1999a, study 1). The central findings of study 1 were 
replicated with similar differences between the own significant other group (M = 5.70) 
and the significant others of another participant group (M = 4.82, F(1,74) = 4.22 p = 
.04) (Glassman & Andersen, 1999a, study 2). The findings demonstrated that 
significant other representations could be activated by the subliminal presentation of 
features of significant others. 
Shah (2003a, study 1) demonstrated that when participants received a subliminal 
prime (55 milliseconds) with the name of their mothers, they rated significantly more 
commitment to the goals that their mother had for them, compared to a prime of a 
control word (B = 1.19, F(1,34) = 9.31, p < .01) or the name of a friend (B = 0.93, 
F(1,34) = 9.03, p < .01). The analysis also provided evidence that when participants 
reported being close to their mother, priming them with the name of their mother had 
a significantly stronger effect compared to the friend prime (B = 0.83, F(1,34) = 5.28, 
p < .01) or the control prime (B = 1.17, F(1,34) = 5.12, p = .01). Closeness to the 
friend moderated the priming effect in a similar way. 
3.3.2.3.8 Representation consistent evaluation 
In a between subjects design Andersen and Baum (1994) asked fifty participants to 
describe both a significant other about whom they feel very positively and one about 
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whom they feel very negatively. Two weeks later, in a “different experiment” about 
“social interaction” half of the subjects learned about a target person that resembled 
their own positive or negative significant other and the other half about a target 
person that resembled someone else’s positive or negative significant other. They 
then completed an evaluation measure of the target person and a recognition 
memory test. The recognition memory test again confirmed that the recognition-
confidence ratings for category descriptive features that were not presented were 
higher when the target resembled their own significant other (F(4,46) = 14.63, p < 
.0004). On the evaluation measure, subjects rated the target persons more positively 
when they resembled their positive significant other (M = 4.72), rather than the 
significant other of someone else (M = 4.21, t(46) = 3.47, p < .005). The target 
person resembling the own negative significant other were also rated more 
negatively (M = 3.39) than the target resembling another person’s negative significant 
other (M = 4.17, t(46) = 5.09, p < .0005). The participants expressed more 
representation-consistent evaluation toward the target person when the target 
resembled their own significant other (Andersen & Baum, 1994). In this study the 
subjects listed their significant other features two weeks in advance and the 
transference phenomenon occurred even when the significant other was not primed 
immediately in advance. It suggested that the significant other representations were 
chronically accessible, although the representation relevant features of the target 
persons also acted as possible sources of temporary activation. 
In research examining the representation-derived evaluation in transference, 
participants were asked to name and describe positively and negatively evaluated 
significant others. Representation-derived evaluation was then examined by 
manipulating significant-other resemblance and the evaluative tone of the significant 
other representation in the experimental setting. In a “real” social context where the 
target person was allegedly seated next door and a personal interaction was 
imminent, participants tended to evaluate new persons as a function of whether or 
not the new persons resembled a positively or negatively toned significant other 
(Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996). People liked a new person that 
resembled a positively toned significant other more than a negatively toned 
significant other. The effect, however, did not hold up in all experimental conditions 
(Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996). 
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3.3.2.3.9 Representation consistent affect 
The Andersen and Baum (1994) experiment was also used to study the transfer of 
transient schema-triggered affect. The participants felt slightly less depressed when 
targets resembled their own positive significant other (M = -.20) compared to their 
own negative significant other (M = .01), but the pattern was non-significant. 
Andersen et al. (1996) designed a study to investigate the assumptions that 
motivations, expectations and affect experienced previously in relationships with 
significant others, can be activated and applied to other persons. Participants' facial 
expressions were covertly videotaped as they learned each descriptive statement 
about the new target person. This provided a non-verbal measure of the affect 
experienced by the participant upon encoding the descriptive statements. Two 
judges, blind to the condition, rated participants' facial expressions for pleasantness 
as they read each descriptor (Andersen et al., 1996). Participants responded with 
more positive affect when they were learning about the target that resembled their 
positively toned significant other in comparison to the negatively toned significant 
other (t(76) = 1.73, p = .045). This pattern did not emerge when the target resembled 
the yoked participant’s significant others. Analyses were also conducted to ascertain 
whether the participants’ affect was responsive to the valence of the target 
descriptive statements. Participants displayed more positive affect when they were 
exposed to the positive descriptive statements of a target person resembling their 
negatively valenced significant other. However, they responded to negative 
descriptive statements of the positively valenced target person with especially 
positive facial affect. The negative descriptive statements in relation to the positive 
significant other moved the participants to respond with positive affect. This pattern 
was not present in the affective response to the yoked participant’s significant other. 
The study however did not demonstrate any difference in participants’ self-report of 
their own subjective mood state. 
3.3.2.3.10 Representation consistent motivation 
The study by Andersen et al. (1996) also examined the motivation to interpersonal 
closeness of participants, by assessing their desire to approach the target person 
rather than avoid him or her. In the pre-test session, participants were asked to name 
a positively toned significant other whom they felt close to and wanted to be still 
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closer to, and a negatively toned significant other whom they did not feel close to and 
from whom they wanted to be even more distant. After learning about the new target 
person, the participant’s self-reported motivation for interpersonal closeness with the 
target person was assessed. The results showed that participants were more 
motivated to approach the target persons who resembled their own positively toned 
significant other (M = 3.96) relative to the target resembling their negatively toned 
significant other (M = 2.62, t(76) = 3.72, p < .001). This pattern did not occur for the 
yoked participant's significant other. 
3.3.2.3.11 Representation consistent expectancies 
Andersen et al. (1996) assessed participants' expectancies of being accepted or 
rejected by a new target person that resembled a positively or negatively toned 
significant other. At pre-test, the participants indicated that the positively toned 
significant other would demonstrate more liking and the negatively toned significant 
other would demonstrate more rejection towards them. As predicted, the participants 
expected the target persons, that resembled their positively toned significant others, 
to like them more (M = 4.85) than the target persons that resembled their negatively 
toned significant others (M = 3.83, t(76) = 2.46, p < .01) (Andersen et al., 1996).  
3.3.2.3.12 Representation consistent role relations 
Interpersonal roles and scripts can help to define relationships with significant others. 
The social-cognitive model of transference suggests that the roles one experiences 
in a relationship with a significant other are included in the linkages between the 
representations of the self and the significant other in memory. When a target person 
resembles a perceiver’s significant other, role information linking the significant other 
with the self should also be activated.  
Baum and Andersen (1999) investigated the hypothesis that if the person acts 
incongruent to the expected role relationship, the expectations and goals of the 
perceiver might be disrupted, leading to negative affect. When a significant other 
relationship is positive, and the target person acts in congruence to that role, the 
perceiver might experience a relatively positive mood state. In the pre-test session, 
participants were asked to generate positive and negative descriptive statements 
about positively toned significant others who were authority figures to them. 
Participants then learned about a new target person resembling their own or a yoked 
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participant’s significant other. All the participants anticipated an interaction with the 
target person in which the person was in the role of either an “expert” or a “beginner” 
(Baum & Andersen, 1999). When the target resembled their own positively toned 
significant other and was in an incongruent role relative to the significant other, 
participants reported increased depressed mood (M = .296). When the target was in 
a congruent role, it was reflected in the non-depressive reported mood state of the 
participant (M = -0.166, t(55) = 1.77, p < .05). These differences did not emerge in 
the yoked participants’ significant-other condition. The results demonstrated that 
information about the typical role relationship with significant others can be stored in 
memory as part of significant other representation (Baum & Andersen, 1999). 
Interpersonal roles experienced previously in relationships can provide structure for 
the affect experienced in new relationships with other people (Chen & Andersen, 
1999). 
3.3.2.3.13 Significant other representations and goal pursuit 
The work by Shah (2003a, study 1) described in section 3.3.2.3.5 and 3.3.2.3.7, 
demonstrated that the subliminal activation of participants’ representations of their 
significant others automatically increased their commitment to the goals that these 
individuals have for them. Shah (2003a, study 2) demonstrated that participants’ 
closeness to their father, the perceived value their father placed on the task goal and 
the priming with their father’s name significantly predicted the persistence of the 
participants on the task (B = 1.57, F(1,43) = 4.31, p < .05), as well as their 
performance on the task (B = 1.58, F(1,43) = 4.18, p < .05). The results provided 
evidence that participants’ representations of significant others may have 
motivational effects, affecting goal accessibility, goal commitment, goal persistence 
and goal performance. Apart from replicating the findings of study 2, Shah (2003a, 
study 3) also revealed that participants primed with the name of a significant other 
that would not want them to do well, performed significantly worse in persistence (B = 
-1.01, F(1,108) = 6.24, p = .01) and performance (B = -1.01, F(1,108) = 5.36, p < .05) 
than participants in the control condition. As participants’ closeness to this significant 
other increased, the negative effect of this priming became more negative for goal 
persistence (B = -0.65, F(1,108) = 4.24, p < .05) and goal performance (B = -0.87, 
F(1,108) = 4.12, p < .05). The priming effect with the names of significant others were 
however significantly weakened as the number of other goals increased that the 
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participants’ significant other also had for them (B = -0.035, F(1,43) = 4.86, p < .050) 
(Shah, 2003a, study 4). Similar results were found with goal persistence and goal 
performance. 
3.3.2.3.14 Significant other representations and the self 
The social-cognitive model of transference assumes that representations of 
significant others are associated with the self in memory. The relationship between 
the self and the significant other defines the linkages between the representation of 
significant others and the representations of the self (Andersen & Glassman, 1996; 
Andersen, Reznik & Chen, 1997) (see also Baldwin in section 3.3.1.2.2). A study by 
Hinkley and Andersen (1996) tested the hypothesis that when a significant-other 
representation is activated, predictable shifts in the content and evaluation of the 
working self-concept will take place. In the pre-test session, participants provided 
general self-descriptions as a measure of their general working self-concepts. Then 
participants listed positive and negative descriptive statements for a positively and a 
negatively toned significant other. They also generated statements describing the 
way they are when with each of the significant others. In the experimental session 
participants learned descriptive statements about a new target person allegedly 
sitting next door, that resembled their own or a yoked participant’s positively or 
negatively toned significant other. Participants were asked to describe themselves as 
they “are now” by generating self-descriptive statements. Participants were also 
asked at the pre-test and experimental session to classify each of their working-self-
concept descriptive statements as positive or negative. These evaluations were used 
as a measure of self-evaluation (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). The basic inference and 
memory effect was again demonstrated and implied that any other effects that 
emerged did so in the context of transference. The degree of overlap between 
participants’ general self-concept and their self-with-significant-other was calculated 
on an item-by-item basis at the pre-test session and after exposure to the 
experimental manipulation. Participants’ working self-concept did overlap more with 
the self-with-significant-other when the target person resembled the participant’s own 
significant other rather than a yoked participant’s significant other (F(1,75) = 4.30, p = 
.04). In the context of transference, perceivers appeared to become the self they are 
when with the relevant significant other (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). Participants 
perceived their overlapping working self-descriptive statements as more positive 
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when the target resembled their own positively toned significant other rather than 
their own negatively toned significant other (F(1,75) = 11.91, p < .001). The 
difference was not found in the yoked participants’ significant other condition (Hinkley 
& Andersen, 1996). Although the overall overlap was quite low, the working self-
concept of participants shifted in the direction of the self-with-the-significant-other 
when the target person resembled the participant’s own significant other (Hinkley & 
Andersen, 1999). 
3.3.2.4 Discussion of the social-cognitive model of transference 
Relationships with significant others are not only characterised by a history of 
frequent interactions, but also by its emotional significance and relevance to the self-
concept of the individual.  
Baldwin (1992) theorised that the self-with-significant-other information is 
represented in memory in the form of relational schemas. Various information-
processing effects were predicted based on the relational schema. Although the 
information-processing predictions of Chen and Andersen (1999) are similar, they 
refer to these effects as representation-derived rather than schema-triggered effects, 
because they do not take a similar stand on the internal architecture or schematicity 
of significant-other representations. They focus on the unique characteristics of every 
person’s experience in forming a personal exemplar or construct. The ideographically 
generated, rather than experimenter-generated stimulus material, acknowledged the 
individual nature of the significant other representations. Even as the closeness of 
the individual to the significant other increases, the influence of the significant other 
representation follow suit (Shah, 2003a, study 3). 
It could be assumed that representations of significant others are connected to many 
other social constructs in memory. Andersen and Cole (1990) demonstrated the 
relative ease with which participants could retrieve features of significant others. Due 
to its high accessibility, significant other representations can provide a structure for 
the experience of new relationships with other people. After their review of several 
studies in their research program, Andersen and Berk (1998, p. 81) concluded: “…it 
has been shown, that mental representations of significant others serve as 
storehouses of information about given individual’s from one’s life, and can be 
activated (made ready for use) and applied to (used to interpret) other individuals, 
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and that this is especially likely when the new individual in some way resembles a 
significant other”.  
The studies reviewed in section 3.3.2 revealed the multi-faceted ways in which past 
experiences with significant others can play a role in present interpersonal behaviour. 
Memory effects, as well as the transfer of affect, expectations and motivation, have 
been demonstrated. Significant other representations have been associated with 
shifts in working self-concept as well as improved goal performance and 
perseverance. 
Most of the studies in the research program by Andersen used feature based 
approaches that view mental representations as composed of lists of features and 
attributes. The use of a representation in interpreting a stimulus is then a function of 
the overlap between the feature-based cues in the stimulus and the feature-based 
knowledge in the representation. This approach can be contrasted with the theory-
based approach where a single target cue may activate a whole theory concerning 
the significant other (Chen & Andersen, 1999). In the theory-based approach, the 
overlap in features is unnecessary to demonstrate the representation-consistent 
effect. The units of knowledge that constitutes the match between the representation 
in memory and the activating stimulus still need to be clarified. 
The chronic accessibility of a social construct, as well as the measure of transient 
activation, could contribute to its readiness for non-conscious processing. Chronic 
accessibility refers to its readiness for use in social perception, even in absence of 
triggering cues. Possible transient sources of activation are significant other relevant 
attributes in a stimulus person, other triggering cues, advanced priming and even 
subliminally presented or non-consciously perceived stimuli. The study by Andersen 
et al. (1995) demonstrated that chronic and temporary activation contributed in an 
additive manner to the activation of significant-other representations. Because there 
was a degree of applicability of features in all the experiments, the chronic 
accessibility factor could not be completely isolated.  
Glassman and Andersen (1999a) presented features of a significant other at a 
subliminal level to participants in an effort to activate a significant other 
representation in a situation of limited information. The results confirmed the 
prediction of Chen and Andersen (1999) that transference might occur whether the 
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perceiver is aware of the resemblance between the new person and a significant 
other or not. However, the presence of assimilation and contrast effects 
demonstrated that awareness of a priming stimulus might lead a perceiver to try and 
avoid interpreting a new person in terms of a significant-other representation, 
especially if the perceiver is of opinion that such an interpretation would be 
inappropriate or irrelevant. 
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CHAPTER 4  PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES 
This chapter presents a summary of the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Based on this summary, certain under researched areas will be identified, followed 
by specific research questions to be addressed in the present study. The objectives 
of the study and the hypotheses to be investigated will then be presented. The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion of the operasionalisation of the variables in 
the present study. 
4.1 General summary of review 
The present study investigates the social-cognitive structures and processes involved 
in the influence of past social experiences on present processing of social 
information, as outlined in Chapter 1. The preceding review of selected theoretical 
contributions and research studies not only provided a theoretical framework and 
rationale for the study, but also provided information on appropriate methods and 
procedures in order to operationalise the research questions. 
4.1.1 Attachment theory and working models 
Attachment theory provides a useful general framework for understanding the 
influence of past relationship experiences. As children mature, they develop mental 
representations of themselves, the world and the significant people in their lives. 
These representations or working models reflect their past interactions with 
attachment figures and therefore also organise current interactions in terms of prior 
history. Past interactions with the significant others in their lives constitute the bulk of 
the experiences used as the content of working models. There has been limited 
empirical work investigating the structure and processes of working models. 
4.1.2 Secure and insecure attachment styles 
Attachment research (see Feeny et al., 1994) has drawn a prominent distinction 
between secure and insecure attachment as two primary clusters. In retrospective 
studies, people with secure attachment styles described their primary attachment 
figures as warm, responsive, available and sensitive. In comparison, insecure 
attachment was associated with cold, rejecting, unfair or inconsistent attachment 
figures. It can be expected that the content of working models, including the 
significant other representations of people with secure versus insecure attachment 
styles, are significantly different and they process social information differently. 
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Baldwin et al. (1993, study 2) demonstrated that persons with different attachment 
styles could be differentiated in terms of their effectiveness in processing 
expectations of others. Persons with different attachment experiences demonstrated 
varied attraction to potential dating partners (Baldwin et al., 1996, study 3). A 
distinction can be drawn between participants with secure and insecure attachment 
styles and it can be assumed that they have different histories of attachment 
experiences available to them. It still needs to be demonstrated that representations 
of positive significant others are chronically available in participants with secure 
attachment styles and that they influence the processing of congruent interpersonal 
information. The same question applies to the demonstration of the availability of 
negative significant others in the working models of people with insecure attachment 
styles. 
4.1.3 Three elements of relational schemas 
Apart from working models there have been a number of suggestions concerning the 
structure of interpersonal cognition. Although the content of working models have not 
been specified, attachment theory dictates that a self-element, other-person element 
and interaction-element be included. The theoretical contribution of Baldwin (1992) 
shares the assumption that working models of relationships act as cognitive maps for 
people’s social worlds. He proposed that self-with-significant-other information is 
represented in memory in relational schemas. The relational schemas concept also 
highlights the influence of past social experiences on current experience. A relational 
schema is hypothesised to include three elements, namely the self-schemas, 
associated significant other schemas, and interpersonal scripts. In the present study 
it is assumed that interpersonal relationships are represented in memory structures 
consisting of these three independent but closely connected elements. Although the 
self-schema and the significant other representation has received attention in 
empirical research, just a few investigations focused on the interpersonal script 
element in isolation or in combination with the other two elements (see studies by 
Baldwin et al., 1993; Baldwin & Keelan, 1999; Fehr et al., 1999). 
4.1.4 Significant other representations 
The work by Andersen and colleagues (Chen et al., 1999) provided a theoretical 
model and research paradigm for the investigation of significant other 
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representations. Significant other representations are prominent examples of the 
person schema element of relational schemas. The significant other representation 
was considered to be a single case or individual-person exemplar, which could be 
investigated like any other social construct. Their research emphasised the richness 
in associations, the distinctiveness and the accessibility of significant other 
representations (Andersen & Cole, 1990). In the present study it is assumed that a 
representation of a specific significant other can be stored in memory and is linked to 
many other associations related to that person. 
4.1.5 Information-processing effects of relational schemas 
The activation of schemas proposes certain information-processing consequences, 
such as greater sensitivity to representation consistent information, improved 
information-processing efficiency, and improved memory. Information-processing 
effects were predicted for all three elements of the relational schema (Baldwin, 
1992). There have been numerous studies of the processing effects of the self-
schemas and person-schemas. The work of Andersen and associates (for example 
Andersen, et al., 1996; Andersen & Baum, 1994; Baum & Andersen, 1999; Chen & 
Andersen, 1999; Glassman & Andersen, 1999a; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996) 
documented a variety of processing effects of significant other representations. 
Although most studies dealt with the self-schemas and person-schemas elements in 
isolation, Baldwin et al. (1990) and Hinkley and Andersen (1996) demonstrated the 
effect of activating significant other representations on the experience of the self. 
There is a need for studies demonstrating information processing effects of 
interpersonal scripts associated with significant other representations. 
4.1.6 Conjoint schematicity of different elements 
The three elements of the relational schema are thought to be structurally associated 
in memory, such that activating one element could spread to another element and 
indeed the entire structure, referred to as conjoint schematicity. Baldwin supported 
his claim towards a unified relational schema with three different elements with 
evidence demonstrating that when one element of the relational schema was primed, 
the activation spread to other elements (Baldwin, 1994; Baldwin, et al., 1990; Baldwin 
& Holmes, 1987; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996). In a number of these studies this effect 
has been demonstrated utilising subliminal priming methodology. It has not yet been 
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demonstrated that priming of the other-schema element could lead to measurable 
information-processing effects related to the interpersonal script element. 
4.1.7 Network of multiple schemas 
People have a variety of attachment experiences and therefore different models can 
become activated under different circumstances to guide interpersonal perception 
and behaviour. Stated in terms of relational schemas, people have multiple self-
schemas, multiple presentations of others and different scripts of likely sequences of 
action between the self and other. Their personal learning history will determine 
which relational schemas are used more often to encode particular social 
information. It is very likely that these relational schemas are linked to each other in a 
network of different schemas. Some schemas might be very broad and general, while 
others might be very specific to particular circumstances. There is still much to learn 
about the structure of working models and how they are connected to each other. An 
investigation of the chronic accessibility and temporary activation of the different 
elements of a working model will be a valuable contribution. 
4.1.8 Chronic accessibility of schemas 
Certain chronically accessible schemas will play a more dominant role in processing 
social information. According to social-cognitive theory, chronic accessibility refers to 
the continuous readiness of a construct to be activated by even minimal sources of 
activation. Some constructs have been activated so frequently in the past, or may be 
connected to so many other constructs, that it has a high probability of being 
activated by an external or internal stimulus. The chronic accessibility of significant 
other representations has already been demonstrated (Glassman & Andersen, 
1999b). Based on the attachment theory, it is very likely that persons with a secure 
attachment orientation, have extended experience of positive interactions with 
positive significant others. Their representations of a positive significant other as well 
as their scripts of positive interpersonal interactions are predicted to be chronically 
accessible and fairly dominant. The inverse could be predicted to be true of people 
with an insecure attachment orientation. Activation of one element of the relational 
schema could spread to activation of the other. 
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4.1.9 Temporary activation through priming 
Apart from chronic accessibility and spreading activation, there are many other 
possible sources of construct activation, including present goals and needs, recent 
activation and level of applicability. Priming of social constructs, a procedure that 
activate identified stored knowledge, have been demonstrated in the form of single 
word semantic priming, trait words, names, stories, pictures of significant others, 
guided visualisation of significant others and exposure to lists of features. The use of 
advanced priming should also be investigated within a social context. In a sense it is 
analogous to being reminded about a significant other just before speaking to a 
target person with characteristics corresponding to the significant other. In the real 
world it is often not only the immediate resemblance to the significant other that may 
be triggering the transference response, but also other means of advanced priming. 
The use of a proper name of a significant other has demonstrated promise in 
activating significant other representations (Baldwin, 1994; Shah, 2003a). It should 
be investigated further in a controlled experiment. 
4.1.10 Subliminal priming 
Although most of the priming studies utilised supraliminal primes, a number of 
studies also demonstrated the use of subliminal priming (Baldwin, 1994; Baldwin et 
al., 1990; Banse, 1999; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Erdley & D’Agostino, 1988; 
Pierce & Lydon, 1998; Shah, 2003a, 2003b). The information-processing effect of 
subliminal priming is a reflection of processing in a non-conscious or automatic 
manner. A number of studies (Bargh, 1982; Bargh & Pratto, 1986, Bargh & Thein, 
1985; Bargh & Tota, 1988) demonstrated that self-relevant information could be 
processed in a non-conscious manner. The subliminal priming of constructs also 
avoids the contrast effect that has been demonstrated where participants become 
aware of attempts to influence their judgements or other responses. Studies by 
Higgins et al. (1985), Higgins and Bargh (1987), Moskowitz and Roman (1992), 
Newman and Uleman (1990), and Strack et al. (1993) confirmed the contrast effect. 
Based on the review, the use of subliminal priming methodology as a means of 
temporary activation is recommended. 
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4.1.11 Interaction of chronic and temporary activation 
The accessibility or pre-activation of a representation can be from several sources – 
chronic activation, recent activation or current goals (Bargh, 1996). Both greater 
temporary and chronic accessibility predict higher accessibility and stronger 
responses to stimulus information. Bargh et al. (1986) studied the interaction 
between temporary and chronic activation by selecting subjects chronic or 
nonchronic for a construct and then subliminally priming them or not in a seemingly 
unrelated experiment. The outcome of the study was inconclusive. They recommend 
that chronic and temporary sources of accessibility should be viewed as equivalent 
and that chronicity and priming could have independent and interactive effects on 
judgements. In the field of interpersonal or relational schemas only Baldwin et al. 
(1990) used a similar procedure to Bargh et al. (1986) when they classified 
participants in high and low religious practicing groups and primed them with the face 
of a religious leader. The studies by Andersen et al. (1995) and Glassman and 
Andersen (1999), investigating the chronic and temporary accessibility of significant 
other representations, used a time delay of about two weeks to operationalise 
chronic accessibility. Further investigation of the interaction between chronic 
accessibility and temporary activation is needed, as well as the effect of the 
applicability of stimulus material on activation. 
4.1.12 Explicit and implicit procedures 
Most available studies of working models made use of self-report data or explicit 
cognitive tasks. There has been a general lack of suitable methodologies other than 
self-report. Direct observation of behaviour played a prominent role in early research 
about infant-mother attachment (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991). Adult participants are 
prone to interfering effects when they are being observed in an experimental setting. 
The presence of contrast effects in priming research has already been discussed. 
The expectation that working models may very well function on an automatic level, 
opens up the possibility of utilising research methods that rely on implicit processes. 
The subliminal priming with names of significant others can be useful in investigating 
the non-conscious operation of working models. 
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4.1.13 Overlapping features 
Most of the research on the social–cognitive model of transference utilised 
overlapping features as stimulus cues for the activation of the significant other 
representations. The features listed by the participants overlapped with the features 
presented as stimulus cues. The transference phenomenon was then derived when 
participants indicated with confidence during the test phase that features, listed 
during the learning phase but absent during the target presentation, were indeed 
present. In most of these experiments the features were presented in supraliminal 
presentation, although the participants were ignorant to the real purpose of the 
experiment. When overlapping features are used, it is difficult to rule out implicit 
learning or even repetition priming effects as possible sources of the transference 
effect. The feature-based approach can be contrasted with a theory-based approach, 
where significant other representations can consist of different elements, which need 
not overlap at all. Certain elements can be used as priming stimuli and different 
elements can be used as an index of transference. Hinkley and Andersen (1996) 
demonstrated that representations of significant others are linked to representations 
of the self. It should be possible to activate significant other representations with 
simple but relevant priming stimuli (for example, first names of significant others) and 
demonstrate the spreading activation to another aspect (for example, the processing 
of typical interpersonal interactions). The priming paradigm of activation, used by 
Baldwin (1994) in investigating relational schemas, avoids the possible compromising 
effects of using overlapping features and will also be used in the present study. 
4.1.14 Ideographic and nomothetic methods 
Belsky and Cassidy (1994) observed that in attachment research the primary focus is 
on the origin of individual difference. In social-cognitive research the focus is mainly 
on understanding cognitive mechanisms in general and with little attention to 
explaining individual difference. They recommend that these two fields of study 
should be increasingly integrated. In the majority of studies by Baldwin and co-
workers (except Baldwin and Holmes, 1987) a nomothetic design was used, applying 
a single experimenter generated priming stimulus to all the participants. Although 
activation effects have been demonstrated, it could not be ascribed to priming with a 
personally generated stimulus from a personal relationship (for example a name of a 
specific significant other). The emphasis of the research paradigm used by Andersen 
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and co-workers (see Chen & Andersen, 1999) was on the significant other 
representation as an individual-person exemplar. In the learning phase the content of 
a particular significant other representation was established by ideographic methods. 
During the subsequent testing phase this information was utilised in a nomothetic 
design. In this manner the theoretical demand of individualised content of personal 
cognitive constructs could be reconciled with the rigour of an experimental design. 
The same sequence as Andersen and co-workers will be used in the present study. 
4.2 Problem statement and research questions 
Different theoretical orientations have put forward the notion that personal histories of 
social relationships and experiences guide how people construe their social world 
and how they interact with others. Within social-cognitive research there has been a 
recent emphasis on how social-cognitive processes are shaped by social histories 
and interpersonal contexts (Baldwin, 1997). Utilising concepts and research methods 
derived from cognitive psychology, social-cognitive researchers have empirically 
investigated the social-structures and processes involved in the influence of past 
social experiences on present social functioning. However, despite the general 
acceptance of this assumption and various theoretical formulations, limited empirical 
research has been done to demonstrate this assumption under experimental 
conditions. 
4.2.1 Problem statement 
The summary of the literature review (section 4.1) highlighted these shortcomings in 
the existing research on the role of past knowledge on present social behaviour and 
social relationships. 
a) Despite the contribution of attachment theory, there has been limited empirical 
work investigating the structure and processes of working models, particularly 
regarding the chronic accessibility and temporary activation of the different 
elements of working models. 
b) Based on attachment theory, it is very likely that persons with a secure 
attachment orientation have extensive experience of positive interactions with 
positive significant others. From a social-cognitive perspective, 
representations of positive significant others as well as their scripts of positive 
interpersonal interactions are chronically accessible in participants with secure 
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attachment styles and they influence the processing of congruent 
interpersonal information. The same applies for representations of negative 
significant others and participants with insecure attachment styles. This 
theoretical proposition needs to be demonstrated empirically. 
c) From a relational schema perspective, it has been proposed that a working 
model has three components, the self-schema, the other-schema and the 
interpersonal script. Although both the self-schema element of the relational 
schema and the significant other representation have received attention in 
empirical research, only a few investigations focused on the interpersonal 
script element in isolation or in combination with the other two elements. There 
is a need for studies, which investigate the information-processing effects of 
interpersonal scripts associated with significant other representations. 
d) It has not yet been demonstrated that priming of the significant other schema 
element of a relational schema could lead to measurable information-
processing effects related to the interpersonal script element. 
e) The outcome of previous studies on the effect of chronic and temporary 
sources of accessibility was inconclusive. Further investigation of the 
interaction between chronic accessibility and temporary activation is therefore 
needed, as well as further studies on the effect of the applicability of stimulus 
material on activation. 
Additionally, the literature review also indicated certain shortcomings in the 
methodology used up to now. These shortcomings and recommended new directions 
were taken into consideration in the present study. 
a) The use of a proper name of a significant other has demonstrated promising 
results in activating significant other representations (Baldwin, 1994; Shah, 
2003a) and should be investigated further in a controlled experiment. 
b) The use of subliminal priming methodology as a means of temporary 
activation is recommended and the subliminal priming with names of 
significant others can be useful in investigating the non-conscious operation of 
working models. 
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c) The priming paradigm of activation used by Baldwin (1994) in investigating 
relational schemas avoids the possible compromising effects of using 
overlapping features and will also be used in the present study. 
d) Andersen and co-workers used a combination of ideographic and nomothetic 
methods to reconcile individualised content of personal cognitive constructs 
with standardised experimental procedures. The same sequence of activities 
will be used in the present study, but in combination with a priming technique. 
4.2.2 Research questions 
Based on the preceding summary of shortcomings in existing research, the following 
research questions were formulated. 
a) Will target interpersonal information in scripted form (positive or negative 
target script) be processed more efficiently when it is consistent with the 
chronically accessible relational schemas (part of a secure or insecure 
attachment style)? 
b) Will the target interpersonal information in scripted form be processed more 
efficiently when relational schemas consistent to the target information are 
temporary activated by a subliminal semantic priming stimulus also consistent 
to the target? 
c) Will the subliminal activation of a significant other element of the relational 
schema through conjoint schematicity lead to measurable information-
processing effects in the interpersonal script element of the schema? 
d) Will the information-processing effects of chronic accessibility, temporary 
subliminal priming and applicability of target information remain independent 
or combine in an interactive manner? 
e) Will the different levels of applicability of the scripted target information 
(unambiguously positive, unambiguously negative, ambiguous or 
mixed/contrary) influence the information-processing effects? 
4.3 Objectives of the present study 
The present study focuses on the recent emphasis in social-cognitive research on 
how social-cognitive processes are shaped by social histories and interpersonal 
contexts (Baldwin, 1997). It is based on social-cognitive theory and aims to integrate 
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the theory and basic empirical paradigms from the relational schema model and the 
social-cognitive model of transference with concepts from the attachment theory 
tradition. It focuses on social-cognitive structures and processes involved in the 
influence of past social experiences on present social functioning, and investigates 
the structure and processes of the working models of individuals with secure and 
insecure attachment orientations. 
In particular, this study will investigate 
a) the structure of working models by demonstrating the conjoint schematicity of 
different elements of the relational schema; 
b) the chronic accessibility of the working models of individuals with secure and 
insecure attachment orientations; 
c) whether significant other representations could be activated outside of 
awareness to facilitate the subsequent conscious processing of interpersonal 
information; 
d) through response time effects in a priming paradigm, whether the person-
schema and interpersonal script elements of a relational schema are 
connected; 
e) the combining effect of chronic accessibility, advanced priming and the nature 
of the target stimulus on the processing of scripted information, and 
f) the individuals nominated as primary positive significant others by participants 
with secure and insecure attachment styles. 
4.4 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are related to the basic theoretical assumption that participants with 
a history of particular relationship experiences (chronic accessibility), will process 
congruent relationship information (an applicable interpersonal script) more efficiently 
when they are primed with information from a significant other with whom they share 
some of these relationship experiences. The following hypotheses will be 
investigated: 
a) The main hypothesis about the interaction between chronic accessibility, 
temporary activation and script applicability predicts that chronic positive 
participants will process scripted positive interpersonal information more 
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efficiently when they are primed with the name of a positive significant other 
than when they are primed with the name of a negative significant other or a 
control prime. Similarly, chronic negative participants will process scripted 
negative interpersonal information more efficiently when they are primed with 
the name of a negative significant other than when they are primed with the 
name of a positive significant other or a control prime. (This hypothesis 
combines all the independent variables and can be regarded as the main 
hypothesis of the study). 
b) The priming hypothesis predicts that participants will process scripted positive 
interpersonal information more efficiently when they are primed with the name 
of a positive significant other than when they are primed the name of a 
negative significant other or a control prime. Similarly, participants will process 
scripted negative interpersonal information more efficiently when they are 
primed with the name of a negative significant other than when they are 
primed with the name of a positive significant other or a control prime. 
c) The chronic accessibility hypothesis predicts that participants with a history of 
positive interactions (positive relational schemas chronically available) will 
process scripted positive interpersonal information more efficiently than 
participants with a history of negative interactions. Similarly, the chronic 
accessibility hypothesis also predicts that participants with a history of 
negative interactions (negative relational schemas chronically available) will 
process scripted negative interpersonal information more efficiently than 
participants with a history of positive interactions. 
d) The script applicability hypothesis predicts that the level of applicability of the 
target script to the chronically available relational schema will facilitate the 
processing of the scripted information. 
In addition, the following will also be investigated. 
a) In line with the priming hypothesis it will be explored whether participants 
primed with the name of a positive significant other indicate more often that 
positive statements, not presented in the target script, were indeed presented 
to them, than participants primed with a negative significant other or a control 
prime. Similarly, participants primed with the name of a negative significant 
 80
other will indicate more often that negative statements, not presented in the 
target script, were indeed presented to them, than participants primed with a 
positive significant other or control prime. 
b) It will be investigated whether, as can be expected form attachment theory, 
the majority of participants will nominate a parent or close family member as 
the primary positive significant other. 
c) Similarly, it will be investigated whether securely attached participants will be 
more likely to nominate a parent as primary positive significant other 
compared to insecurely attached participants, as predicted by attachment 
theory. 
4.5 Operasionalisation of present study 
The processing of social information depends on the characteristics of the perceiver 
as well as the characteristics of the stimulus. Based on attachment theory and 
previous research it can be predicted that individuals with secure and insecure 
attachment styles have different relationships histories. Secure people have 
experienced multiple warm, responsive and supportive interactions. The 
representations of these interactions and the significant others involved are therefore 
chronically accessible. The inverse is true for insecure people. In the present study 
chronic accessibility for relational schemas of positive or negative significant others 
will be operationalised as a score on an attachment style measure. Chronic 
accessibility is an independent variable in the present study. 
These positive or negative significant other representations can be activated even 
further through a priming procedure as a source of temporary activation. Temporary 
accessibility will be operationalised as the subliminal presentation of the name of a 
positive or negative significant other. Temporary activation is also an independent 
variable in the present study. 
Through conjoint schematicity the representation of the positive or negative 
significant other should be linked to the scripts of interactions with that significant 
other. The conjoint priming effect suggests that when the representation of the 
significant other is primed, the related interpersonal scripts also become activated 
and it will be measurable in the efficiency of processing of the interpersonal 
information. The applicability of the stimulus information will be operationalised as the 
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presentation of positive, negative or ambiguous interpersonal information. The 
valence of the target interpersonal script is the third independent variable in the 
study. 
The three independent variables in the present study will be (a) chronic accessibility 
(secure or insecure attachment style), (b) temporary activation (subliminal priming 
with the name of a positive or negative significant other), (c) target interpersonal 
script (the script will describe a positive, negative, mixed positive and negative or 
ambiguous interpersonal interaction. The dependant variables will be the accuracy 
and reaction time in processing the target interpersonal script. 
Although the focus of the present study will be on the effects of the activation of 
significant other representations of university students, there is no reason to expect 
that the underlying structures and processes will differ from the general population. 
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CHAPTER 5  METHOD 
5.1 Overview 
The present study examines the influence of chronic accessibility and subliminal 
temporary activation of significant other representations on the accuracy and speed 
of processing scripted interpersonal information, congruent to the significant other 
representation or not. 
A group of 137 university students participated in two sessions that took place no 
more than two weeks apart. During the first session participants completed a 
biographical questionnaire and the Attachment Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Feeney et 
al., 1994). The second session entailed an experiment conducted on an individual 
basis on a personal computer. The experiment was a fully crossed two (chronic 
accessibility: dominant positive significant other versus dominant negative significant 
other) times three (prime identity: positive significant other, negative significant other 
or control prime) times four (script stimulus: positive script, negative script, 
ambiguous script or mixed script) between subjects design. The independent 
variables were chronic accessibility, temporary subliminal activation and nature of the 
script presented. The dependant variables were response accuracy and reaction 
time. 
All the material, to which the participants were exposed to, including the experimental 
task on the computer program, was available in Afrikaans and English. At the start of 
the study participants could indicate their language preference and continue to 
perform all the tasks in that language. 
Permission was obtained from the office of the registrar of Stellenbosch University to 
conduct the research project on campus and to invite students as participants. 
5.2 Session one 
5.2.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirty-seven (N = 137) university students took part on invitation in 
session one of the study. They were recruited by the researcher with general notices 
been put up in four Stellenbosch University student residences, inviting students to 
participate in a study about the processing of relationship information. The 
participants volunteered to take part without any monetary reward. Their ages ranged 
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from 18 to 24 years, with a mean age of 19.93 years (SD = 1.16). The majority of the 
participants (88%) were Afrikaans speaking and 12% (n = 16) were English speaking. 
Fifty-three (39%) were female students with ages ranging from 18 to 23 years (M = 
19.83, SD = 1.07). Forty-six of the females were Afrikaans speaking (87%) and the 
other seven English speaking (13%). Eighty-four (61%) of the participants were 
males with ages ranging from 18 to 24 years (M = 20.00, SD = 1.22). Seventy-five of 
the males were Afrikaans speaking (89%) and the other nine English speaking 
(11%). 
Participants were assigned to the chronic positive (n = 69) or chronic negative (n = 
68) condition by means of a separate median split for males and females on the 
Confidence Scale of the ASQ (Appendix A). The median of the scores of all the 
participants was 33. The median of the scores of the female participants was 33 
(minimum = 20, maximum = 45) and the median of the male scores was 34 
(minimum = 18, maximum = 46). Forty-two males and 27 females were assigned to 
the chronic positive group and 42 males and 26 females were assigned to the 
chronic negative group. 
5.2.2 Materials and apparatus 
Session one was conducted in a group format. There were five groups of between 18 
and 37 participants each. Every participant received a booklet (Appendix B) that 
explained the procedures, asked for some biographical details, and also included the 
ASQ. 
5.2.3 Measures 
5.2.3.1 Biographical details 
Biographical details, as well as the information concerning participants’ significant 
others, were gathered by means of self-report. 
Participants were asked to indicate their sex (male or female), age (in years) and 
language preference (Afrikaans or English) in the appropriate blocks in the booklet. 
They also provided self-generated participant codes to enable the experimenter to 
prepare the appropriate experimental material for the computer task in session two. 
No identifying personal details were requested. 
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The concept “significant other” was explained in the booklet and space was provided 
for participants to list the names of a number of the most important people in their 
lives. They were also requested to write down, in the spaces provided in the booklet, 
the actual first names of the single most important positive and the most important 
negative significant other and the role they play in their lives. 
5.2.3.2 Attachment Style Questionnaire 
The ASQ is a 40-item questionnaire developed by Feeney et al. (1994) as a measure 
of different attachment styles that could be used with young adolescents. The 
rationale, development as well as the reliability and validity data of the ASQ were 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Upon their arrival at the laboratory the experimenter introduced the participants to the 
research project by reading the first paragraph from the booklet. They were then 
requested to write down a personal, self-generated eight figure participant number in 
the experimental booklets. This was used to identify them during session two. 
Aided by the text in the booklets, the experimenter explained the concept of 
significant others to the participants and requested them to compile a list of the 
significant people in their lives. The text in the booklet also distinguished between 
positively valenced and negatively valenced significant others and participants were 
requested to write down the actual first names and roles of the most dominant 
positive and most dominant negative significant other in their lives. 
Participants then completed the ASQ. They were requested to write down or 
memorise their participant number. They handed back the booklets to a research 
assistant and were invited to take part in the second part of the experiment. They 
could select a specific time on specified days during the following two weeks to 
complete the individual computer task of session two. 
The experimenter scored the ASQ, assigned each participant to an experimental 
condition, generated an individual computer number for every participant, and 
included the name of the appropriate significant other in the computer program 
running the second priming experiment. Participants were assigned to the chronic 
positive or chronic negative condition by means of a median split for the male group 
and the females group. The median of the scores of all the participants on the 
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Confidence Scale of the ASQ was 33. The median of the scores of the female 
participants was 33 (minimum = 20, maximum = 45), and the median of the male 
scores was 34 (minimum = 18, maximum = 46). All male participants with scores 
above the median for the male group and all female participants with scores above 
the median for the female group were assigned to the chronic positive condition. 
Participants with scores below the two median values were assigned to the chronic 
negative group. 
5.3 Session two 
5.3.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirteen students (n = 113) took part in session two of the study. 
Twenty-four of the 137 participants from session one did not make an appointment 
for session two or did not turn up for their individual appointment. The data of another 
four participants were incomplete and were not used in the subsequent analysis. The 
demographic profile of the remaining 109 participants did not differ from that of the 
participants in session one. Their ages ranged from 18 to 24 years (M = 19.95, SD = 
1.16). Sixty five percent (n = 71) were male and 35% (n = 38) were female. Ninety-
two percent of the participants (n = 100) were Afrikaans speaking and 8% (n = 9) 
English speaking. The median split of the Confidence Scores on the ASQ for the 
participants that took part in session two was also 33. 
The gender or language preference of the participants did not significantly influence 
the presented results either singularly or interactively and will not be discussed any 
further. 
Table 5.1 shows the assignment of the 109 participants to the twenty-four cells of the 
2x3x4 experimental design. Apart from inclusion in the broad chronic positive or 
chronic negative group based on their scores on the ASQ Confidence Scale, all the 
other cells were filled on a random basis. Thirty-eight participants received the 
positive priming stimulus, 38 received the negative priming stimulus and 33 received 
the control stimulus. Twenty-eight participants received the positive script, 27 
participants received the negative script, and two groups of 25 each received the 
mixed script or ambiguous script respectively. 
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Table 5.1 
Assignment of Participants (N = 109) to Experimental Conditions 
 
Chronic 
accessibility 
n Priming stimulus n Script presented n 
positive 3 
negative 5 
mixed 4 
positive 17 
ambiguous 5 
positive 4 
negative 6 
mixed 5 
negative 18 
ambiguous 3 
positive 4 
negative 4 
mixed 5 
positive 51 
control 16 
ambiguous 3 
positive 6 
negative 4 
mixed 6 
positive 21 
ambiguous 5 
positive 6 
negative 4 
mixed 5 
negative 20 
ambiguous 5 
positive 5 
negative 4 
mixed 4 
negative 58 
control 17 
ambiguous 4 
 
5.3.2 Material and apparatus 
A research assistant matched the participant code and computer code of the 
participants but was blind to the group or condition of the participants. The 
experimental task was run by a computer program, which also provided all the 
necessary instructions and trial runs (see Appendix C). The experimental task was 
performed on an individual basis, privately in a quiet and well-lighted room with a 
table and a personal computer. The research assistant was available in the room 
next door if the participant experienced any difficulties. 
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5.3.2.1 Primes 
The first name of the positive or negative significant other for each participant was 
presented on the computer screen in white letters on a black background. A set of 
random consonants were used as a control stimulus and also presented as white 
letters on a similar black background. 
5.3.2.2 Masks 
To mask the names, pattern masks (containing scrambled consonant letters) were 
superimposed. The length of the name mask was adjusted for each participant so 
that it covered the stimulus name or the control stimulus. 
5.3.2.3 Priming procedure 
The prime words were presented in alternation with the letter masks. The word 
READY appeared on the screen for 1500 milliseconds, followed by the presentation 
of the mask for 100 milliseconds, followed by the name of the significant other that 
appeared on the screen for 33 milliseconds. Then the mask appeared again for 100 
milliseconds, followed by the priming stimulus, and so on. The name was presented 
20 times, 33 milliseconds at a time for a total exposure of 0.66 seconds. The 
presentation was completed with a mask of 100 milliseconds. 
5.3.2.4 Target script stimulus 
Vignettes of interpersonal transactions each including nine stimulus statements were 
formulated in paragraph format. These statements together formed a script of a 
positive, a negative, a mixed or an ambiguous interpersonal transaction. These 
scripts were compiled based on the results of a pilot study done earlier with a similar 
group of participants about the action components of their interpersonal transactions 
with positive and negatively valenced significant others. In the first phase of the pilot 
study participants were asked to nominate positive and negative significant others 
and describe the content of typical interactions with them in a scripted sequence. In 
the second phase, a group of participants rated the action components derived from 
the previous phase as positive, negative or ambiguous. The target scripts eventually 
selected are shown in Appendix D. In the present study participants were instructed 
to imagine these statements being directed at them and to read it carefully, because 
they would have to answer questions about it. The appropriate vignette was 
 88
presented in paragraph format on the computer screen for forty seconds, and then 
followed by a pattern mask. 
5.3.2.5 Responses 
Thirty-six statements (nine statements each from the positive, negative and 
ambiguous interpersonal transactions, as well as nine filler statements) were 
presented one by one on the screen in an order that was balanced randomly across 
all participants. Six of the nine statements per group could be presented to some 
participants (depending on their assignment to a target script stimulus), but three of 
the nine statements were not presented to any participant. Each single statement 
was kept on the screen for five seconds or until the participant gave an answer by 
pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard. The software running the experiment 
on the computer recorded the reaction time from the appearance of the statement on 
the screen to the participant's response. If the participant did not respond within five 
seconds, it was recorded as no response and the participant were requested to 
proceed to the next statement. All 36 statements are showed in Appendix E. 
5.3.2.6 Apparatus 
The experiment was run on a personal computer with a fast monitor (85 Hz). A 
computer program was developed to run the experiment. The keys 1 and 2 on the 
right number field of the computer keyboard were used as response keys for “YES” 
and “NO” respectively. The reaction time was measured to a millisecond. Participants 
pressed the Enter key on the right number field to proceed to the next statement 
when they were ready. 
5.3.3 Procedure 
Upon their arrival participants were directed individually to the personal computers to 
perform the experiment. After instructing them how to use the computer program, the 
program requested them to clear their minds from other current concerns in their lives 
and to attend to what will be presented to them. To enable them to do that, they 
should focus at the centre of the computer screen. The word READY and a row of 
flashing letters were presented. “It is thought by some researchers that flashing 
stimuli facilitate attention. All you need to do is look at the figures in the centre of the 
screen”. 
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After a short practice trial that primarily assisted participants to learn how to respond 
by means of the appropriate keys on the computer keyboard, participants viewed the 
flashing stimuli, that is the experimental manipulation aiming to subliminally activate 
the significant other representations. Participants were assigned to three priming 
conditions: the positive significant other, the negative significant other or the control 
condition. 
The different stimuli were presented during the experiment in the following sequence: 
a)  The word READY as a target focus appeared first on the screen for 1500 
milliseconds. 
b) It was followed by the presentation of the masking configuration for 100 
milliseconds. 
c) Then followed the subliminal presentation of the name of a positive or 
negative significant other or a control word for 33 milliseconds. 
d) The sequence was concluded with the presentation of the masking 
configuration for 100 milliseconds. 
e) The presentation of subliminal prime and the mask was repeated twenty times. 
f) The presentation was completed with a mask of 100 milliseconds. 
Following the attention-facilitating exercise the stimulus script action parts were 
presented in the form of a short vignette on the computer screen. It was a vignette of 
an interpersonal transaction including the nine stimulus statements and was 
formulated in paragraph form. The participants were instructed to imagine these 
statements being directed at them and to attend to them carefully, because they will 
have to answer questions about it. The vignette was presented on the computer 
screen for forty seconds, and then followed by the letter mask. 
The paragraph with scripted interpersonal information was followed by a repeat 
presentation of the experimental manipulation. The word READY appeared again as 
a target focus on the screen for 1500 milliseconds, followed by the presentation of 
the masking configuration for 100 milliseconds, the subliminal presentation of name 
or control word for 33 milliseconds. The subliminal prime and the masking 
configuration were again repeated twenty times.  
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The participants then had to indicate whether any of 36 response statements that 
were presented to them in random balanced order, were indeed presented to them 
during the earlier presentation of the scripted paragraph or not. They were asked to 
respond as quickly as possible by pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard. The 
statements appeared on the computer screen for five seconds. Participants could 
indicate that they were ready for the next statement by pressing the Enter key on the 
keyboard. If the participants did not respond within five seconds, they were requested 
by the computer program to proceed to the next statement. The sequence of the 
priming stimuli, masks, target scripts and response statements are graphically 
presented in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
READY 
2 
ADRIAN 
3 
ZBXSJD 
I already know       4 
you for quite some 
time. I hear you have 
thought about an 
excellent idea again. 
I will enjoy .... 
5 
KDJSHFR 
6 
READY 
7 
ADRIAN 
8 
ZBXSJD 
9 
I hear you have 
thought about an 
excellent idea again. 
Screens displayed 
1.  Focus 
2.  Name of significant other (positive, negative or control) 
3.  Pattern mask of scrambled consonants 
4.  Target script (positive, negative, mixed or ambiguous) 
5.  Pattern mask 
6.  Focus 
7.  Name of significant other (positive, negative or control) 
8.  Pattern mask of scrambled consonants 
9.  Statements 1 to 36 (in random order, 5 seconds each)  1500 ms 
 33 ms
 100 ms 
  40 s 
 100 ms 
  1500 ms
 33 ms
 100 ms
   5 s 
Figure 5.1. S
equence in presentation of prim
es, m
asks, 
target scripts and response statem
ents. 
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Repeated 
20 times 
Repeated 
20 times 
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After they had responded to all 36 statements, the computer program asked another 
set of questions to determine the significance of stimulus presentation to the 
participants (see section 5.3.4.3). 
They were also asked to type their names and addresses if they wish to receive a 
summary of the main results of the research report. The participants were thanked for 
their co-operation. After the completion of the study, all participants that indicated 
interest received a full written debriefing and a summary of the research report 
containing the results of the experiment by mail.  
5.3.4 Measures 
5.3.4.1 Response accuracy 
The 36 Yes or No responses of each participant to all 36 statements were recorded. 
The computer program stored information on the sequence with which the 
statements were presented to every participant. It also stored information on whether 
each of the 36 statements was indeed presented as one of the nine statements in the 
script that the participant received. A response was recorded as accurate when the 
participant indicated that a statement was present or absent in the script, depending 
on whether that particular statement was presented or not. 
5.3.4.2 Reaction time 
Reaction time for every response was measured. If the participant did not respond 
within five seconds, it was recorded as no reply. 
5.3.4.3 Checks on the manipulation 
Until the formal debriefing, participants were ignorant of the real aim of the 
experimental task and the nature of the subliminal stimulus. Cheesman and Merikle 
(1985) argued that one of the best indicators of awareness is simply the subjects’ 
own report of what they saw, which is also what the present awareness assessment 
measured. 
Participants were asked a number of questions to investigate their knowledge of the 
presence of the subliminal presentation and the significance of the stimulus 
presentation (see Appendix F). 
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CHAPTER 6  RESULTS 
6.1 Overview 
Apart from the objectives and hypotheses of the present study, this chapter will 
outline the results for the nomination of significant others and for the manipulation 
checks (indicating the participants’ awareness of the subliminal stimuli and their 
experience of the valence of the target scripts). The analysis of the effects of the 
three independent variables (chronic accessibility, temporary activation and valence 
of target script) will then be presented, followed by an exploration of “false memory” 
responses where participants indicated that statements not actually presented to 
them, were present. 
6.1.1 Objectives 
The present investigated the social-cognitive structures and processes involved in 
the influence of past social experiences on present social functioning. It can also be 
described as an investigation of the working models of individuals with secure and 
insecure attachment orientations.  
In particular, this study investigated 
a) the structure of working models by demonstrating the conjoint schematicity of 
different elements of the relational schema; 
b) the chronic accessibility of the working models of individuals with secure and 
insecure attachment orientations; 
c) whether significant other representations could be activated outside of 
awareness to facilitate the subsequent conscious processing of interpersonal 
information; 
d) through response time effects in a priming paradigm, whether the person-
schema and interpersonal script elements of a relational schema are 
connected; 
e) the combining effect of chronic accessibility, advanced priming and the nature 
of the target stimulus on the processing of scripted information, and 
f) the persons nominated as primary positive significant others by participants 
with secure and insecure attachment styles. 
 94
6.1.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are related to the basic theoretical assumption that participants with 
a history of particular relationship experiences (chronic accessibility), will process 
congruent relationship information (an applicable interpersonal script) more efficiently 
when they are primed with information from a significant other with whom they share 
some of these relationship experiences. The following hypotheses will be 
investigated: 
a) The main hypothesis about the interaction between chronic accessibility, 
temporary activation and script applicability predicts that chronic positive 
participants will process scripted positive interpersonal information more 
efficiently when they are primed with the name of a positive significant other 
than when they are primed with the name of a negative significant other or a 
control prime. Similarly, chronic negative participants will process scripted 
negative interpersonal information more efficiently when they are primed with 
the name of a negative significant other than when they are primed with the 
name of a positive significant other or a control prime. (This hypothesis 
combines all the independent variables and can be regarded as the main 
hypothesis of the study). 
b) The priming hypothesis predicts that participants will process scripted positive 
interpersonal information more efficiently when they are primed with the name 
of a positive significant other than when they are primed the name of a 
negative significant other or a control prime. Similarly, participants will process 
scripted negative interpersonal information more efficiently when they are 
primed with the name of a negative significant other than when they are 
primed with the name of a positive significant other or a control prime. 
c) The chronic accessibility hypothesis predicts that participants with a history of 
positive interactions (positive relational schemas chronically available) will 
process scripted positive interpersonal information more efficiently than 
participants with a history of negative interactions. Similarly, the chronic 
accessibility hypothesis also predicts that participants with a history of 
negative interactions (negative relational schemas chronically available) will 
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process scripted negative interpersonal information more efficiently than 
participants with a history of positive interactions. 
d) The script applicability hypothesis predicts that the level of applicability of the 
target script to the chronically available relational schema will facilitate the 
processing of the scripted information. 
In addition, the following will also be investigated. 
a) In line with the priming hypothesis it will be explored whether participants 
primed with the name of a positive significant other indicate more often that 
positive statements, not presented in the target script, were indeed presented 
to them, than participants primed with a negative significant other or a control 
prime. Similarly, participants primed with the name of a negative significant 
other will indicate more often that negative statements, not presented in the 
target script, were indeed presented to them, than participants primed with a 
positive significant other or control prime. 
b) It will be investigated whether, as can be expected form attachment theory, 
the majority of participants will nominate a parent or close family member as 
the primary positive significant other. 
c) Similarly, it will be investigated whether securely attached participants will be 
more likely to nominate a parent as primary positive significant other 
compared to insecurely attached participants, as predicted by attachment 
theory. 
6.2 Nomination as significant others 
In session one participants were asked to nominate significant other people in their 
lives. The concept of significant others was explained as those people that have an 
important influence in their lives. Mostly it will be people that they know quite well in 
the present or knew quite well in the past. Significant others can broadly be divided 
into two groups of people. Positive significant others can be very supporting and 
people feel good about themselves in their presence. The actions and opinions of 
negative significant others also influence people, but they are often negative and 
critical and therefore often cause people to feel bad about themselves. Participants 
were asked to name a positive and negative significant other from their lives. 
 96
6.2.1 Positive significant others 
In line with the findings of other studies in this field more than half the participants 
(52.9%) nominated a parent as their positive significant other. Mothers were 
nominated in about two thirds of these cases as the positive significant other (64%). 
In 32.2% of cases a friend or romantic friend were nominated. Table 6.1 presents a 
summary of the positive significant others nominated by the all participants that took 
part in session one. 
Table 6.1 
Positive Significant Others Nominated by Total Group (N = 135) and by Male (n = 82) 
and Female (n = 53) Participants 
 
Positive 
significant 
other 
 
Males 
(n = 82) 
% 
 
Females 
(n = 53) 
% 
 
Total group 
(N = 135) 
% 
mother 
 
27.7 43.4 33.8 
father 
 
22.9 13.2 19.1 
brother/ sister 
 
9.6 3.8 7.4 
other family member 
 
3.6 7.6 5.0 
lecturer/ coach / counsellor 
 
1.2 3.8 2.1 
romantic friend 
 
9.6 13.2 10.9 
female friend 
 
7.2 9.4 8.1 
male friend 
 
18.1 5.7 13.2 
 
6.2.2 Negative significant others 
Table 6.2 presents a summary of the negative significant others nominated by the 
participants. 
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Table 6.2 
Negative Significant Others Nominated by Total Group (N = 135) and by Male (n = 
82) and Female (n = 53) Participants 
Negative 
significant 
other 
 
Males 
(n = 82) 
 
% 
 
Females 
(n = 53) 
 
% 
 
Total group 
(N = 135) 
 
% 
mother 
 3.7 5.7 4.4 
father 
 22.0 20.8 21.5 
brother/ sister 
 3.8 13.2 9.6 
other family member 
 7.2 3.8 5.9 
lecturer/ coach / counsellor 
 4.9 3.8 4.4 
romantic friend 
 8.5 3.8 6.6 
female friend 
 12.2 34.0 20.8 
male friend 
 34.2 15.1 26.6 
 
Friends constituted more than half (54%) of the negative significant others 
nominated. Parents were nominated a negative significant other in a quarter of the 
cases (25.9%), and in the majority of those cases (83%) they referred to fathers. The 
findings supported the notion from attachment theory that members of their primary 
family are the most important positive significant others in the lives of a group of 
young adults. 
6.2.3 Confidence Scale and significant others 
Further analysis indicated that 59.7 % of participants higher in confidence (according 
to median split on ASQ Confidence Scale) nominated a parent as their positive 
significant other (40.3% for mother, 19.4% for father). Only 17.8% of the chronic 
positive group regarded their friends to be their first nomination of a positive 
significant other. In comparison, 30.5% of the participants lower in confidence 
nominated a parent as their positive significant other (20.3% for mother, 10.2% for 
father). In the chronic negative group, 35.6% regarded their friends as their first 
nominated positive significant other. This finding supports the notion that a close 
relationship with parents can be associated with a sense of security in self and 
others. There were no significant differences between participants higher or lower in 
confidence in the nomination of their negative significant others. 
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6.3 Checks on the manipulation 
After the completion of session two of the study, all participants answered a number 
of questions about their experience of the experimental conditions (see Appendix F). 
The answers highlighted their level of awareness of the subliminal priming stimulus 
as well as their experience of the valence of the target script. To establish that the 
priming stimuli were subliminal, no one of the participants should report any 
conscious recognition of it. It is also important to establish whether the participants 
could identify when a positive, negative, mixed or ambiguous script was presented to 
them. 
6.3.1 Awareness of subliminal presentation 
Some of the questions assessed the participants’ awareness of the subliminal 
priming stimuli. The responses of 108 participants on those questions are presented 
in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3 
Awareness of Subliminal Priming Stimuli (N = 108) 
 
Question 
 
Yes 
 
% 
 
No 
 
% 
 
Did the concentration exercises help you to focus your attention on the 
task that you had to do? 
 
 
62.0 
 
 
38.0 
 
Were you suspicious about the nature of the flashing symbols? 
 
 
48.1 
 
51.9 
 
 
Do you think any information was presented to you during the flashing 
symbols? 
 
 
17.6 
 
 
82.4 
 
 
Do you think there was any relation between session one and session 
two? 
 
 
64.8 
 
 
35.2 
 
 
The majority (62%) of participants were of the opinion that the flashing stimuli 
assisted them in focusing their attention on the task. It can be concluded that the 
experiment succeeded in drawing the attention of the participants to the centre 
location on the monitor screen where the stimuli were presented. 
Almost half of the participants (48%) indicated that they were somewhat suspicious 
of the flashing stimuli and when being asked, 18% responded that information could 
have been presented to them during the flashing stimuli. None of them however 
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reported any conscious recognition of the subliminal stimuli or could even come close 
to accurately guessing the content of the subliminal information presented. Almost 
65% were of the opinion that there might have been some or other connection 
between sessions one and two of the study. It can be concluded that the priming 
stimuli were indeed subliminal and none of the participants reported any conscious 
awareness of the content presented. 
6.3.2 Experience of the different target scripts 
Participants were randomly allocated to the different experimental conditions (Table 
5.1). Table 6.4 presents the responses of participants in the different experimental 
conditions about their experience of the valence or polarity of the content of the 
interpersonal scripts presented to them. 
Table 6.4 
Experience of Target Scripts of Total Group (N = 109) and Participants in Different 
Subgroups 
 
Content of target script 
 
 
Participants 
 
positive 
 
% 
 
negative 
 
% 
 
positive and 
negative 
% 
 
neutral 
 
% 
 all (N = 109) 43 44 54 15 
Script      
 positive  (n = 28) 
 
100 4 11 18 
 negative (n = 27) 
 
0 100 48 3 
 ambiguous (n = 25) 
 
44 28 72 36 
 mixed  (n = 28) 
 
29 46 89 7 
Prime      
 positive  (n = 38) 
 
42 42 
 
61 18 
 negative (n = 37) 
 
46 41 
 
57 16 
 control  (n = 34) 
 
41 50 
 
44 15 
Chronic      
 positive  (n = 51) 
 
37 51 
 
61 12 
 negative (n = 57) 
 
49 39 
 
49 19 
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The results provide evidence that the participants attended to the scripts and was 
aware of the content presented them. All participants recognised the content of the 
script as positive behaviour when a positive script was presented to them. The same 
applied to the participants that received a negative script. The majority of participants 
that received the ambiguous (72%) and mixed (89%) scripts were of opinion that the 
scripts included positive and negative behaviour towards them.  
In general, participants that received the subliminal presentation of the name of a 
positive or negative significant other did not differ significantly from each other in their 
conscious experience of the scripts presented to them. The subliminal prime did not 
influence their conscious awareness of the content of the script. They were however 
more likely than those that received a control prime to indicate that the scripts were 
both positive and negative towards them (61% and 57% compared to 44%). This 
result may indicate an interference of non-conscious processing in conscious 
experience. 
Participants in the chronic positive group experienced the scripts generally as more 
negative towards them (51% compared to 39%), and participants in the chronic 
negative group experienced the scripts as more positive towards them (49% 
compared to 37%). This might indicate a contrast effect. 
6.4 Average reaction time of participants 
Every participant made 36 responses; therefore there were 3924 responses in total 
for the 109 participants. On average, it took participants 2.85 seconds to respond. 
The average time per response for participants in the different experimental groups is 
presented in Table 6.5. Participants in the chronic negative group generally 
responded faster than those in the chronic positive group (F(1,3922) = 98.88; p < 
0.001). Priming had a significant effect on reaction time (F(2,3921) = 15.23; p < 
0.001), most likely because the negative priming group responded slower than those 
in the other groups. Participants primed with a control stimulus responded faster than 
those primed with the name of a positive or negative significant other. This could 
mean that the subliminal priming with the names of significant others slightly 
interfered with the response of participants. Participants receiving the ambiguous 
script responded the fastest of all the subgroups (2.62 seconds) and significantly 
faster than the participants receiving the other scripts (F(3,3920) = 22.77; p < 0.001).  
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Table 6.5 
Average Response Time of Total Group (N = 109) and Participants in Different 
Conditions 
 
 All Chronic Prime Script 
  (N = 109) 
positive 
(n = 58) 
negative 
(n = 51) 
positive 
(n = 38) 
negative 
(n = 38) 
control 
(n = 33) 
pos. 
n = 28) 
neg. 
(n = 27) 
amb. 
n = 25) 
mix. 
n = 29 
Average 
response 
time  
2.85 3.03 2.68 2.79 3.00 2.74 2.83 2.91 2.62 3.00 
 
6.5 General accuracy of responses 
The general accuracy of responses was also investigated. A response was recorded 
as accurate when participants indicated correctly whether a statement was present 
(nine statements) or absent (27 statements) in the scripts presented to them. A 
summary of these results is presented in Table 6.6. 
Participants in the prime control condition (27.85 out of the 36 responses) were more 
accurate than participants in the two experimental priming conditions (prime positive 
= 25.97 and prime negative = 26.26). This result was true for the responses to the 
positive, negative, ambiguous and filler statements and might indicate that the 
subliminal priming stimuli had a debilitating effect on the general accuracy of 
participants. 
As could be expected, participants in the ambiguous (26.36) and mixed (24.14) script 
conditions experienced more difficulty in accurately determining the presence or 
absence of the target statements presented to them, compared to those receiving the 
negative (27.63) and positive (28.54) scripts. 
The accuracy of participants in indicating the presence or absence of the nine 
positive, negative, ambiguous and filler statements, is also recorded in Table 6.6. 
Participants in the chronic positive group were more accurate than the chronic 
negative group in determining whether positive statements were presented (6.67 
compared to 6.36). In turn, participants in the chronic negative group were more 
accurate than the chronic positive group in indicating whether negative statements 
were presented (7.62 compared to 6.75). 
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Table 6.6 
Average Number of Correct Responses of Total Group (N = 109) and Participants in 
Different Conditions 
 All Chronic Prime Script 
 (N = 109) 
positive 
(n = 58) 
negative 
(n = 51) 
positive 
(n = 38) 
negative 
(n = 38) 
control 
(n=33) 
pos. 
(n =28) 
neg. 
(n =27) 
amb. 
(n = 25) 
mix. 
(n = 29) 
 
Statements 
 
          
 
positive  
 
6.50 6.67 6.36 6.29 6.50 6.76 6.18 8.00 6.16 5.72 
 
negative 
 
7.21 6.75 7.62 7.00 7.24 7.42 8.82 6.07 7.44 6.52 
 
ambiguous 
 
6.54 6.14 6.90 6.68 6.16 6.82 6.89 7.07 6.60 5.66 
 
filler 
 
6.39 6.06 6.67 6.00 6.37 6.85 6.64 6.48 6.16 6.24 
 
all 
 
26.64 25.61 27.55 25.97 26.26 27.85 28.54 27.63 26.36 24.14 
 
The average reaction time of participants was influenced by valence of script with 
participants receiving ambiguous scripts the fastest of all. The general accuracy of 
responses was influenced by valence of scripts (participants receiving mixed scripts 
were least accurate), by priming condition (participants receiving a control prime were 
more accurate) and attachment style (less secure participants were more accurate). 
These findings will be discussed in Chapter 7. The main analysis of the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependant variables and the possible interactions 
between conditions will now be presented. 
6.6 Analysis of effect of independent variables 
The main analysis was conducted in a stepwise manner. Firstly, the accuracy of 
participants in terms of the number of correct and incorrect responses was analysed. 
Then, by analysing the reaction time of correct responses under the various 
experimental conditions, the availability of the script information was analysed per 
chronic group. 
 
 
 103
6.6.1 Analysis of accuracy of responses 
Table 6.7 shows the accuracy of participants per chronic group in remembering the 
presence and absence of the statements from the various scripts. A “no response” 
was coded when participants did not answer within five seconds. 
Table 6.7 
Accuracy of Responses per Chronic Group and Script (n = 3924) 
    
Statement 
 
 
 
Chronic
 
 
Script 
 
Accuracy 
 
absent
 
present
 
Total
negative negative incorrect 70 26 96
correct 250 80 330
no response 4 2 6
positive incorrect 70 25 95
correct 382 126 508
no response 7 2 9
ambiguous incorrect 99 17 116
correct 278 107 385
no response 1 2 3
mixed incorrect 120 32 152
correct 276 99 375
no response 9 4 13
positive negative incorrect 76 27 103
correct 310 106 416
no response 19 2 21
positive incorrect 85 11 96
correct 205 86 291
no response 7 2 9
ambiguous incorrect 101 15 116
correct 194 80 274
no response 2 4 6
mixed incorrect 144 29 173
correct 228 97 325
no response 6 6
 
The differences in the number of correct responses between negative and positive 
scripts per chronic group were highly significant (see Table 6.8). The chronic 
negative participants were in general more accurate than expected in indicating 
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whether the statements from the positive script were presented to them or not. The 
opposite was true of the chronic positive participants. They were more accurate than 
expected in indicating whether the statements from the negative script were 
presented to them or not.  
Table 6.8 
Number of Correct Responses per Chronic Group and Negative 
and Positive Script 
Chronic Script Observed n Expected n Χ2 p 
negative negative 330 419.0 22.10  < .001 
 positive 508 419.0   
positive negative 416 353.5 37.81  < .001  
 positive 291 353.5   
 
Differences in the number of incorrect responses between negative and positive 
scripts per chronic group were very small (see Table 6.5) and not statistically 
significant (p > .10). Overall, when the responses from participants were correct, the 
difference between the chronic groups, given the differences in the negative and 
positive scripts, was significant (Χ2 = 58.02; p < .01). This was not the case when the 
responses were incorrect. 
Differences in the number of correct responses between the participants receiving 
the ambiguous and mixed scripts were only significant for the chronic positive group 
and only at 4% level (See Table 6.9).  
Table 6.9 
Number of Correct Responses per Chronic Group and Ambiguous and Mixed Script 
Chronic Script Observed n Expected n Χ2 p 
negative ambiguous 385 380.0 0.13 p = .717 
 mixed 375 380.0   
      
positive ambiguous 274 299.5 4.34 p = .037 
 mixed 325 299.5   
 
Differences in the number of incorrect responses between ambiguous and mixed 
scripts were highly significant for the chronic positive group (Χ2 = 11.24; p < .001), 
and for the chronic negative group (Χ2 = 4.84; p = .028). Overall, however, when 
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responses were incorrect, the difference between the chronic groups, given the 
differences in the ambiguous and mixed scripts, was not statistical significant (Χ2 = 
0.57; p > .010). 
On the basis of these results the further analysis was based on the correct responses 
only, and the negative and positive scripts were used as levels for the factor script. 
This decision was supported by the difficulty caused by two possible explanations for 
incorrect responses. (a) Participants could indicate in the memory test that 
statements were presented to them as part of the particular script, although it was not 
presented. (b) Participants could indicate in the memory test that statements were 
not presented to them as part of the particular script, although it was indeed 
presented. Shah (2003a) also commented on additional difficulty interpreting 
interpreting the response time of incorrect responses in terms of accessibility effects 
(see also Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992 and Fazio, 1990). 
6.6.2 Analysis of response times 
The priming paradigm suggests that congruent priming facilitates the response to a 
target. Thus, the response time to remember the script statement accurately should 
be shorter when the prime is congruent with the script. 
Figure 6.1 presents the relationship between the three levels of priming per level of 
script and chronic group. The response times are based on accurate or correct 
responses only. For reasons of completeness, all conditions are presented.  
 Chronic negative Chronic positive 
 
Script 
mixedambigous positive negative 
3.4 
3.2 
3.0 
2.8 
2.6 
2.4 
2.2 
2.0 
PRIME
negative
positive
control
M
ea
n 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
e 
 
Script
mixed ambigous positivenegative
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.0
2.8
2.6
2.4
2.2
PRIME 
negative
positive
control 
M
ea
n 
re
sp
on
se
 ti
m
e 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Response time of accurate responses per level of priming 
and script per chronic group. 
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The response time of participants in the chronic negative group, who received 
negative scripts, were the fastest when they received a negative prime. The 
response time was slowest when they received a positive prime. This finding is in line 
with the priming hypothesis. 
Participants in the negative chronic group responded very fast to indicate the 
presence or absence of statements from ambiguous scripts. This effect seems to be 
a result of the script condition, as it was true for all three priming conditions. 
The participants from the chronic positive group were also comparatively fast to 
indicate the presence or absence of statements from ambiguous scripts. Their 
response time, when they received a positive script, was also the fastest if primed 
with a positive significant other, offering further support for the priming hypothesis. 
Again, when receiving a positive script, their response time was also the slowest 
when primed with a negative prime.  
The corresponding means, standard errors and 5% confidence levels for each 
chronic group per level of priming and script, are presented in Table 6.10. 
 107
Table 6.10 
Response Time per Chronic Group, Prime and Script 
  95% Confidence Interval 
Chronic Prime Script M SD Lower Bound Upper Bound 
negative negative negative 2.43 .101 2.229 2.624 
positive 2.61 .079 2.456 2.767 
ambiguous 2.37 .089 2.191 2.539 
mixed 3.17 .095 2.988 3.360 
positive negative 2.73 .100 2.534 2.927 
positive 2.81 .078 2.653 2.959 
ambiguous 2.17 .091 1.993 2.351 
mixed 2.57 .089 2.394 2.744 
control negative 2.61 .101 2.411 2.808 
positive 2.78 .087 2.612 2.955 
ambiguous 2.38 .101 2.187 2.582 
mixed 2.41 .100 2.216 2.610 
positive negative negative 3.55 .085 3.379 3.711 
positive 3.25 .106 3.046 3.460 
ambiguous 2.39 .121 2.148 2.624 
mixed 3.24 .099 3.048 3.437 
positive negative 3.02 .090 2.840 3.192 
positive 2.34 .117 2.110 2.568 
ambiguous 2.83 .097 2.637 3.017 
mixed 3.00 .120 2.766 3.236 
control negative 2.45 .096 2.258 2.635 
positive 3.07 .101 2.874 3.271 
ambiguous 2.53 .119 2.301 2.767 
mixed 2.80 .091 2.622 2.980 
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In Figure 6.2 the effects of priming are graphically presented only for the negative 
and positive scripts and per chronic group. The figure demonstrates support for the 
priming hypothesis. The response time of participants in the chronic negative group, 
who received negative scripts, were the fastest when they received a negative prime. 
The response time was slowest when they received a positive prime. The response 
time of participants in the chronic positive group, who received positive scripts, were 
the fastest when they received a positive prime. The response time was slowest 
when they received a negative prime. 
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Figure 6.2. Accurate response time per level of priming and negative 
and positive script for each chronic group. 
 
Separate univariate analyses of variance were done for the differences between 
positive and negative priming. The level of significance of the mean differences of the 
response times per polarity of script and group is shown in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11 
Significance of Differences Between Positive and Negative Priming per 
Polarity of Script and Group 
Chronic Script (I) Prime (J) Prime df F p
negative negative positive negative 1,219 4.3 .039
control negative 1,217 1.58 .210
control positive 1,218 .64 .424
positive positive negative 1,360 2.98 .084
control negative 1,322 2.49 .116
control positive 1,328 .04 .843
positive negative positive negative 1,293 14.33 .000
control negative 1,275 75.70 .000
control positive 1,258 21.00 .000
positive positive negative 1,180 43.68 .000
control negative 1,206 1.47 .226
control positive 1,191 29.17 .000
 
It appears from Table 6.11 that in the chronic negative group, only the absolute 
difference between negative and positive priming with a negative script was 
significant (p = .039). In the chronic positive group, only the difference between 
control and negative priming with a positive script was not significant (p > .10). 
The congruencies of the priming effects can be deducted from Figure 6.2. In the 
chronic negative group, congruent priming only appears when prime and script are 
negative. The response time is faster than in the prime control condition. There is, 
however, no congruent priming when prime and script are positive. Likewise, 
discongruent priming appears when a negative script is positively primed. 
In the chronic positive group, congruent priming only appears when prime and script 
are positive. There is, however, no congruent priming when prime and script are 
negative. Likewise, discongruent priming appears when a positive script is negatively 
primed or when the script is negative and the prime is positive. The mean response 
times are slower than the mean response time in the prime control condition. 
The following conjunctive structure can be used to describe the relationship between 
‘chronic’ and ‘script’ when priming effects occur (see Table 6.12). In a conjunctive 
model of categorisation, two or more characteristics should both or all be present 
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before the concept qualifies to be a member of that category. It is a more complex 
level of organisation than only the presence or absence of a single characteristic 
(Benjafield, 1994). In a conjunctive model of priming all the dimensions should be 
above a particular minimum to have effect and the different dimensions could not 
compensate for each other. 
Table 6.12 
Conjunctive Model of Script and Chronic Group on Priming 
 Chronic positive Chronic negative 
Prime is positive 
Script is positive 
 
Congruent  
priming effect 
No  
priming effect 
Prime is negative 
Script is negative 
 
No  
priming effect 
Congruent  
priming effect 
Prime is negative 
Script is positive 
 
Discongruent  
priming effect 
No 
 priming effect 
Prime is positive 
Script is negative 
 
No  
priming effect 
Discongruent  
priming effect 
 
The rationale of the conjunctive model is that script and chronic group must have the 
same polarity in order for the prime to have either a congruent or a discongruent 
effect. 
The next analysis was conducted to evaluate the differences between the chronic 
groups as a function of their response time to negative and positive scripts when their 
responses were accurate and the prime congruent to the script. (Congruent primed 
scripts refer to all cases where the polarity of the prime was equal to the polarity of 
the script). In Table 6.13 the results of a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
(chronic x script) are presented.  
 111
Table 6.13 
Results of Two-way Analysis of Variance for Chronic Group and Script 
Source df F p 
CHRONIC 1 10.946 .01 
SCRIPT 1 17.654 .00 
CHRONIC x SCRIPT 1 64.952 .00 
Error 528   
 
The results in Table 6.13 show the two main effects for chronic group (p = .01) and 
script (p = .00), and a highly significant interaction effect between chronic group and 
negative and positive scripts (p < .001). 
Table 6.14 and Figure 6.3 below provide insight in the interactive relationship 
between chronic group and script. When responses are correct and the primes 
congruent to the scripts, the chronic negative group was significantly faster than the 
chronic positive group when they had to recognise statements from a negative script 
(F(1,292) = 8.352; p = .004). Likewise, the chronic negative group was significantly 
slower then the chronic positive group when they had to recognise statements from a 
positive script (F(1,236) = 68.28; p < .001). The results therefore support the 
conjunctive model of priming as was proposed. 
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Table 6.14 
Interactive Relationship in Response Times Between Chronic Group and Negative 
and Positive Script 
    95% Confidence Interval 
Chronic Script N M SD Lower Bound Upper Bound 
negative negative 110 2.43 .103 2.224 2.629 
positive 184 2.81 .080 2.650 2.963 
positive negative 156 3.55 .087 3.375 3.715 
positive 82 2.34 .119 2.104 2.573 
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 Figure 6.3. Mean response time per chronic group when script is positive or 
negative. 
In Figure 6.4, the mean response times (based on correct responses only) per group 
are plotted for the ambiguous and mixed script. The mean response times of the 
chronic negative and chronic positive groups differed significantly for both ambiguous 
and mixed scripts respectively (F(1,657) = 16.86; p < .001, and, F(1,698) = 9.881; p < 
.002). 
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 Figure 6.4. Mean response time per chronic group when script is ambiguous 
or mixed. 
In addition, participants from both chronic groups, found it easier to decide whether a 
statement from an ambiguous script was presented before compared to a statement 
from a mixed script. In contrast to findings concerning positive and negative scripts 
(Figure 6.3), the interaction between script (mixed or ambiguous) and chronic group 
(negative or positive) was not significant (F(1,1355) = 0.98; p = .754) (see also Table 
6.15). 
Table 6.15 
Interactive Relationship in Responses Times Between Chronic Group and 
Ambiguous and Mixed Script 
  95% Confidence Interval 
Chronic Script M SD Lower Bound Upper Bound 
negative ambiguous 2.30 .055 2.195 2.412 
mixed 2.72 .056 2.613 2.833 
positive ambiguous 2.62 .065 2.492 2.748 
mixed 3.00 .060 2.885 3.120 
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The same effect is not present as was observed with the positive and negative 
scripts. 
In the concluding part of the results section, a number of other trends in the response 
pattern of participants will be presented. 
6.7 Average number of yes responses 
The average number of “yes” responses to the 36 statements was also explored. A 
“yes” response refers to a participant indicating that a particular statement was 
presented as part of the script, which was presented to him/her. Therefore a “yes” 
response could be accurate or not. Although it was stated previously that the 
ambiguous and mixed groups were least accurate in their responses, they were more 
likely to indicate that a statement was presented. This could also be an indication of 
their uncertainty in distinguishing between statements that was presented and those 
that were not. It is also of interest that the chronic positive group in general recorded 
more “yes” responses than the chronic negative group. 
Investigating the “yes” responses to positive and negative statements showed that 
the chronic positive and chronic negative groups demonstrated a contrast effect. The 
chronic positive group gave more “yes” responses to negative statements and the 
chronic negative group gave more “yes” responses to positive statements. The 
priming groups, however, followed the intuitive pattern, with the positive prime group 
giving more “yes” responses to positive statements and the negative prime group 
giving more “yes” responses to negative statements. 
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Table 6.16 
Average Number of Yes Responses by Total Group (N = 109) and by Participants in 
Different Conditions 
 Chronic Prime Script All 
Statements positive negative positive negative control positive negative ambiguous mixed  
positive 3.98 4.31 4.39 4.26 3.76 7.50 0.74 2.80 5.28 4.16 
negative 2.06 1.50 1.53 1.89 1.88 0.00 4.96 0.00 2.00 1.76 
ambiguous 1.06 1.24 1.32 1.05 1.09 0.00 0.00 5.04 0.00 1.16 
filler 2.20 2.22 1.97 2.26 2.42 2.21 1.96 2.44 2.24 2.21 
all 14.98 13.10 13.87 14.61 13.39 13.21 12.37 14.96 15.38 13.98 
 
6.8 Statements not presented 
In a number of studies (see Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990; 
Andersen et al., 1995; Andersen et al., 1996; Glassman & Andersen, 1999b; Hinkley 
& Andersen, 1996) the nomination of representation consistent items, not presented 
to the participants, were used as an index of representation activation. In the present 
study, three positive and three negative items consistent with the positive and 
negative scripts, were also included in the memory test, but not presented to any 
participant. There were also three filler items that were not presented to any 
participant. The responses on these items for all the participants and for the different 
subgroups are presented in Table 6.17. 
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Table 6.17 
Average Number of Statements not Presented but Recalled by Total Group (N = 109) 
and by Participants in Different Conditions 
Participants Statements 
 positive negative filler 
All 1.31 0.67 0.77 
Chronic    
positive 1.17 0.87 0.96 
negative 1.42 0.51 0.61 
    
Prime    
positive 1.49 0.66 0.91 
negative 1.47 0.77 0.70 
control 0.91 0.58 0.66 
    
Script    
positive 2.15 0.00 0.42 
negative 0.17 1.83 0.64 
ambiguous 1.12 0.44 1.12 
mixed 1.62 0.54 0.89 
 
Participants were much more likely to indicate that the positive statements were 
presented to them as part of the script than the negative statements. This was true 
for all conditions, apart from the participants that received the negative script. 
Although the trends are in the predicted direction, participants receiving a positive 
prime (1.49) were only slightly more likely to indicate that the three positive 
statements were presented to them, than participants receiving the negative prime 
(1.47). The same applies to the selection of the negative statements by participants 
receiving the negative prime (0.77) in comparison to those receiving the positive 
prime (0.66). 
6.9 Summary of results 
Separate univariate analyses of the difference in response times of accurate 
responses between positive and negative priming per polarity of chronic group and 
script indicated support for the priming hypothesis. This hypothesis stated that 
chronic positive participants would process scripted positive interpersonal information 
more efficiently when they are primed with the name of a positive significant other 
than when they are primed with the name of a negative significant other or a control 
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prime. Similarly, chronic negative participants would process scripted negative 
interpersonal information more efficiently when they are primed with the name of a 
negative significant other than when they are primed with the name of a positive 
significant other or a control prime. The average response time of the chronic 
negative group was fastest when they received a negative prime (p = .039), and for 
the positive group was fastest when they received a positive prime (p = .000). The 
results of a two-way analysis of variance for chronic group and script showed a highly 
significant interaction effect between chronic group and script (p = .000). When the 
primes were congruent to the scripts, the chronic groups were significantly faster in 
recognising statements from a congruent script. 
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CHAPTER 7  DISCUSSION 
7.1 Outline of discussion 
In this chapter, support for the main hypothesis of the study will first be considered. 
Then the effect of the three independent variables (temporary activation, chronic 
accessibility and interpersonal script) will be discussed in the light of previous 
findings. The results concerning the combination of temporary and chronic activation, 
significant others, and a discussion of some unexpected results will conclude the first 
part of this chapter. 
In the second part of the chapter some implications of the findings for theory, 
research and therapeutic application will be considered. The limitations of the study 
will be discussed and recommendations will be made for future research in this area. 
7.2 Support for main hypothesis 
The general aim of the present study was to investigate the social-cognitive 
structures and processes involved in the influence of past social experiences on the 
present processing of social information under controlled experimental conditions. 
The main hypothesis stated that chronic positive participants would process scripted 
positive interpersonal information more efficiently when they are primed with the 
name of a positive significant other than when they are primed with the name of a 
negative significant other or a control prime. Similarly, chronic negative participants 
would process scripted negative interpersonal information more efficiently when they 
are primed with the name of a negative significant other than when they are primed 
with the name of a positive significant other or a control prime. 
The results demonstrated support for this hypothesis and participants with a history 
of particular relationship experiences (secure or insecure attachment styles), 
processed congruent relationship information (positive or negative interpersonal 
script) more efficiently when they were primed with information from a significant 
other with whom they share some of these relationship experiences (name of positive 
or negative significant other). 
7.3 Temporary activation 
The temporary activation of a relational schema was the first independent variable in 
the present study. Recent activation of a social construct increases the likelihood that 
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the construct will be used to interpret new information. Priming can be considered as 
one form of temporary activation (Higgins, 1996). The priming paradigm suggested 
that congruent priming would facilitate information-processing. 
7.3.1 Evidence for temporary activation 
The results of the present study (see Table 6.11) supported the priming hypothesis 
and indicated that participants in the chronic positive group processed positive scripts 
significantly faster when they were primed with the name of a positive significant 
other than when they were primed the name of a negative significant other. The 
same effect was found for chronic negative participants, who responded to negative 
scripts significantly faster when primed with a negative significant other compared to 
a positive significant other. 
This support for the priming hypothesis was obtained with a minimal prime in the form 
of a subliminal presentation (33 milliseconds) of the name of a significant other. In 
their responses to the manipulation checks (see Table 6.3) participants did not report 
any recognition of the contents of the subliminal priming. The subliminal presentation 
of the name of the positive or negative significant other also did not influence 
participants’ conscious experience of the different target scripts (see Table 6.4). The 
priming stimuli were clearly unobtrusive. 
Apart from the reaction time effects, a number of trends in the results also supported 
the priming hypothesis. Participants primed with the control stimulus were more 
accurate in their recognition of statements presented to them than participants 
primed with positive or negative significant others (see Table 6.6). Although 
participants were unaware of the prime, it might have introduced some bias in the 
responses. Participants primed with the name of a positive significant other indicated 
more often that positive statements were presented to them (4.39), than participants 
primed with a negative significant other (4.26), or a control prime (3.76). Participants 
primed with the name of a negative significant other also indicated more often that 
negative statements were presented to them (1.89), than participants primed with a 
positive significant other (1.53), or a control prime (1.88) (see Table 6.16). The 
direction of these trends may represent a tendency to indicate that prime congruent 
statements were presented as part of the script. This tendency received further 
support from the responses of participants to statements not presented to them. 
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Participants primed with the name of a positive significant other indicated more often 
that positive statements, that were not present in the script, were indeed presented to 
them (1.49), than participants primed with a negative significant other (1.47) or 
control prime (0.91). Participants primed with the name of a negative significant other 
also indicated more often that negative statements, not presented to them, were 
indeed presented (0.77), than participants primed with a positive significant other 
(0.66) or control prime (0.58) (see Table 6.17). These results are similar to those 
reported by Andersen and co-workers using different research methods. Therefore 
both the main analysis and a number of trends supported the priming effect of a 
subliminal stimulus. 
The use of subliminal priming assists in avoiding the contrast effect when participants 
become aware of attempts to bias or control their responses and consciously 
discount it or compensate for it (see Strack et al., 1993). The accessibility effects of 
the subliminal priming of social constructs have been demonstrated in social 
cognition research (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Devine, 1989). Murphy and Zajonc 
(1993) primed participants with happy faces, Pierce and Lydon (1998) with subliminal 
positive or negative interpersonal words, and Herr (1986) with the names of hostility-
related people. Baldwin et al. (1990) primed participants subliminally with the face of 
an authority figure, and Shah (2003, study 2) with the word “father”. In comparison, 
the present study demonstrated priming effects with an ideographic priming stimulus 
– the name of a significant other specific to the participant. The prime had no general 
evaluative (e.g. well-known hostility-related name) or general affective content (e.g. 
picture of a serious or happy face or the word “father”). The present results supported 
the work by Baldwin (1994) who primed participants with the name of a highly critical 
or accepting person, Banse (1999) who primed participants with the name or face of 
a romantic partner, or Shah (2003a, study 1) and Mikulincer et al. (2001, study 4) 
who primed participants with names of significant others. 
In the present study the names of significant others were generated in session one. 
There was a number of days delay between sessions one and two and the names 
were not mentioned in session two. Therefore it seems as if it can be stated with 
confidence that there could not have been any residual activation of the priming word 
and the priming effects could only be explained by the subliminal exposure of the 
name of the personally specific significant other. It is possible that the same 
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significant other, although generally experienced as positive (or negative) could also 
have been involved in interactions with the participant, which the latter experienced 
as very negative (or positive). The influence of the target script will be discussed 
later. 
7.3.2 Response time effects 
The priming effects (as well as the chronic accessibility and target script effects) were 
measured in terms of response or reaction time. Response time is generally used in 
social cognition research as indication of the speed of cognitive processing. Faster 
response times are an indication of facilitated processing and high levels of 
availability of constructs. Slower response times may indicate additional processing, 
low availability or even emotional interference. Higgins et al. (1982) demonstrated 
faster response times in memory tasks for chronically accessible constructs. The 
speed of processing self-relevant information was significantly faster in studies by 
Markus (1977). In the present study, the faster response times in the memory task 
could indicate the heightened availability of the significant other representation and 
associated information. 
7.3.3 Activation of cognitive structures 
Smith and Zárate (1992) reviewed evidence that a proper name, as an exemplar of 
one, could also operate as a social construct. Andersen et al. (1995) demonstrated 
that an activated individual person exemplar could be used to interpret new 
individuals. In the present study, the activation of an individual person exemplar 
facilitated the processing of an interpersonal script. According to the spreading 
activation paradigm (Collins & Loftus, 1975) other information (available in cognitive 
structures) linked in a network to the name of the significant other, was also 
activated. 
The research program of Andersen and co-workers (reviewed in section 3.3.2) 
explored the qualities of significant other representations and its effects on the 
processing of interpersonal information. Significant other representations share many 
associations with many other constructs. Stored representations of significant others 
can be activated and applied to new others (Andersen, et al., 1998). In the present 
study, it was hypothesised that significant other representations are closely 
associated with the representations of many typical transactions between the index 
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person and the significant other. The present study extended previous research in 
demonstrating that activated significant other representations can facilitate the 
processing of congruent interpersonal scripts. 
Therefore, the present results supported the notion of Baldwin (1992) that relational 
schemas are based on repeated interactions with significant others and are 
constituted by three interrelated elements (self-schema, person-schema and 
interpersonal script). The present results demonstrated, with response time effects in 
a priming paradigm, that the person-schema and interpersonal script are connected. 
Therefore, the present results satisfy the requirement of Higgins and Bargh (1987) 
that one element of a hypothesised schema must be primed and measures taken 
demonstrating that the activation has spread to another element, before the 
existence of a schema can be claimed. 
The present results correspond to the components of working models as proposed 
by Collins and Read (1994) (see section 2.2) and provide some insight into the 
structure and processing of working models. 
7.4 Chronic accessibility 
The chronic accessibility of a relational schema was the second independent variable 
in the present study. Chronic accessibility refers to the readiness of a construct to be 
activated and used in the processing of information even with minimal temporary 
activation (Higgins, 1996). The lower threshold for activation might be the result of 
frequent activation of the construct in the past or the high level of connectedness with 
other constructs. 
7.4.1 Evidence of chronic accessibility 
The results of the present study supported the hypothesis that target interpersonal 
scripts will be processed more efficiently when they are consistent with chronically 
accessible relational schemas. When the responses were accurate, and prime 
congruent to the script, chronic group had a significant effect on response time (p = 
.01) (see Table 6.13 and Figure 6.3). 
Apart from the reaction time effects in the main analysis, a number of trends in the 
results also supported the chronic accessibility hypothesis. The average response 
time of the chronic negative group responding to negative scripts was 2.43 seconds, 
and the average response time to positive scripts was 2.81 seconds (see Table 
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6.14). The average response time of the chronic positive group responding to 
positive scripts was 2.34 seconds, compared to 3.55 seconds when responding to 
negative scripts (see Table 6.14). 
7.4.2 Secure and insecure attachment 
In the present study, chronic accessibility was operasionalised as secure and 
insecure attachment styles. The distinction between secure attachment and insecure 
attachment in general is well supported in literature, although the different insecure 
groups are not as clearly differentiated as suggested by theory (Feeny et al., 1994). 
After a meta-analysis Baldwin and Fehr (1995) reported satisfactory test-retest 
results for the secure group. In most populations secure and insecure participants 
were in almost equal proportions (Hazan & Shaver, 1994), supporting the decision in 
the present study to use a median split of the confidence scale of an attachment style 
measure. The recollections of childhood relationships with parents differed 
systematically between secure and insecure groups (see section 2.5). Based on 
different histories of repeated interactions, the significant other representations of the 
secure and insecure groups could be expected to be different and associated with 
different interpersonal scripts. The relational schemas and the working models of 
these groups could be considered to be different (depending on the preferred 
theoretical perspective). 
7.4.3 Comparison to past findings 
Baldwin et al. (1993) explored the relational schemas underlying attachment styles 
and demonstrated the chronic accessibility of interpersonal constructs by means of 
self-report and lexical decision tasks. Baldwin et al. (1990) differentiated between 
high and low practising religious students when priming them with the face of a 
prominent religious leader. This could be stated as a difference between high and 
low chronic accessibility for religious constructs. 
Glassman and Andersen (1999b) operasionalised chronic accessibility for significant 
other representations as the delayed measurement of transference effects. Their use 
of over-lapping features at the learning and measurement phase might have 
compromised their findings (see section 7.10.2).  
The use of attachment style as operasionalisation of chronic accessibility for different 
interpersonal scripts with significant others was a new development and was 
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supported by the results. It extended the work by Baldwin et al. (1996) where self-
reported attachment style was related to the ease with which participants could 
generate exemplar relationships matching these styles. 
7.5 Interpersonal script 
The valence of the interpersonal script presented to participants was the third 
independent variable of this study. A script could be defined as a representation of 
knowledge about a coherent sequence of events in a well-known situation or context. 
People are assumed to abstract scripts from repeated experience with similar 
situations and then to apply them to the understanding of new experiences. Baldwin 
(1992) defined an interpersonal script as a cognitive structure representing a 
sequence of actions and events that define a stereotypical relational pattern. The 
script is structurally connected to the self-schema and the representation of a 
significant other. All three elements are predicted to demonstrate information 
processing effects. 
7.5.1 Evidence of script applicability 
The results of the manipulation check demonstrated that the participants were well 
aware of the content and polarity (positive, negative, ambiguous or mixed) of the 
scripts presented to them (see Table 6.4). When responses were accurate and the 
prime congruent with the script, the polarity of the script had a significant effect on 
the response time (p = .00, see Table 6.13). Chronic positive participants were 
significant faster in responding to the positive script than the negative script, and 
chronic negative participants were significantly faster in responding to the negative 
script. 
Apart from the reaction time effects in the main analysis, a number of trends in the 
results also supported the script applicability hypothesis. Although only six positive 
statements were included in the positive script presented to participants, they 
indicated during the memory test that they received an average of 7.5 positive 
statements during the script presentation. Participants that received negative scripts 
followed the same pattern in their responses to negative statements, although not as 
extreme (see Table 6.16). Participants receiving positive scripts gave more “yes” 
responses to positive statements not presented to them (2.15) than to any other 
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scripts. Participants receiving negative scripts responded more “yes” to negative 
statements not presented to them (1.83) than to any other scripts (see Table 6.17). 
Participants that received the mixed scripts were the least accurate of all the 
participants in responding to the presence or absence of all statements (see Table 
6.6), and they gave more “yes” responses to all statements than any other script 
(15.38 “yes” responses, see Table 6.16). These results clearly demonstrated their 
uncertainty about which statements were presented to them. The most likely 
explanation is that the mixed scripts did not have a clear polarity that could assist 
recognition of the statements. 
7.5.2 Past findings on scripts and applicability 
Fehr et al. (1999) explored typical interpersonal scripts dealing with anger in close 
relationships. Baum and Andersen (1999) found that role relationships could be 
stored in memory as part of significant other representations. Positive affect is 
experienced when other people behave according to the representation consistent 
role relations. The present study extended the earlier research by empirically 
demonstrating a link between attachment style and congruent interpersonal scripts. 
Knowledge activation does not depend only on the accessibility of stored knowledge, 
but also on the applicability between the stored knowledge and the presented 
stimulus. The greater the overlap between features of the stored knowledge and the 
attended features of the stimulus, the greater is the likelihood that the knowledge will 
be used in the processing of the stimulus (Higgins, 1989). Andersen et al. (1995) 
demonstrated that applicability of the target stimulus to the significant other 
representation lead to greater representation consistent memory effects, but the 
study by Chen et al. (1999) could not show increasing memory effects with 
increasing levels of applicability. Smith and Branscombe (1987) demonstrated that 
priming effects could also be a function of the prime-stimulus similarity. In the present 
study, there were no similarities in the observable features of the stimuli, but a 
definite relationship proposed on theoretical grounds between the primes (names of 
significant others), the stimuli (interpersonal scripts) and the available memory 
structures (attachment working models). 
It was possible that the content of the target scripts presented to the participants 
activated the available scripts in memory (working models of the attachment style), 
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which facilitated the processing of the scripted information. It can explain the effect of 
the polarity of the presented scripts on their processing, but still does not explain the 
priming effects that were found. The present study is a demonstration of the pre-
activation of cognitive structures. The discussion will now focus on the interaction 
between chronic and temporary accessibility. 
7.6 Chronic and temporary accessibility 
The main hypothesis of the present study stated that chronic positive participants 
would process scripted positive interpersonal information more efficiently when 
primed with the name of a positive significant other, with the equivalent hypothesis 
that chronic negative participants would process scripted negative interpersonal 
information more efficiently when primed with the name of a negative significant other 
(see section 4.4). The combining effect of chronic and temporary accessibility was 
also investigated. 
7.6.1 Past findings on chronic and temporary accessibility 
There are not many studies available in the field of interpersonal relationships that 
combine chronic and temporary activation. Bargh et al. (1986) selected participants, 
chronic or non-chronic for a particular construct, and subliminally primed them or not 
in a seemingly unrelated experiment. Chronic accessibility had a reliable effect, but 
did not interact with the priming. In a study by Higgins and Brendl (1995) the effect of 
chronicity was non-significantly stronger within the priming condition. In the study by 
Andersen et al. (1995) participants learned about the features of a significant other 
and the researchers compared the results of immediate measurement (temporary 
activation or priming condition) and delayed measurement (chronic accessibility 
condition). The temporary activation and chronic accessibility contributed in additive 
manner to activation. 
7.6.2 Conjunctive model 
The results of the present study supported a conjunctive model of script and chronic 
accessibility on priming. In the chronic negative group, congruent priming only 
appeared when the prime and the script were negative. The response times were 
faster than those of the control condition. Likewise, in the chronic positive group, 
congruent priming only appeared when the prime and the script were positive. The 
target script and the chronic group had to be congruent for the prime of the same 
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polarity to have an effect. In a conjunctive model all the dimensions should be above 
a particular minimum to have effect and the different dimensions cannot compensate 
for each other. Therefore, in the present study a more complex relationship between 
temporary activation and chronic accessibility is proposed, than merely an additive 
relationship. 
The question by Carlston (1991), whether temporary and chronic sources of 
construct activation are equivalent or not, cannot be answered by the results of the 
present study. It can be stated that the results of the present study indicate a 
conjunctive model, where both elements are indeed necessary. The availability of 
information is a necessary condition for chronic accessibility, and temporary 
activation is dependant on the applicability of the information. Information-processing 
is indeed a product of the individual and the situation. 
7.7 Unconscious processing 
The results of the present study demonstrated that significant other representations 
could be activated outside of awareness to facilitate the subsequent conscious 
processing of interpersonal information. The results supported Glassman and 
Andersen (1999a) in their demonstration of the unconscious activation of significant 
other representations. It also complemented the findings of Higgins et al. (1982), 
showing that people can interpret the behaviour of others at an automatic level, as 
well as the results by Smith and Lerner (1986), demonstrating that social judgements 
can be considered as procedural learning. 
Social cognition in real life situations often involves various higher mental processes. 
Bargh (1996) mentioned for example that stereotyping involves stereotype activation 
(which is a relatively uncontrollable cognitive process) and stereotype use (which is a 
relatively controllable cognitive process). The cognitive processing of relationship 
information involves declarative and procedural knowledge. The conscious and non-
conscious processes may at times influence each other, but at other times operate 
according to different rules.  
7.8 Findings concerning significant others 
The present study also explored the significant others that were identified by the 
participants. According to attachment theory, it was expected that the majority of 
participants in the present study would nominate a parent or close family member as 
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the primary positive significant other. When Andersen et al. (1995) asked a group of 
47 undergraduate students to consider the significant other people in their lives, they 
listed family members (44%) of whom 22% were mothers and 9% fathers, close 
friends (48%) and romantic partners (8%). In the present study 65% of the students 
nominated a family member as the primary positive significant other. Thirty-four 
percent nominated their mothers and 20% nominated their fathers. Twenty-one 
percent of the students nominated friends and 11% listed romantic friends. Family 
members and parents in particular are important significant others for university 
students. The results of the present study supported the prediction based on 
attachment theory, as well as earlier findings about the identification of positive 
significant others. The present study also asked participants to list negative 
significant others. Fifty-four percent nominated friends, demonstrating the importance 
of peer relationships. A further 22% of the male and 21% of the female participants 
listed their fathers as the primary negative significant other. This is in agreement with 
results by Fox et al. (1991) who concluded, after a meta-analysis of attachments to 
mother and father, that 31% of the people reported a secure attachment to one 
parent and an insecure attachment to the other. This supports the view that people 
can have multiple attachments in a complex network of attachment relations. 
Although certain working models or relational schemas will be more accessible than 
others, different models or schemas can be activated towards different people. 
According to attachment theory it was also expected that securely attached 
participants would be more likely to nominate a parent as primary positive significant 
other, than the insecurely attached participants.  
Sixty percent of the securely attached participants in the present study nominated a 
parent as primary positive significant other (40% mother and 19 % father). In 
comparison 36% of the insecurely attached participants nominated a friend as 
primary positive significant other and only 30% nominated a parent (20% mother and 
10% father). There was no difference in their proportional nomination of negative 
significant others. This finding supports the importance of secure primary relations in 
the development of social confidence as proposed by attachment theory. In the 
results of the present study there were also a number of unexpected findings that is 
more difficult to explain, which will now be mentioned. 
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7.9 Unexpected findings 
7.9.1 Chronic group and accuracy 
In general the chronic negative group, the more insecure participants, were more 
accurate than the chronic positive group in determining the presence or absence of 
scripted statements in the memory test, with an average of 27.55 compared to 25.61 
correct responses (Table 6.6). The chronic negative group were significantly more 
accurate in determining the presence or absence of scripted statements when they 
received a positive script than when they received a negative script (p < .001, Table 
6.8). The chronic positive group was more accurate when they received a negative 
script rather than a positive script (p < .001, Table 6.8). This result might be in 
support of the suggestion by Bargh and Thein (1987) and Fiske and Taylor (1991) 
that at the expert level of schema development, people will favour schema 
inconsistent material and remember it better than schema consistent material. In this 
particular case the expert schema could refer to the chronically available 
interpersonal script. In general the chronic positive participants remained more 
accurate (6.67) than chronic negative participants (6.63) in identifying positive 
statements (Table 6.6), and chronic negative participants remained more accurate 
(7.62) than chronic positive participants (6.75) in identifying negative statements 
(Table 6.6). 
7.9.2 Chronic group and assessment of scripts 
In the manipulation check the more securely attached participants reported that in 
general the scripts described more negative behaviour (51%) than positive behaviour 
(36%). The less securely attached participants reported that the scripts described 
more positive behaviour towards them (49%) than negative behaviour (39%). A 
similar explanation to section 7.9.1 is probably warranted. The behaviour that was 
contrary to their more accessible working models or relational schemas made a more 
lasting impression on the participants. 
7.10 Implications of the findings 
7.10.1 Implications for theory 
The results of the present study contribute to the theoretical understanding of the 
influence of past relationship history on the current processing of interpersonal 
information. Socialisation history or family background maintains certain constructs, 
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mental sets, relational schemas or working models at a state of high readiness 
through the frequent activation of those constructs. Through priming by an internal or 
external event certain of these constructs, schemas or models can be pre-activated. 
The incoming information (target or stimulus statements) will be processed in terms 
of the relevant activated schemas or models, which in turn will influence the 
organisation and retention of that material. The present study proposes a conjunctive 
model stating that chronic accessibility, target applicability and temporary activation 
should be present, congruent and above a particular minimum to have an effect on 
the processing of information. The relationship between the chronic accessibility and 
temporary activation of social constructs is seemingly more complex than merely an 
additive one. 
In agreement with Smith and Zárate (1992) and Andersen et al. (1995) the present 
study provided evidence that a proper name can also operate as a social construct 
and be activated to facilitate the processing of interpersonal information. This 
activation can take place with a minimal prime and outside conscious awareness. 
The results also provided empirical evidence for the relational schema notion of 
Baldwin (1992) by empirically demonstrating with response time effects in a priming 
paradigm that a person-schema (in this case a significant other representation) and 
an interpersonal script are connected. The results contribute to the understanding of 
the nature of chronically accessible relational schemas and working models of people 
with secure and insecure attachment styles, by demonstrating a link between 
attachment style and the processing of congruent interpersonal scripts. 
7.10.2 Implications for methodology 
The present study combined the research paradigms of two prominent researchers in 
the field of relationship representations (Baldwin, 1992) and significant other 
representations (Andersen, et al. 1997). The standard research paradigm of Baldwin 
and co-workers involved the following steps in a single session: (a) measurement of 
chronic accessibility (e.g. attachment style); (b) subliminal presentation of 
experimenter generated stimulus; (c) presentation of a task in an interpersonal 
domain consistent to chronic accessibility or priming stimulus, and (d) measurement 
of task performance. The standard research paradigm of Andersen and co-workers 
(as detailed in section 3.3.2.2) involved the following step in sessions one: (a) 
learning about the features of significant others (e.g. features ABCDEF); and the 
 131
following steps in session two: (b) presentation of features of an unknown target 
person (e.g. features ABCGHI); (c) presentation of a test of the features of the target 
person (e.g. features ABDEGH), and (d) measurement of the participant’s certainty of 
recall of features not actually presented (e.g. features DE). The present study was an 
integration of the two approaches and was conducted in the following way (see 
chapter 5 for details). Session one involved the following steps: (a) learning about the 
names of positive and negative significant others; and (b) measurement of chronic 
accessibility (attachment style). The following steps formed part of the second 
session: (c) subliminal presentation of the name of significant other; (d) presentation 
of the target interpersonal script; (e) presentation of a test with statements from 
different scripts; and (f) measurement of the accuracy and reaction time of 
responses. 
The integration of the two research paradigms advanced the available methodology 
in the following ways. (a) The use of the combination of ideographic and nomothetic 
techniques (from the Andersen-paradigm) ensured that personalised priming stimuli 
could be used. Personalised priming stimuli are not possible in the single session 
Baldwin-paradigm. (b) The study used the advanced measurement of chronic 
accessibility and the subliminal priming (from the Baldwin-paradigm) to ensure 
representation consistent priming and avoid the contrast effect to priming. (c) The 
study did not use the overlap of features in the learning and test phase, as was done 
by Andersen. In the Andersen-paradigm implicit learning, repetition priming or the 
associations between features cannot be ruled out as possible sources of 
transference effects. The present study used a theory-based approach (and not a 
feature based approach) in hypothesising associations between chronic cognitive 
structure, priming stimulus and target interpersonal script. (d) In the tradition of 
priming research (and most of the Baldwin studies), the present study also used 
response time measurements as a direct assessment of priming effects. (e) The 
integration of the two research paradigms made it possible to investigate the three 
independent variables chronic accessibility, temporary subliminal activation and 
valence of target script in one experimental design. 
7.10.2 Implications for application 
The conjunctive model of priming and the experimental design of the present study 
can be applied in social cognition research to investigate stereotypes for social 
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categories and prototypes for social situations. The priming paradigm can be used to 
assess people’s stereotypical expectations of scripted interpersonal behaviour of 
people in other social categories. 
Although the present research is not primarily a clinical study, the investigation of the 
mental representation of interpersonal behaviour is in a number of ways relevant to 
the clinical field. Many theories of emotional disorders refer to the interpersonal 
dimension. Dysfunctional interpersonal behaviour and relationships problems are one 
of the hallmarks of personality-disordered people. Exploring relationship expectations 
can also be of value for people with a history of conflictive or abuse relationships. 
Many therapists looking for the core cognitive construct in depression have begun to 
study interpersonal structures (e.g. Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Safran & Segal, 1990). 
Hooley and Teasdale (1989) found that the best predictor of relapse in unipolar 
depressive patients was how critical they think their significant others were. It is 
possible to investigate this hypothesis in a therapeutic context, by priming a patient 
with a certain significant other person and assessing the effect on the processing of 
interpersonal information (Baldwin, 1992). Priming and assessing performance in 
cognitive processing tasks can be of important diagnostic value in investigating 
interpersonal expectations. It can be an alternative to self-report or behaviour 
observation methods. 
After a review of the literature, Sperling and Lyons (1994) indicated that the modes of 
therapy that focus on correcting dysfunctional mental representations, appear to fall 
in the following categories: (a) therapies that provide alternative representations of 
interpersonal functioning through relational modelling within the therapist-patient 
relationship; (b) therapies with a more specific application of relational modelling or 
reparenting, through establishing a corrective emotional attachment with the parent 
or primary caretaker, that competes with the dysfunctional representations; (c) 
therapies that aim to cognitively and emotionally evaluate and change mental 
representations and the defences that maintain them; and (d) therapies that focus 
specifically on the reconstruction of representational narratives. Some of these 
therapies put more emphasis on the therapist-patient relationship, while others focus 
more explicitly on changing mental representations through interpersonal or cognitive 
techniques. 
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Bowlby (1988) has always been quite clear on the therapeutic implications of the 
attachment approach: 
A therapist applying attachment theory sees his role as being one of 
providing the conditions in which his patient can explore his 
representational models of himself and his attachment figures with a 
view to re-appraising and restructuring them in the light of the new 
understanding he acquires and the new experiences he has in the 
therapeutic relationship. (p. 138) 
The eventual therapeutic aim will be the modification of interpersonal 
representations, which will affect the experience and processing of current 
interpersonal behaviour, which then further modify these representations (Lopez, 
1995). 
7.11 Limitations of the present study 
In the present study it was decided to use a subliminal prime to avoid the contrast 
effects often reported when participants are aware of the primes and the aim of the 
experiment. The priming effect reported in the present study was relatively small 
compared to the effects of chronic accessibility and the target script. A larger priming 
effect could probably be achieved with a more significant prime, e.g. a visualisation 
prime, but that would risk the contrast effect. 
The chronic accessibility variable was limited to two attachment styles, based on the 
median split of the Confidence Scale of the ASQ, to avoid the controversy about the 
test-retest stability of the avoidant and anxious/ambivalent attachment styles. A 
possible solution could be to use the fourfold categorisation of Bartholomew and 
Horowitz (1991) and develop a different set of target scripts congruent to every 
category. This approach will also broaden the emphasis of the present study on the 
positive or negative scripts. 
The central component of the relational schema, namely the self-schema, was not 
directly assessed or included as a variable in the present study. The target person, 
with whom every person is most familiar, is the self. The cognitive representation of 
the self contains components or categories that have a significant influence on the 
person’s schemas of significant others and scripts of the interactions with those 
significant others. The chronic accessibility effects demonstrated in the present study 
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by participants with secure or insecure attachment styles, could be seen as an 
indirect indication towards the influence of self-schemas on the processing of 
interpersonal information. 
Although the underlying structures and processes in the activation of significant other 
representations of university students will not be different from the general 
population, the contents of their relational schemas is expected to be quite different 
from pre-adolescent children, as well as from adults in longer term relationships or in 
parent roles themselves. 
7.12 Recommendations for future directions 
It is important to replicate the present study to confirm the results that were obtained. 
The conjunctive model of priming can be applied to explore other elements of 
relational schemas or working models as well. 
The present study investigated chronic accessibility, temporary activation and script 
applicability in a between subject design. The same variables can be investigated in 
a within subject design where the same participant receive different primes and 
different target scripts. The representations of positive and negative significant others 
can be activated within the same person. The co-existence of seemingly 
incompatible models e.g. “good parent” and “bad parent” can be investigated in 
persons with different attachment styles. 
Baldwin et al. (1993) investigated different attachment styles with lexical decision 
task methods and target words representing outcomes in specific interpersonal 
contexts. From the perspective of the conjunctive model of priming, the study can be 
adjusted slightly. Participants can be primed with a significant other, a particular 
interpersonal script can be the context and the target word can remain the outcome. 
In this manner, the conjunctive model of priming can be tested in a different 
experimental design. 
It has been mentioned (see section 7.11) that the experimental design used in the 
present study can be applied to the fourfold categorisation attachment styles 
proposed by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991). Participants can be assigned to one 
of four chronic accessibility groups, namely (a) secure and comfortable with intimacy 
and autonomy, (b) preoccupied with relationships, (c) dismissing of intimacy, and (d) 
fearful of intimacy and their cognitive processing of different category congruent 
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target scripts can be investigated. The following category congruent scripts can serve 
as examples: scripts expressing trust or mistrust, acceptance or rejection, attraction 
or avoidance, dependence or independence. 
Another follow-up study would be to compare the effects of priming participants with 
the names of positive or negative valenced significant others that they have 
nominated, to priming them with generic names of significant others (e.g. “father” or 
“mother”) as was done by Shah (2003a). The work by Shah (2003a) demonstrated 
that priming participants with generic names of significant others (for example 
“father”) could demonstrate effects, but the effects increased with the degree to 
which participants reported themselves to be closer to the significant other. The 
results of the present study demonstrated that some participants regarded their 
fathers as positive significant others and other participants had the opposite view. 
The central importance of the self-schema (mentioned in section 7.11) has been 
mentioned. It is possible that prominent working models might involve a self-
component that operate as an overriding metacognitive strategy in categorising 
significant others and interpersonal scripts. This notion can be formulated in theory 
and empirically investigated. 
7.13 Final summary 
This study investigated the influence of past social experiences on the present 
processing of social information under controlled experimental conditions. The results 
demonstrated support for the primary hypothesis that people with a history of 
particular relationship experiences, will process congruent relationship information 
more efficiently when they are primed with information from a significant other with 
whom they share some of these relationship experiences. Participants with more 
secure attachment histories processed congruent interpersonal script more efficiently 
when they were subliminally exposed to the name of a significant other with whom 
they share positive experiences. The equivalent result was achieved for participants 
with more insecure attachment histories. Apart form demonstrating the implicit effects 
of significant others on social interaction, this result also provided evidence through 
cognitive processing effects in a priming paradigm that the person-schema and 
interpersonal script are connected in a relational schema as proposed by Baldwin 
(1992). The results of the present study also demonstrated a highly significant 
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interaction effect between category of attachment style and interpersonal script in the 
processing of interpersonal information. A conjunctive model of priming was 
proposed to describe a more complex relationship between chronic activation and 
temporary activation. 
The present study employed fairly simple priming and target stimuli, because the 
more varied the stimulus information, the more numerous will be the schematic 
categories activated and the more complex the cognitive representation of the 
information. Carlston (1994) provided an associated systems model to further our 
understanding of the complex interrelationships among different forms of construct 
representation. Carlson and Smith (1996) stated that: “Memory by its very nature is 
reconstructive, and retrieval efforts generally obtain a ‘mush’ that can be taken apart 
into components only with great difficulty and uncertainty” (p. 203). They concluded 
that the memories we experience as retrievals from our past, the perceptual world we 
consciously experience, and the judgments we make about persons are all 
constructed from information drawn from many sources and from many mental 
representations. The objective of the present study was to broaden our 
understanding of certain components of this “mush” in the social memory of people! 
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Appendix A Items of Confidence Scale (ASQ) 
 
Items of the Confidence Scale of the Attachment Style Questionnaire 
 
Item 1: 
Overall, I am a worthwhile person 
Item 2: 
I am easier to get to know than most people 
Item 3: 
I feel confident that other people will be there for me when I need them 
Item 19: 
I find it relatively easy to get close to other people 
Item 31: 
I feel confident about relating to others 
Item 33: 
I often worry that I do not really fit in with other people (reverse score) 
Item 37: 
If something is bothering me, others are generally aware and concerned 
Item 38: 
I am confident that other people will like and respect me 
 
Scale: 
1 = totally disagree 
2 = strongly disagree 
3 = slightly disagree 
4 = slightly agree 
5 = strongly agree 
6 = totally agree 
 
Range of scores:  maximum = 48 
minimum = 8 
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Appendix B Instructions and Worksheet Session One 
 
PROCESSING OF RELATIONSHIP INFORMATION 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in our project on the processing of 
information about relationships. The first session will ask some questions about the 
significant people in your life and your relationship with them. This will take about 20 
to 30 minutes. In the second session we will utilize a computer task to investigate 
how you process information about possible interactions with other people. It will take 
less than 10 minutes of your time. We hope that it will be enjoyable to participate. 
You will help us to gather valuable data. 
 
All information will be dealt with confidentially and the information of individual 
participants will never be made known to anybody. Do ask us if you have any 
questions or uncertainty about this matter. 
 
In the space provided, indicate whether you are male or female, your age and 
whether you would like to complete the project in English or Afrikaans.  
 
BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS 
 
 
MALE 
 
 
 
 
FEMALE 
 
 
 
 
 
AGE 
 
 
 
 
 
AFRIKAANS 
 
 
 
 
ENGLISH 
 
 
 
 
The project consists of two investigations and we would like to ensure that the same 
people take part in sessions one and two. In the space provided write down your 
student number, or if you do not want to do that, any eight number code that you will 
have to remember until the second session. 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CODE 
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INTRODUCTION TO SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 
 
Significant others are the people in our lives that have an important influence on us. 
We have to deal with them quite often or had to deal with them regularly at some 
time in our past. We mostly cannot ignore their opinions, although we do not 
necessary agree with them. Mostly it is people that we presently know quite well or 
knew quite well in the past. In other words, people that have an important influence in 
our lives either presently or in the past. They are mostly family and friends, but can 
also be other people.  
 
Significant others can broadly be divided into two groups of people. We experience 
some significant others as very supporting of us, and they make us feel good about 
ourselves. We can describe them as positive significant others in our lives. The 
actions and opinions of other important people in our lives do influence us as well, 
but they are often negative and critical towards us. Then they make us feel bad about 
ourselves and give rise to negative feelings towards them.  
 
In the space provided, compile a short list with the first names of the most important 
significant other people in your life. Write down the actual name of the most important 
positive significant other at P and the actual name of the most important negative 
significant other at N. Also indicate his/her role in your life, e.g. Mother, friend, 
partner. 
 
 
POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT OTHER PERSONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOSTLY POSITIVE 
 
 
NEGATIVE AT TIMES 
 
P 
 
 
N 
 
ROLE IN YOUR LIFE 
 
 
ROLE IN YOUR LIFE 
 
P 
 
 
N 
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Please complete the following questionnaire and write your responses on the answer 
sheet. 
 
ATTACHMENT STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Show how much you agree with each of the following items by rating them on 
this scale: 
 
1 = totally disagree   2 = strongly disagree 
 
3 = slightly disagree   4 = slightly agree 
 
5 = strongly agree    6 = strongly agree 
 
1. Overall, I am a worthwhile person.  
2. I am easier to get to know than most people.  
3. I feel confident that other people will be there for me when I need them.  
4. I prefer to depend on myself rather than other people.  
5. I prefer to keep to myself.  
6. To ask for help is to admit that you’re a failure.  
7. People’s worth should be judged by what they achieve.  
8. Achieving things is more important than building relationships.  
9. Doing your best is more important than getting on with others.  
10.   If you’ve got a job to do, you should do it no matter who gets hurt.  
11.   It’s important to me that others like me.  
12.   It’s important to me to avoid doing things that others won’t like.  
13.   I find it hard to make a decision unless I know what other people think.  
14.   My relationships with others are generally superficial.  
15.   Sometimes I think I am no good at all.  
16.   I find it hard to trust other people.  
17.   I find it difficult to depend on others.  
18.   I find that others are reluctant to get as close as I would like.  
19.   I find it relatively easy to get close to other people.  
20.   I find it easy to trust others.  
21.   I feel comfortable depending on other people.  
22.   I worry that others won’t care about me as much as I care about them.  
23.   I worry about people getting too close.  
24.   I worry that I won’t measure up to other people.  
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Show how much you agree with each of the following items by rating them on 
this scale: 
 
1 = totally disagree   2 = strongly disagree 
 
3 = slightly disagree   4 = slightly agree 
 
5 = strongly agree    6 = strongly agree 
 
25.   I have mixed feelings about being close to others.  
26.   While I want to get close to others, I feel uneasy about it.  
27.   I wonder why people would want to be involved with me.  
28.   It’s very important to me to have a close relationship.  
29.   I worry a lot about my relationships.  
30.   I wonder how I would cope without someone to love me.  
31.   I feel confident about relating to others.  
32.   I often feel left out or alone.  
33.   I often worry that I do not really fit in with other people.  
34.   Other people have their own problems, so I don’t bother them with mine.  
35.   When I talk over my problems with others, I generally feel ashamed or 
foolish.  
36.   I am too busy with other activities to put much time into relationships.  
37.   If something is bothering me, others are generally aware and concerned.  
38.   I am confident that other people will like and respect me.  
39.   I get frustrated when others are not available when I need them.  
40.   Other people often disappoint me.  
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ANSWER SHEET 
 
 
ITEM 1 
 
  
ITEM 15 
 
  
ITEM 29 
 
 
 
ITEM 2 
 
  
ITEM 16 
 
  
ITEM 30 
 
 
 
ITEM 3 
 
  
ITEM 17 
 
  
ITEM 31 
 
 
 
ITEM 4 
 
  
ITEM 18 
  
ITEM 32 
 
 
ITEM 5 
 
  
ITEM 19 
  
ITEM 33 
 
 
ITEM 6 
 
  
ITEM 20 
  
ITEM 34 
 
 
ITEM 7 
 
  
ITEM 21 
 
  
ITEM 35 
 
 
 
ITEM 8 
 
  
ITEM 22 
 
  
ITEM 36 
 
 
 
ITEM 9 
 
  
ITEM 23 
 
  
ITEM 37 
 
 
 
ITEM 10 
 
  
ITEM 24 
  
ITEM 38 
 
 
 
ITEM 11 
 
  
ITEM 25 
  
ITEM 39 
 
 
 
ITEM 12 
 
  
ITEM 26 
 
  
ITEM 40 
 
 
 
ITEM 13 
 
  
ITEM 27 
   
 
ITEM 14 
 
  
ITEM 28 
   
 
CLOSING 
 
Thank you for taking part in session one. Please put the worksheet and questionnaire 
in the envelope provided. Have you written down your participant code where you 
can remember it? The computer task will take place on (. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . ) at (. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .). It will take less than 10 minutes of your 
time. 
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Appendix C Instructions of Computer Task Session Two 
 
Introduction 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in our second investigation. Can you 
remember your participant code from the first session? Trace your participant code 
on the list provided and identify the corresponding computer number. You will have to 
type this number into the computer. 
 
[Provide list with participant codes and computer numbers]. 
 
When the program ask your computer number, type the three numbers and one letter 
that you have received. Then press ENTER. 
 
Type your computer number. 
 
Well done. 
 
When you need to answer yes or no during the exercise, type 1 (for yes) or 2 (for no) 
on the numeric keyboard on the right of the keyboard in front of you. Do you notice 
the numbers (1) and (2)? Answer the question that will follow by answering yes (1) or 
no (2). 
 
Are you male? (Are you female?) 
 
Well done. 
 
This exercise will investigate how you process information about possible behaviour 
of other people towards you.  
 
It is very important that you clear your mind of all the events that is currently 
happening in your life and try to focus for the following few minutes on the tasks that 
will be presented to you.  
 
Researchers have recommended that flashing stimuli can be used to facilitate 
attention and concentration. This will also be done in this experiment. All you have to 
do is to focus on the figures in the middle of the screen. The word READY will be 
presented first, followed by the concentration exercise. 
 
After the concentration exercise, you will be required to read a paragraph very 
carefully. The paragraph will describe the behaviour of a person in a particular 
situation towards you. Read the paragraph with attention, because you will have to 
answer some questions about it. You will receive only a limited period of time to read 
the paragraph. 
 
Are you ready to proceed with the concentration exercise and the paragraph? Type 
(1) for yes or (2) for no.  
 
[Presentation of subliminal prime]. 
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Read the paragraph carefully. 
 
[Presentation of interpersonal script]. 
 
Now you have to indicate whether the following statements were present in the 
paragraph or not.  Indicate your answer by typing (1) for yes or (2) for no.  Read 
every statement carefully and decide whether it was part of the paragraph presented 
to you. 
 
You will have only have a limited number of seconds before the next question will 
appear.  Answer as quickly as you can.  Answer by typing (1) if the statement was 
part of the paragraph or (2) if it was not.  Before you answer the statements, we will 
repeat the concentration-exercise.  Focus your attention on the figures in the middle 
of the screen.  Are you ready to proceed? 
 
[Presentation of subliminal prime]. 
 
[Presentation of 36 statements in random order]. 
 
Thank you for your help until now.  Please answer the following questions on your 
experience of taking part in this experiment. 
 
Answer the following question by typing the keys (1) for yes or (2) for no. 
 
[Presentation of checks on the manipulation]. (See Appendix F). 
 
Thank you for your valuable contribution and good luck with your studies. 
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Appendix D Scripts Presented 
 
POSITIVE SCRIPT 
 
I already know you for quite some time. (F1) I hear you have thought about an 
excellent idea again. (P1) I will enjoy listening to what you plan to do. (P3) I will help 
you with pleasure if you need it. (P4) You can decide whether to take my advice or 
not. (F4) You always listen very carefully to what I tell you. (P6) I am certain you will 
take the best decision again. (P7) I am proud of the way you have dealt with this 
matter. (P9) I will keep in touch with you about this matter. (F6) 
 
NEGATIVE SCRIPT 
 
I already know you for quite some time. (F1) I hear you have thought about an 
absurd idea again. (N1) I do not even want to listen to what you intend to do. (N3) I 
am tired of having to rescue your mistakes. (N4) You can decide whether to take my 
advice or not. (F4) You never even listen to what I have to tell you. (N6) I am certain 
that you will take the wrong decision again. (N7) I am disappointed about the way 
you dealt with this matter. (N9) I will keep in touch with you about this matter. (F6) 
 
AMBIGUOUS SCRIPT 
 
I have to deal with you quite often. (F2) I hear that you have thought about a different 
idea. (A1) I will have to talk straight about what you plan to do. (A3) There are a 
number of ways you could deal with this matter. (A4) I know you have your own 
opinion about this matter. (F5) You do not always listen equally well to what I say to 
you. (A6) I think you have to consider very well before you take a decision. (A7) I do 
have mixed feelings about the way you dealt with this matter. (A9) I will remember 
how you dealt with this matter. (F9) 
 
MIXED SCRIPT (1) 
 
I have to deal with you quite often. (F2) I hear you have thought about an excellent 
idea again. (P1) I do not even want to listen to what you intend to do. (N3) I will help 
you with pleasure if you need it. (P4) I know you have your own opinion about this 
matter. (F5) You never even listen to what I have to tell you. (N6) I am certain you will 
take the best decision again. (P7) I am disappointed about the way you dealt with this 
matter. (N9) I will remember how you dealt with this matter. (F9) 
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MIXED SCRIPT (2) 
 
I have to deal with you quite often. (F2) I hear you have thought about an absurd idea 
again. (N1) I will enjoy listening to what you plan to do. (P3) I am tired of having to 
rescue your mistakes. (N4) I know you have your own opinion about this matter. (F5) 
You always listen very carefully to what I tell you. (P6) I am certain that you will take 
the wrong decision again. (N7) I am proud of the way you have dealt with this matter. 
(P9) I will remember how you dealt with this matter. (F9) 
 
The statement numbers in brackets refer to the numbers in Appendix E and were not 
presented to the participants, but are included here for identification of the 
statements. Mixed script (1) and mixed script (2) are equivalent versions. 
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Appendix E 36 Statements in Memory Test 
 
STATEMENTS 
Positive Negative Ambiguous Filler 
P1 N1 A1 F1 
I hear you have 
thought about an 
excellent idea 
again 
I hear you have 
thought about an 
absurd idea again 
I hear that you 
have thought 
about a different 
idea 
I already know 
you for quite 
some time 
P2 N2 A2 F2 
I really would like 
to discuss this 
idea with you 
I do not want to 
discuss this idea 
with you 
I am available to 
discuss this 
matter with you 
I have to deal with 
you quite often 
P3 N3 A3 F3 
I will enjoy 
listening to what 
you plan to do 
I do not even 
want to listen to 
what you intend 
to do 
I will have to talk 
straight about 
what you plan to 
do 
I obviously have 
my own opinion 
on this matter  
P4 N4 A4 F4 
I will help you with 
pleasure if you 
need it 
I am tired of 
having to rescue 
your mistakes 
There are a 
number of ways 
you could deal 
with this matter  
You can decide 
whether to take 
my advice or not 
P5 N5 A5 F5 
I will gladly 
support this plan 
I can not support 
this endeavour at 
all 
I first have to 
consider carefully 
what you plan to 
do 
I know you have 
your own opinion 
about this matter 
P6 N6 A6 F6 
You always listen 
very carefully to 
what I tell you 
You never even 
listen to what I 
have to tell you 
You do not 
always listen 
equally well to 
what I say to you 
I will keep in 
touch with you 
about this matter 
P7 N7 A7 F7 
I am certain you 
will take the best 
decision again 
I am certain that 
you will take the 
wrong decision 
again 
I think you have 
to consider very 
well before you 
take a decision  
I wonder what 
your decision will 
be 
P8 N8 A8 F8 
I am certain that 
you will make a 
success of this 
matter as well 
I am certain that 
you will fail in this 
matter as well 
I am very certain 
that you will have 
to work very hard 
on this  
I do have an 
influence on the 
decisions that you 
make 
P9 N9 A9 F9 
I am proud of the 
way you have 
dealt with this 
matter 
I am disappointed 
about the way 
you dealt with this 
matter 
I do have mixed 
feelings about the 
way you dealt 
with this matter 
I will remember 
how you dealt 
with this matter 
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Appendix F  Checks of the Manipulation 
 
a) In the paragraph that you have read, was the behaviour of the person positive 
towards you? (YES or NO) 
b) Was the person behaving negatively towards you? (YES or NO) 
c) Was the person behaving both positively and negatively towards you? (YES or 
NO) 
d) Was the person behaving in a neutral way towards you? (YES or NO) 
e) Did the concentration exercises help you to focus your attention on the task 
that you had to do? (YES or NO) 
f) Were you suspicious about the nature of the flashing symbols? (YES or NO) 
g) Do you think any information was presented to you during the flashing 
symbols? (YES or NO) 
h) What information do you think was presented to you during the flashing 
symbols? (Type the information and end by typing ENTER twice.) 
i) Do you think there was any relation between Session 1 (the questionnaires 
about significant other) and Session 2 (the paragraph about the behaviour of 
another person that you had to read and remember)? (YES or NO) 
j) Do you want to receive a full debriefing of the experiment and the results? 
(YES or NO) (Type your name and address here. End by typing ENTER twice) 
 
